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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and scope 
This dissertation deals with the role and importance of corporate governance and risk man-
agement from an empirical corporate finance perspective. Corporate finance and corporate 
governance literature are usually based on the assumption that ownership and control of a 
firm are separated (Shleifer/Vishny 1997).
1
 The owners of a firm delegate control to the 
management. Due to asymmetrically distributed information and incomplete contracts, 
agency problems arise which can hamper the owners’ objective of shareholder value max-
imization (Jensen/Meckling 1976). In this setup, the term corporate governance refers to 
the set of internal and external mechanisms and provisions that aim at safeguarding the 
interests of the firm’s suppliers of finance (Shleifer/Vishny 1997). In this sense, corporate 
governance comprises prerequisites that debt and equity holders demand before entrusting 
their money to a firm and its managers. In contrast, risk management denotes managers’ 
efforts to limit their firm’s exposure to certain risks, e.g. interest rate risk, exchange rate 
risk, commodity price risk, in order to reduce variability of the firm’s cash flows (Froot et 
al. 1993). This enhances firm value if reduced variability enables the firm to take ad-
vantage of valuable investment opportunities. This typically holds due to the fact that in-
ternally available funds for investments vary and external financing is costly (Froot et al. 
1993). By reducing downside potential, risk management also helps managers meeting 
(corporate) governance-related requirements. Thus, corporate risk management and corpo-
rate governance are both tools that aim at controlling risks and the associated threat of de-
creasing returns on investment from the perspective of the firm’s management and the 
firm’s suppliers of finance, respectively. 
As the field of corporate governance and risk management comprises a wide range of top-
ics, I want to stress three specific aspects that will be addressed in the main chapters of this 
dissertation: 
1. The contribution of capital structure and ownership structure to corporate govern-
ance 
                                                 
1
 Although one can legally distinguish between firm, company, and corporation, the terms are used inter-
changeably as synonyms throughout this dissertation. 
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2. The role of corporate governance in external financing: The case of seasoned equi-
ty offerings (SEOs) 
3. Interest rate risk management: Anticipating central banks’ target rate setting 
These three governance and risk-related issues were chosen due to their vital role in the 
recent financial crisis. Following the recovery after the burst of the internet bubble in the 
early 2000s, the United States and Europe enjoyed economic upswing and prosperity. In 
2006 and 2007, however, enormous risks in the US housing and subprime mortgage mar-
ket materialized and gradually became noticeable as borrowers defaulted (Demyanyk/Van 
Hemert 2011). Due to the global interconnectedness of financial institutions and markets as 
well as the popular securitization of mortgage loans, the US subprime mortgage crisis 
caused severe financial turmoil that ultimately led to a global financial and economic crisis 
(Keys et al. 2010). The economy has recovered since then. However, the crisis’ repercus-
sions, such as the near-bankruptcy of Greece and central banks’ target rates near zero per-
cent, are still tangible. Although the main objective of this dissertation is not an in-depth 
analysis of the financial crisis, the investigated topics have certainly been affected by the 
crisis and the obtained results reflect the effects on corporations and the economy. Thus, 
this dissertation contributes to the academic literature by offering new insights as to how 
the crisis has shaped the prerequisites and requirements for risk management and corporate 
governance. Moreover, the financial crisis revealed which kinds of risk are particularly 
important for global and interconnected financial markets. In this respect, my dissertation 
also has implications for regulators concerning the prevention of future financial crises. 
The three selected topics constitute some of the most important risks corporations have to 
cope with. First, the initial two topics deal with the type and availability of financing which 
is a matter of survival for corporations. Especially during times of financial turmoil, a lack 
of internally available funds forces firms to forgo valuable investment opportunities, which 
decreases firm value (Campello et al. 2010; Duchin et al. 2010). In order to avoid this, the 
question is addressed whether and how capital structure and ownership structure can con-
tribute to corporate governance and thereby to the success of a company.
2
 The first topic 
focuses on the status quo of capital and ownership structure and their respective value con-
tribution. The second subject subsequently sheds light on the relation of corporate govern-
                                                 
2
 Capital structure denotes the proportion of debt to equity a firm uses to finance its operations. Ownership 
structure designates the distribution of equity by investor type and concentration of shares. 
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ance and access to additional funds by issuing new shares. It is thus concerned with chang-
es in capital structure and possibly in ownership structure. 
Second, the risk of interest rate changes likewise represents a major challenge to corpora-
tions. Central bank actions are an important factor in this respect. Monetary policy makers 
intend to achieve price stability and sustainable economic growth usually by changing the 
(short-term) target interest rate. In this way, they attempt to affect the short end of the yield 
curve (Cook/Hahn 1989), which in turn can have an effect on longer-term interest rates 
(Kuttner 2001; Swanson/Williams 2014). Changes in medium- and long-term interest rates 
are of great importance since they affect firms’ funding and consequently their investment 
opportunities. Therefore, forecasting future monetary policy actions is beneficial to firms 
in order to develop future financing and investment strategies. During the course of the 
previous financial crisis, regulators tried to limit the negative effects by taking unprece-
dented steps in fiscal and monetary policy. At times in concerted actions, central banks 
decreased target rates in order to avoid a credit crunch, stimulate lending and thereby foster 
investment and consumption. Due to the severity of the crisis, target rates in Europe and in 
the US hit new historic lows in 2008 and 2009 and eventually reached the zero lower 
bound (ZLB).
3
 Until today short-term interest rates have not yet departed from the lower 
bound.
4
 Accordingly, expected target rate changes are asymmetrically distributed. Besides, 
there is evidence that monetary policy follows a different regime during financial crises 
than it does during normal times (Martin/Milas 2013). Hence, the adaption of monetary 
policy forecasting models is indispensable in order to form reasonable expectations of fu-
ture interest rates and debt financing opportunities. By applying appropriate models, firms 
are enabled to hedge interest rate risk and adjust their funding and investment strategy ac-
cordingly. This represents the final type of risk covered in this dissertation. 
To sum up, in the main part of my dissertation I will deal with the aforementioned govern-
ance and risk-related topics. Each of the main chapters of my dissertation is dedicated to 
one of the three aspects. The next section provides a brief outline of the dissertation and 
describes how the three main chapters are organized and related to each other. 
                                                 
3
 The Federal Reserve and the Bank of England (BoE) decided for their last rate cuts in late 2008 and early 
2009, respectively. This effectively constituted the ZLB with target rates between 0 and 0.25% in the US and 
0.5% in the UK. In contrast, the European Central Bank (ECB) retained its main refinancing rate at 1% at 
that time and gradually decreased its target rate to 0% from 2011 to 2016 (European Central Bank 2016). 
4
 While the Fed increased its target rate in December 2015 for the first time in nearly ten years, the ECB and 
the BoE have not yet opted for an increase in the target rate (as of April 2016). 
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1.2 Outline of the dissertation 
Figure 1.1 shows a graphical representation of the three main chapters of this dissertation. 
The fields on the left-hand side of Figure 1.1 represent the distinction between microeco-
nomic and macroeconomic risk that will be analyzed. The right-hand side adopts a corpo-
rate finance perspective and assigns the main chapters to debt and equity financing. 
Figure 1.1: Overview of the main chapters of the dissertation 
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Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to microeconomic risk and represent the corporate govern-
ance perspective of the dissertation. Broadly speaking, the corresponding chapters study 
effective management and governance of firms from a shareholder value perspective. The 
research question that the second chapter intends to answer is whether there is a systematic 
relationship between the financing structure of a firm, i.e. its capital structure and its own-
ership structure, and its value. Put differently, can managers increase firm performance and 
value by reasonably managing capital and ownership structure? Subsequently, chapter 3 
addresses the related question whether good corporate governance can facilitate additional 
equity financing. Rephrased, the question becomes: Is well-functioning corporate govern-
ance a credible signal that helps avoiding losses in shareholder value when firms issue new 
equity? 
Macroeconomic risk is addressed in chapter 4. The chapter is concerned with forecasting 
monetary policy actions. Instead of directly analyzing implications for shareholder value, 
this chapter develops a forecasting or warning tool which managers and regulators can use 
to protect shareholder value and react depending on economic development and market 
expectations, respectively. More specifically, chapter 4 deals with interest rate risk as im-
plied by expected target rate changes by the Federal Reserve (Fed). As explained above, 
the Fed’s monetary policy is intended to influence overall credit conditions through its 
impact on the term structure of interest rates. The research question addressed in this final 
chapter is how the announcement of macroeconomic indicators affects monetary policy 
expectations across different economic conditions. Taking into account the results of this 
investigation, managers can develop interest rate forecasting tools that incorporate the 
firm’s expectations of future economic development. Since the risk of changing interest 
rates affects all firms and investors in an economy, it is categorized as macroeconomic risk 
throughout this dissertation. In order to detect this risk early enough to prevent decreases in 
firm value, firms can put in place effective risk management tools. Chapter 4 provides an 
instrument for this purpose. By covering one of the major risk factors associated with debt 
financing, the chapter additionally completes the picture of chapters 2 and 3 that primarily 
deal with equity financing. 
Furthermore, the three selected topics of this dissertation can be classified alternatively. 
While chapters 2 and 4 highlight the relevance of governance and supervision in financial 
markets in general, chapter 3 is concerned with an additional aspect of major importance: 
the real estate sector. The crises in Europe and in the US were fostered or even caused by 
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housing market distortions. Risks associated with real estate valuation, the related lending 
standards, and securitization were identified as one of the major causes of the recent crisis 
(Duchin et al. 2010; Keys et al. 2010; Demyanyk/Van Hemert 2011; Dell’Ariccia et al. 
2012). Apart from the financial crisis, housing and real estate are of great importance for 
several reasons. First, housing constitutes a sizeable share of the total economy amounting 
to nearly 16% of the US gross domestic product (GDP) in the fourth quarter of 2015 (U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 2016).
5
 Therefore, it is an economically meaningful indus-
try. Second, research suggests that real estate is an important asset class that should be in-
cluded in efficient portfolios (e.g. Kallberg et al. 1996; Hudson-Wilson et al. 2003; 
Armonat/Pfnür 2004). Third, the value of firms’ real estate assets affects corporate invest-
ment through its eligibility to serve as collateral for debt financing (Chaney et al. 2012). 
Thus, real estate is also of great importance in the field of corporate finance. In order to 
account for its relevance, chapter 3 is devoted to real estate. By studying listed real estate 
companies, the chapter is located at the intersection of stock and real estate markets. 
In addition to investigating several distinct topics, this dissertation is characterized by a 
variety of different methodologies. Chapter 2 begins with a comprehensive survey of lit-
erature. Thus, results and conclusions are drawn from a meta-analysis. Chapters 3 and 4 
employ daily and intraday event study methodology in order to determine the impact of a 
specific sample of public announcements on capital markets. The event studies are subse-
quently followed by cross-sectional and panel regressions, respectively, which augment the 
investigation by identifying determinants of the documented announcement effects. De-
spite the methodologically different approaches, the commonality of all chapters is their 
reliance on capital market data.
6
 This is a powerful tool in financial research as data is 
widely available. 
Overall, governance and risk management seem to represent important corporate functions 
from the perspective of shareholders and other stakeholders. In the main part of this disser-
tation (chapters 2 to 4), I intend to provide supportive evidence for this by analyzing three 
specific subjects in detail. Finally, chapter 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
                                                 
5
 This comprises personal consumption expenditures on housing and utilities services (12.3%) as well as 
gross private domestic residential investments (3.5%). 
6
 Even chapter 2 indirectly relies on capital market data by reviewing mostly empirical finance literature. 
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2 The influence of ownership and capital structure on firm 
performance – A literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
The modern corporation is characterized by the separation of ownership and control. In 
their famous work, Berle and Means (1932) argue that dispersed ownership has a negative 
impact on firm performance because many small shareholders cannot effectively control 
the management. Managers pursue personal objectives which are, at times, detrimental to 
the shareholders’ goal of profit maximization. Consequently, a lack of control results in 
decreases in shareholder value. The emerging literature following Berle and Means de-
scribes the behavior of firms that are not (entirely) controlled by their owners and the con-
sequences of this behavior. The most popular article in this context is probably by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) who base their argumentation on agency problems between managers 
(the agents) and owners (the principals), i.e. managers follow their own interests rather 
than acting on behalf of the shareholders. In consequence, resources are not allocated effi-
ciently and firm value is destroyed. However, the separation of ownership and control is 
usually inevitable due to the separation of capital and entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs or 
managers possess expertise in their respective business area whereas financiers have the 
necessary funds available (Shleifer/Vishny 1997). Thus, the two parties agree on a contract 
exchanging capital for ownership rights, i.e. control and cash flow rights (Hart 2001). In 
case capital is supplied on the basis of a debt contract, there is initially no transfer of con-
trol rights. Only if the entrepreneur (borrower) violates certain contractual arrangements 
(covenants), the lender may get control rights (Shleifer/Vishny 1997). A financing contract 
thus enables entrepreneurs to found and run their business and financiers to participate in 
the success of the business since the contract grants them some of the firm’s cash flows. 
How safe is this guaranty? How can the financiers make sure that they get back their in-
vestment plus a return? The set of mechanisms to accomplish this is called corporate gov-
ernance (Shleifer/Vishny 1997). The part of corporate governance related to debt and equi-
ty financing is the topic of interest of the present chapter. 
The suppliers of finance want to assure that firm value is maximized which, in turn, max-
imizes their return. In order to achieve this, the managers who control the firm’s operations 
need to be incentivized. Particular importance is attached to managerial equity ownership 
The influence of ownership and capital structure on firm performance 
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since it aligns the incentives of managers with those of outside shareholders 
(Jensen/Meckling 1976). Moreover, the use of debt financing and thus the choice of an 
optimal capital structure play a major role. Debt puts pressure on managers to perform well 
as they face the legal obligation to make interest payments and repay the principle (Jensen 
1986). To safeguard their interests, debt holders monitor the management and use cove-
nants to prevent managerial pursuit of value-destroying objectives (Park 2000). Thus, 
through incentive alignment, monitoring, and control, the ownership structure and the capi-
tal structure of a firm represent an important piece of a firm’s corporate governance 
framework. This framework aims at ensuring that the value of the firm is maximized. It is 
this intersection of corporate governance and corporate finance that motivates the present 
literature review. Since Modigliani and Miller (1958), economists try to understand how 
firms’ financing decisions and structures influence performance and value. This chapter 
contributes to this research field by providing an overview of the scientific progress that 
has been made, both theoretically and empirically. 
Academics have struggled finding a universal theory on capital structure as well as owner-
ship structure that is able to reconcile the various empirical findings (see e.g. Harris/Raviv 
1991). Recently, there has been promising research with the most striking theoretical in-
sight being that there is in fact no cross-sectional relation between leverage, ownership 
structure, and firm performance (Coles et al. 2012). The main idea is that the financial pol-
icies within the firm are simultaneously optimized in order to maximize firm value. Thus, 
any cross-sectional differences between firms only reflect differences in the respective 
environment the firms operate in. Although the underlying idea is not new (see Demsetz 
1983; Demsetz/Lehn 1985), the structural model by Coles et al. (2012) may help to achieve 
a wider acceptance of this fact or, alternatively, incite other researchers even more to find 
counterevidence. 
In the preceding decades, a vast amount of literature on capital structure, ownership struc-
ture, and/or performance has emerged. However, notably fewer studies have explicitly 
dealt with this triangular relation and the inherent interdependence. In particular, it lacks an 
overview of all these studies and their results. I aim at filling this gap with this literature 
review. In order to limit the huge number of studies related to these topics, I focus on pa-
pers from The Journal of Finance (JF), the Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), and The 
Review of Financial Studies (RFS). In case of frequently cited studies, I also consider pa-
pers from other renowned finance journals such as the Journal of Financial and Quantita-
The influence of ownership and capital structure on firm performance 
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tive Analysis, the Journal of Banking and Finance, and the Journal of Corporate Finance. 
Furthermore, studies that solely examine specific countries and/or industries are disregard-
ed.
7
 
Several literature reviews are somehow related to the present one. Among the most promi-
nent are the capital structure surveys by Harris and Raviv (1991), Myers (2001), Parsons 
and Titman (2009), and Graham and Leary (2011). Other related surveys deal with corpo-
rate governance (Shleifer/Vishny 1997), the board of directors (Hermalin/Weisbach 2003), 
block holders (Holderness 2003), block holders and corporate governance (Edmans 2014), 
family firms (Gama/Galvao 2012), or the interaction of capital structure and strategy 
(Parsons/Titman 2011).
8
 To the best of my knowledge, there is only one literature review 
which explicitly considers the impact of ownership structure on firm performance as well 
as on capital structure. As a vast amount of relevant literature has emerged since this sur-
vey by Short (1994), an update is imperative. I contribute to the literature by structuring 
this research area, providing an overview of recent theoretical models and empirical find-
ings and comparing these to earlier studies. Thereby, I illustrate how the understanding of 
the relation between capital structure, ownership structure, and performance has changed 
over time. For this purpose, differences in research designs and methodologies are stressed. 
Finally, I highlight unsettled issues and offer opportunities for future research.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 recaps the fundamental theories of capital 
structure and ownership structure and illustrates the potential linkage to firm performance. 
Section 2.3 reviews studies that explicitly deal with the effect that the use of debt can have 
on firm performance. Section 2.4 investigates the influence of the allocation of the firm’s 
equity on performance. Section 2.5 explores the link between the two financial policies, i.e. 
capital and ownership structure. Section 2.6 focuses on endogeneity, its causes (2.6.1) and 
econometric remedies (2.6.2) and why it is highly relevant in the context of this literature 
review. In subsection 2.6.3, two models are briefly introduced that have gained considera-
ble attention. These papers account for potential simultaneity of the firm’s financial poli-
cies and thereby fundamentally question some of the earlier documented relations present-
ed in sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5. Finally, section 2.7 points out unresolved questions and 
issues in the literature before section 2.8 concludes. 
                                                 
7
 The only notable exception is subsection 2.2.2 where some country-specific studies on ownership structure 
are discussed. I deem this justifiable since the ownership types that dominate in different countries vary sig-
nificantly. 
8
 See also Hart (2001) for a survey on financial contracting. 
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2.2 The basics of capital structure and ownership structure 
This section addresses the fundamental theories and topics in capital structure as well as 
ownership structure research. It is intended to serve as a basis for sections 2.3 and 2.4 that 
deal with the performance link of those two financial policies in detail. 
2.2.1 Capital structure 
A review of capital structure literature always needs to start with the seminal paper by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) (henceforth MM). According to their theory, assuming per-
fect and frictionless capital markets, capital structure does not matter because investors 
could undo any capital structure change on their own account whenever arbitrage opportu-
nities emerge. Whether or not a firm is highly indebted does neither influence the value of 
the firm nor its cost of capital. Although this seems to be at odds with real world at first 
glance, the major contribution of their paper was the derivation of the conditions under 
which capital structure does not matter.
9
 Subsequently, other theories of capital structure 
have emerged that gradually relax some of the MM assumptions and demonstrate how a 
firm’s leverage ratio can matter. 
First, the (static) tradeoff theory introduces (discriminating) taxes and costs of financial 
distress that did not exist in the frictionless MM world. However, their value implications 
can be substantial when leverage varies (e.g. Scott 1976). Since interest payments are tax 
deductible, firm value increases when firms lever up. On the other hand, the probability of 
bankruptcy increases substantially at high debt levels. This raises the costs of financial 
distress and therefore reduces firm value. Thus, firm value is maximized when the margin-
al value of tax shields of further increasing leverage is exactly offset by the enhanced costs 
of financial distress (Myers 2001).
10
  
Accordingly, the functional form of firm value is an inverted U-shape of the firm’s lever-
age ratio.
11
 
                                                 
9
 For a discussion of the real world “contradictions” to MM propositions, especially dividends, bankruptcy, 
and taxes, see Miller (1988). For an amendment of their model to allow for taxes and further discussion, see 
also Modigliani and Miller (1963); Miller (1977). 
10
 See e.g. Kim (1978) and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) for models of optimal capital structure including 
taxes. For theoretical models deriving a positive relation between leverage and probability of bankruptcy see 
e.g. Ross (1977) and Harris and Raviv (1990). Empirical evidence is provided e.g. by Marsh (1982), and 
Titman and Wessels (1988). 
11
 Some models also include agency costs and benefits in the tradeoff of an optimal capital structure. 
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Second, the pecking order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) assumes 
information asymmetries between the firm’s insiders and its outsiders. In this setting, ex-
ternal investors, as opposed to the management, are neither able to value the firm’s assets 
in place nor its growth opportunities. As managers seek to protect current shareholders’ 
wealth, they would only issue equity if the firm is overvalued. The announcement of a se-
curity issue thus conveys negative information to outside investors. Therefore, these an-
nouncements are typically followed by share price drops (see e.g. Smith (1986a) for an 
overview). As debt holders’ claims are fixed and senior to those of shareholders, debt is 
less information sensitive. Thus, the announcement of debt issues produces less negative 
stock price reactions.
12
 The following pecking order results for financing decisions. First, 
internal financing is preferred since information asymmetries matter only for external fi-
nancing. Second, if internal funds are not sufficient, debt is chosen as its issuance conveys 
less negative information to the market than an equity issue. Third, only the remaining fi-
nancing gaps are closed using (external) equity. In consequence, the pecking order theory 
predicts a negative relation between profitability and leverage ratio. Since profitable firms, 
ceteris paribus, have more internal funds available to finance investment activities, they are 
less dependent on external financing and take on less debt. In contrast to the tradeoff theo-
ry, which assumes that firms have an optimal or target capital structure, the pecking order 
theory implies that a firm’s capital structure is driven by its need to finance new invest-
ments using external funds. 
Third, Baker and Wurgler (2002) formulated the market timing hypothesis. Based on 
asymmetric information, their theory assumes that managers persistently time the market 
when making financing decisions. The resulting capital structure is thus the outcome of 
managers grasping opportunities to issue overpriced equity and repurchasing it in the op-
posite case. In this model, however, share prices do not fully reflect the negative infor-
mation after the issue announcement. Consequently, managers can actually shift wealth 
from new to existing shareholders (Denis 2012).
13
 In contrast, Welch (2004) comes to the 
conclusion that changes in firms’ capital structures are to a great extent driven by share 
price movements. Accordingly, changes in a firm’s market value of equity without coun-
                                                 
12
 In fact, if debt is assumed to be riskless no stock price reaction is predicted. 
13
 Dittmar and Thakor (2007) propose an alternative theory in which managers issue equity when they want 
to finance a new project and expect investors to agree with their evaluation of the project’s prospects. Since 
investor agreement can cause high stock prices their theory coincides with the empirical finding that equity is 
issued when stock prices are high. 
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terbalancing actions by the management are the main driver of changes in the leverage 
ratio in the short- to medium-term. 
The previous three main theories have enjoyed great popularity due to their intuitive ap-
peal. Nevertheless, neither of them alone has been able to explain the numerous facets of 
empirically observed capital structure patterns satisfactory.
14
 Still, they are “useful condi-
tional theories” (Myers 2001, p. 81). The tradeoff model is primarily challenged by the 
persistent empirical finding of a negative relation between profitability and leverage (e.g. 
Titman/Wessels 1988; Rajan/Zingales 1995; Graham/Leary 2011). In case of higher profit-
ability, there is more profit that could be shielded from taxes by increasing leverage. This 
would predict exactly the opposite relation. Furthermore, firms’ leverage ratios are usually 
too low to fully exploit all potential tax benefits. According to Graham (2000), firms forgo 
a 15% increase in firm value because of deviations from their optimal capital structure. 
The agency cost of additional debt are likely too small to justify such low leverage ratios 
and the associated forgone benefits (Parrino/Weisbach 1999). The pecking order theory 
faces the issue that it cannot explain the observation of firms that are essentially all-equity 
financed and further issue equity instead of debt (e.g. Fama/French 2002; Strebulaev/Yang 
2013). Still, the pecking order model has been found to explain the choice between debt 
and equity more accurately than the static tradeoff theory (Shyam-Sunder/Myers 1999). On 
the contrary, Fama and French (2002) conclude that each model has the aforementioned 
major flaw in its predictions. Due to many common empirical predictions that have been 
supported by empiricists, it is difficult to prefer one over the other. Finally, the market tim-
ing hypothesis is not able to adequately predict the decisions of firms to issue equity 
(Denis 2012). The short-term need for cash seems to be a much more important driver of 
this decision (DeAngelo et al. 2010). 
In consequence, academics have adjusted the basic models by further relaxing the MM 
assumptions. According to the dynamic tradeoff model, firms still have a target capital 
structure but they face adjustment costs, e.g. issuance and transaction costs (e.g. Fischer et 
al. 1989; Leary/Roberts 2005). In case the costs of further moving toward the target lever-
age ratio outweigh the associated benefits, firms will prefer to maintain their status quo. An 
optimal range of capital structure emerges (Leary/Roberts 2005). Thus, there is only a 
gradual adjustment towards an optimal debt equity ratio with the speed of adjustment de-
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 See Graham and Harvey (2001) for evidence of actual capital structure policies from a survey of chief 
financial officers (CFO). 
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pending on adjustment costs (Flannery/Rangan 2006; Faulkender et al. 2012).
15
 Empirical-
ly, however, these adjustment costs do not seem to be large enough to justify the observed 
deviations from target capital structure and, moreover, adjustment is often even made in 
the “wrong” direction (Hovakimian 2004; Denis 2012). Furthermore, the target leverage 
ratio may change over time (Hovakimian et al. 2001).
16
 This view is also supported by 
recent evidence by DeAngelo and Roll (2015) who question the wide-spread belief that a 
firm’s leverage ratio is time-invariant. In contrast, they document significant variation over 
longer time periods. Consequently, models with time-varying target leverage ratios are 
best-suited to describe the evolution of firms’ capital structures over time, followed by 
models with dynamic target ranges and static models with moderate speed of adjustment.
17
 
Overall, dynamic capital structure models foster the reconcilement of theory and empirical 
evidence but they still do not get beyond the status of conditional theories. Certainly, there 
are far more theories on capital structure.
18
 However, I do not intend to offer a complete 
overview here, but instead focus on the relation to ownership structure and performance. 
2.2.2 Ownership structure 
The majority of academic studies dealing with ownership structure focuses on stakes 
owned by one or several top executives, the management or the board of directors. Due to 
the direct link between managerial decision making and the firm’s operations, and thus its 
performance, it seems natural to study managerial ownership first. However, equity owner-
ship has many facets and other stakeholder groups should also be taken into account when 
investigating ownership structure and its influence on firm performance. The presence of 
large shareholders (block holders), institutional investors, family, or government owners 
has been shown in various studies to influence performance in some way. In this subsec-
tion, I describe the basic ownership types that have aroused the interest of academics. Ad-
                                                 
15
 The adjustment costs, in turn, may vary depending on the firm’s financing needs (or surplus) and whether 
the firm’s current leverage ratio is above or below its target level (Byoun 2008). Also, the country in which 
the firm operates can be a determinant of the adjustment speed of capital structure (Öztekin/Flannery 2012). 
For example, institutional and legal conditions influence the costs and benefits of adjusting leverage which 
can slow down or accelerate this process. 
16
 Strebulaev (2007) argues that the dynamic tradeoff model can remedy the major flaw of the static version. 
Accordingly, an increasing profitability leads to a higher market value of equity which in turn lowers the 
firm’s leverage ratio when no offsetting capital structure adjustments are implemented due to the associated 
costs. 
17
 For additional evidence of long-term capital structure variation see also Graham et al. (2015). 
18
 For an overview of non-tax related models see Harris and Raviv (1991). Graham and Leary (2011) provide 
a survey of recent empirical studies. 
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ditionally, I outline their typical performance impact. The ownership types as well as struc-
tures that prevail in different countries vary to a great extent.  
Studying the ultimate ownership of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies La Porta et 
al. (1999) document the prevalence of controlling shareholders, typically families or the 
State, whereas ownership by financial institutions is less common.
19
 In Europe, Faccio and 
Lang (2002) document that family and dispersed ownership are the dominating types of 
shareholdings. According to their study, large and financial firms are rather widely held 
whereas families more often own stakes in small and non-financial firms. In East Asia, 
Claessens et al. (2000) find that voting rights often exceed cash flow rights, especially in 
small and family firms. Further, they discover that in two thirds of the cases a firm is con-
trolled by only one shareholder. In Japan, Prowse (1992) finds a high degree of ownership 
concentration. Among large shareholders financial institutions seem to play a dominant 
role which can be attributed to regulatory and legal conditions.
20
 In comparison to the U.S., 
managerial ownership plays a secondary role. Contrary to the preceding study, ultimate 
ownership in Japan has been shown to be primarily widely dispersed (Claessens et al. 
2000). This finding highlights the importance of distinguishing between ultimate and 
“simple” ownership in order to draw consistent conclusions. 
Next, the theoretical foundation of the link between these various ownership types and 
performance is addressed. As mentioned above, Berle and Means (1932) stated that dis-
persed ownership has a negative impact on firm performance. However, Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) suggest that “in a rational world” the existence of diffuse ownership structures does 
not imply inefficiency but is instead driven by value maximization. They argue that the 
costs of a more diffuse ownership structure, e.g. managers engaging in value decreasing 
activities due to a lack of control, are offset by the associated benefits, such as lower costs 
of raising capital. Accordingly, the extent to which the various costs and benefits of diffuse 
versus concentrated ownership apply to different firms determines the observed range of 
ownership structures. Varying structures thus only reflect different firm characteristics 
and/or different environmental conditions under which the firms operate. In equilibrium, 
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 Ultimate ownership means that if firm A’s shares are held by firm B then firm B’s ownership structure is 
further examined and so forth in order to finally determine the ultimate owner(s) of firm A (La Porta et al. 
1999). 
20
 Prowse (1992) further emphasizes the imperative distinction whether Japanese firms are independent or 
part of corporate groups, so-called keiretsu, as corporate governance mechanisms differ accordingly. In the 
case of ownership structure, however, he detects no significant differences. For evidence on the persistence 
and implications of Japanese corporate groups see e.g. McGuire and Dow (2003). An analysis of the inherent 
governance structures is provided by Berglöf and Perotti (1994). 
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each ownership structure is set in a way to maximize firm value. In support of this argu-
ment, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) do not find a significant relation between accounting prof-
it rates and ownership. This result is also consistent with Demsetz (1983).
21
 
The most prominent paper dealing with (managerial) ownership is by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) who derive their conclusions from agency theory. They argue as follows. As own-
ership and control are separated, managers run (control) the firm on shareholders’ behalf, 
but they own only a small fraction of its equity. Consequently, managers participate only 
partly in any change in equity value caused by their actions. As managers seek to maxim-
ize their own personal utility, they do not shy away from (equity) value decreasing behav-
ior (e.g. empire building, shirking, consumption of perquisites) if it increases their personal 
utility. This gives rise to conflicts of interest. Thereby, the shareholders’ goal of maximiz-
ing firm value is endangered. These conflicts of interest occur between managers and (out-
side) shareholders on the one hand, and equity holders and debt holders on the other 
hand.
22
 In order to mitigate this problem, the objectives of managers and shareholders need 
to be aligned. Thus, managers need to be incentivized by increasing the sensitivity of their 
private wealth, and thus of their utility, to performance and overall value of the firm. This 
can be accomplished by performance-related pay, e.g. bonus payments, and equity-based 
compensation (e.g. Jensen/Murphy 1990; Kaplan 1994; Mehran 1995; Hall/Liebman 
1998).
23
 By granting managers a sizeable equity stake in the firm, agency problems are 
alleviated because managers’ wealth depends on firm value.24 In this way, they benefit 
from maximizing the value of the firm and act in line with shareholders’ interests. 
A complementing approach to incentivizing managers is external control through monitor-
ing by shareholders. Small shareholders are typically assumed to be too uninformed and 
their actions are too uncoordinated to monitor efficiently. Even if they actually supervise 
the firm’s management and observe misbehavior, they can hardly intervene because they 
do not possess sufficient voting rights. Large shareholders, on the contrary, have the re-
sources and capability as well as the required voting power for disciplining the manage-
ment. Therefore, they engage in monitoring. However, the anticipation of this behavior 
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 Demsetz (1983) was among the first to state that ownership and firm performance are endogenous varia-
bles. I explore this issue in detail in section 2.6. 
22
 In the context of this literature review, I focus on the former conflict. 
23
 For a counter view, see the model by Oyer (2004). 
24
 For an analysis of the relation between equity-based compensation and managerial ownership see Ofek and 
Yermack (2000). An excellent review of theoretical and empirical studies on executive compensation is pro-
vided by Murphy (1999), a more focused review on equity-based compensation and incentives is presented 
by Core et al. (2003). 
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induces small shareholders not to monitor at all, which is known as free rider problem 
(Shleifer/Vishny 1997). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that the presence of large share-
holders has a positive impact on firm value as well as a negative impact on small share-
holders. The former finding supports the notion of efficient monitoring, the latter, however, 
points to a third type of agency conflict, i.e. between small and large shareholders. 
The other aforementioned owner types likewise have a considerable impact on perfor-
mance. The concept of banks monitoring borrowers is well established since Diamond 
(1984). Additionally, banks have been shown to be efficient monitors as large shareholders 
(Gorton/Schmid 2000).
25
 In contrast, the implications of family ownership are not clear. 
For example, a negative impact was documented by Holderness and Sheehan (1988) 
whereas Anderson and Reeb (2003) detect a positive relation. Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
suggest that differentiation between family ownership, control, and management is essen-
tial in order to determine the impact on performance. Specifically, control rights in excess 
of cash flow rights appear to have an inverse effect on performance (Claessens et al. 2002; 
Lins 2003; Villalonga/Amit 2006; King/Santor 2008).
26
 This is not only true for family 
firms but seems valid for all kind of firms (Gompers et al. 2010). Cronqvist and Nilsson 
(2003) estimate the associated agency costs to be in the range of 6 to 25 % of firm value 
for the median firm.
27
 
Additionally, a founder chief executive officer (CEO) effect has been documented to en-
hance firm value whereas heirs as top executives have the opposite effect (e.g. 
Villalonga/Amit 2006; Fahlenbrach 2009). Burkart et al. (2003) suggest that this is due to 
the biased choice of heirs as top managers as opposed to externally hiring a more skilled 
professional manager. Empirical support is provided by Pérez-González (2006). The author 
confirms that nepotism deteriorates firm performance since it precludes effective labor 
market competition. Additional evidence suggests that if the founder of the firm retains a 
seat at the board of directors the externally hired CEO is better incentivized through pay-
                                                 
25
 Gorton and Schmid (2000) examine the German market to derive their conclusions. However, La Porta et 
al. (1999) note that the exercise of control through shareholding banks is rather unusual in the developed 
countries they study. The German universal banking system obviously constitutes an exception. Notable 
differences exist between countries such as Germany and Japan as compared to the US since the US legal 
system imposes restrictions on bank equity ownership. Consequently, US banks play a less active role in 
corporate governance (e.g. Kroszner/Strahan 2001). 
26
 Mechanisms resulting in higher control rights than cash flow rights include e.g. dual class shares, pyrami-
dal structures, cross-shareholdings, or holdings through several control chains (e.g. La Porta et al. 1999; 
Faccio/Lang 2002; King/Santor 2008). 
27
 See Grossman and Hart (1988) as well as Harris and Raviv (1988b) for theoretical models concerning the 
(value) effects of the one share/one vote policy and deviations therefrom. 
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for-performance and CEO retention policy (Li/Srinivasan 2011). This might be another 
explanation why heir-CEO firms underperform. Furthermore, founders or heirs may use 
their influence to make corporations less transparent for outside investors. This facilitates 
the extraction of private benefits of control such that corporate performance is harmed 
(Anderson et al. 2009). 
In contrast to family ownership, government ownership has consistently been shown to 
have a negative impact on firm performance (e.g. Shleifer/Vishny 1997; Chen 2001).
28
 
Consistent with this finding, abandoning state ownership, i.e. privatizing firms, is accom-
panied by increases in performance (e.g. Megginson et al. 1994).
29
 The reason is that con-
trol over state-owned firms is in fact exercised by bureaucrats whose interests are often 
politically motivated (Shleifer/Vishny 1994; Boubakri et al. 2013; Borisova et al. 2015). 
The bureaucrats in charge can exert enormous control but have virtually no cash flow 
rights since any profit accrues to the country’s treasury (Shleifer/Vishny 1997). As in the 
context of family firms, this divergence has a value decreasing effect. 
After having illustrated the basic capital structure theories and important types of equity 
ownership, including their relation to performance, the subsequent section will deal with 
models and empirical studies that explicitly scrutinize the link between leverage and per-
formance as well as ownership structure and performance. 
2.3 Capital structure and firm performance: The role of debt 
As explained above, the two traditional models of capital structure, i.e. the pecking order 
and the tradeoff theory, yield contradicting predictions concerning the use of debt and firm 
performance. So the question that arises is which role does the capital structure play on 
agents within the firm and how does this affect performance? In order to gain insights to 
this issue, I first dwell on several studies that directly examine this relationship. In the se-
cond part, I review papers that investigate the impact of debt on the firm’s performance 
with respect to its position in the market, i.e. its product market power as well as its vul-
nerability in the takeover market. 
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 One notable exception is Borisova et al. (2015) who document that during times of financial turmoil (do-
mestic) government equity ownership can reduce the costs of corporate borrowing. The authors interpret this 
effect as an implicit debt guarantee by the government. During normal times, however, the effect is reversed. 
29
 Megginson and Netter (2001) provide a detailed survey of the literature on privatization. 
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2.3.1 The effect of debt inside the firm 
The most popular model is presumably the free cash flow theory by Jensen (1986). In this 
model, managers have the opportunity and willingness to invest the firm’s free cash flows 
whether or not the firm has profitable investment opportunities, i.e. projects with a positive 
net present value (NPV). Managers seek to build empires and are able to pursue their ob-
jective due to a lack of monitoring and other disciplining mechanisms. Consequently, man-
agers’ investment decisions can destroy shareholder value because of overinvestment. The 
use of debt can mitigate this problem. Because managers commit themselves to a prede-
termined repayment schedule, part of the firm’s free cash flows has to be used to service 
debt obligations. The reduced free cash flows restrict managerial discretion and thus pre-
vent shareholder value destruction through overinvestment.
30
 Hence, the use of debt has a 
positive impact on firm value. As in the tradeoff model, however, extremely high leverage 
ratios might offset the positive effect and instead be harmful to firm value because the 
management will also forgo positive NPV projects and thus underinvest (Myers 1977; 
Stulz 1990). The firm’s optimal capital structure is determined by trading off the (agency) 
costs and benefits of debt (Jensen/Meckling 1976; Harris/Raviv 1991). McConnell and 
Servaes (1995) provide empirical evidence in support of this notion. However, they attrib-
ute the two contrasting effects of leverage (over- or underinvestment) to the availability of 
positive NPV projects to the firm. In high growth firms, i.e. firms with many profitable 
projects, the use of leverage might lead to underinvestment and thus result in reduced firm 
values. On the other hand, firms that only have few profitable projects can alleviate the 
underinvestment problem by increasing leverage. Thus, the optimal choice of leverage 
depends on the firm’s growth options. 
Alternative to underinvestment, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest the asset substitution 
problem as a different kind of agency cost of debt. As before, the management (on behalf 
of the shareholders) has incentives to invest in a risky project even if its NPV is negative. 
Due to their residual claim, equity holders gamble on unlikely but highly profitable project 
outcomes such that, on expectation, they receive a positive return. However, since the 
overall NPV is negative, equity holders can only profit at the expense of debt holders. The 
latter thus bear the entire cost in case of the more likely negative project outcome. If debt 
holders anticipate this behavior, they will pay less at issuance of the debt. Consequently, 
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 The concept of debt bonding in order to discipline management has also been suggested by Grossman and 
Hart (1982). 
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equity holders ultimately bear the costs of their behavior. Other models based on the idea 
that debt helps to reduce overinvestment and thus mitigates value declines through agency 
problems have been developed by Stulz (1990), and Zwiebel (1996). In both models, debt 
restricts managerial actions to create value (“disciplinary effect”, Edmans (2011)). In con-
trast, Edmans (2011) develops a theory in which risky debt provides the managers with 
more discretion. With risky debt outstanding equity ownership becomes more concentrated 
and a large equity holder has incentives to evaluate more accurately whether low short-
term earnings are due to bad management or whether the investment is just long-term ori-
ented. Thus, managers do not have to be afraid to be replaced when their investments do 
not generate immediate short-term profits. In this case, debt increases discretion which 
enhances firm value (“concentration effect”, Edmans (2011)). 
Ross (1977) proposes an alternative model based on asymmetric information between firm 
insiders and outside investors. By issuing debt, the firm can signal its quality to the market 
because the management is confident of being able to fulfill the resulting obligations. This 
perception will lead to higher firm valuation. Empirical evidence in accordance with this 
model was provided by Harvey et al. (2004) for emerging market firms. They investigate 
how shareholder value is influenced by changes in capital structure through debt issues. 
Support for two distinct hypotheses is provided. First, the certification hypothesis states 
that firms issuing bonds for the first time experience an increase in equity value. As higher 
transparency and disclosure standards apply to the firm as well as the requirement to 
achieve a minimum annual performance in order to make the debt-related payments, inves-
tors revise their firm valuation upwards. Second, the recontracting hypothesis assumes that 
firms announcing subsequent debt issues will gain in value because they have successfully 
proven to be able to meet the aforementioned higher transparency and performance re-
quirements. Overall, Harvey et al. (2004) find evidence supporting the notion that the use 
of debt can remedy reductions in firm value by aligning managerial incentives and alleviat-
ing overinvestment problems. An alternative signaling model has been put forward by 
Leland and Pyle (1977). In order to obtain external financing, the entrepreneur (the manag-
er) has to signal her project’s quality by retaining a greater equity share. This signaling 
effect increases firm value. However, if she retains a greater equity share more debt needs 
to be raised due to the need for external funds. On the other hand, from the entrepreneur’s 
signal which causes a higher shareholder value it follows that more cash can be raised from 
selling the remaining equity. Under certain conditions, their model yields an equilibrium in 
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which firms with better quality projects also have higher debt levels. Thus, a positive rela-
tion between firm value and leverage arises.
31
 
In contrast to the preceding models based on signaling and incentive alignment, the Harris 
and Raviv (1990) model assumes value generation due to active intervention by debt hold-
ers. Managers stick to their positions and are reluctant to discontinue the firm’s operations 
even if this was the optimal strategy. In such a situation, debt provides creditors with the 
opportunity to liquidate the firm and thereby mitigates the agency problem between debt 
holders and managers. Thus, by disciplining the management, debt leads to increases in 
firm value. 
So far, debt has been treated as one single security in order to determine its impact on firm 
value. However, debt is not standardized. There is bank lending versus capital market fi-
nancing through bonds, short-term versus long-term, junior versus senior debt and so forth. 
Consequently, models have been developed that evaluate the efficacy of different types of 
debt in reducing asymmetric information or agency problems. For example, Flannery 
(1986) examines the maturity choice of debt in a signaling model. Accordingly, under cer-
tain conditions, firms are able to signal their good quality by issuing more short-term 
debt.
32
 However, Barclay and Smith (1995) find little empirical evidence of signaling of 
firm quality by means of the maturity structure of corporate debt. But they document pat-
terns consistent with a preference for short-term debt when information asymmetries are 
high. On the other hand, Hart and Moore (1995) deal with the effects of debt of different 
seniority in an agency setting while Stulz and Johnson (1985) analyze the effects of se-
cured and unsecured debt on firm value. These models conclude that some profitable pro-
jects need to be forgone if the firm cannot fund the project with further senior or secured 
debt. This seems to be consistent with the prediction of the pecking order theory in that 
riskless debt is preferred over risky debt since it is less information sensitive. In the sense 
of the free cash flow theory, the model by Wang (2011) predicts that debt with higher cou-
pon rates helps to increase firm value as it reduces the opportunity for managerial rent ex-
traction. 
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 Harris and Raviv (1991) point out that only under the assumption of costly personal borrowing by the en-
trepreneur the Leland and Pyle (1977) model can be interpreted as a model of a firm’s capital structure. Oth-
erwise, it considers total debt, i.e. personal debt of the entrepreneur and corporate debt. 
32
 This is because in the presence of information asymmetries the market will incorporate a higher probability 
of decline in creditworthiness (or default) into the required return on long-term debt (Flannery 1986). Hence, 
good quality firms try to avoid these costs of long-term debt.  
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Besides, the identity and dispersion of debt holders could also influence the degree to 
which control over the management is successfully exerted (Short 1994). In his seminal 
model, Diamond (1984) proved that banks are more efficient monitors than atomistic lend-
ers are. In general, it has been argued that concentrated debt holders can control the man-
agement more efficiently due to the non-existence of disagreement between multiple lend-
ers or free rider problems (Stiglitz 1985). Hence, one would expect firms with a more con-
centrated debt structure to achieve higher performance. This point is also stressed by Park 
(2000), who develops a model of debt seniority and maturity and concludes that monitor-
ing is optimally implemented by one single senior debt holder. Furthermore, contrary to 
the traditional corporate finance view, Nini et al. (2012) point out that debt holders can in 
fact exert control well before a firm is in default. By setting up covenants in the credit ar-
rangements, they can intervene in case of violation. The authors document that invest-
ments, leverage, and payout decrease whereas CEO turnover and performance increase 
following violations of financial covenants. Thus, debt holders actively and successfully 
engage in corporate governance. Covenants as well as collateral thereby serve as incentives 
to monitor (Rajan/Winton 1995). However, when debt holders have veto power over the 
firm’s decisions, the effect on firm value tends to become negative (Berkovitch/Israel 
1996). Therefore, firms aim to restrict the influence of banks by optimally choosing the 
source of debt and its seniority (Rajan 1992). 
Another source of influence on managerial decision making is the concern for reputation. 
According to this view, the circumvention of bankruptcy is one of the management’s top 
priorities. Managers tend to be conservative with respect to project choice and avoid taking 
on too much debt (Hirshleifer/Thakor 1992). This is especially true if managers are risk 
averse since they have put their entire human capital in the firm and are thus relatively un-
diversified (Amihud/Lev 1981; Friend/Lang 1988). 
In sum, through monitoring, incentive alignment, signaling, reputational concerns of the 
management, threat of bankruptcy, or some combination of those, debt acts as a disciplin-
ing mechanism and reduces firm value discounts caused by agency costs and/or asymmet-
ric information. 
2.3.2 The effect of debt on the firm’s market position 
Brander and Lewis (1986) paved the way for a different branch of corporate finance litera-
ture dealing with the effects of leverage on the product market performance of a firm ver-
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sus its competitors, or more generally with the interaction between corporate financial pol-
icies and the product market strategy.
33
 In brief, these models derive that leverage affects 
the payoffs to the firm’s equity and debt holders and thereby changes the firm’s equilibri-
um strategy with respect to product quantity and/or price. Since managers primarily focus 
on maximizing the value of equity, instead of overall firm value, debt-related payments by 
levered firms change the equity payoff structure and consequently influence managers’ 
decisions with respect to the product market strategy (Harris/Raviv 1991). Theoretical and 
empirical studies provide evidence that firms employ leverage in order to compete more 
aggressively (e.g. Brander/Lewis 1986; Smith et al. 2012). Thereby, firms boost output, i.e. 
sales, in some cases even at the expense of a temporary decline in profitability.  
Campello (2006) concludes that the effect of leverage on firm performance is non-
monotonic. By increasing leverage, a firm can outperform its rivals with respect to sales 
increases in a competitive environment. Above a certain leverage ratio, however, the effect 
is reversed and the firm’s product market performance decreases relative to that of its 
competitors. The finding of an inverted U-shaped relation between leverage and product 
market performance reconciles empirical evidence (Chevalier 1995a, b; Kovenock/Phillips 
1995; Phillips 1995; Kovenock/Phillips 1997) with the theoretical predictions by Brander 
and Lewis (1986). The empirical papers document, contrary to Brander and Lewis (1986), 
that high leverage can lead to less aggressive product market behavior, reduced invest-
ments and production, and finally strengthen the competitors’ positions. Furthermore, 
when exposed to an exogenous shock such as deregulation, highly levered firms are less 
likely to survive (Zingales 1998). Evidently, leverage enhances a firm’s product market 
performance up to a certain point. However, as proved by the empirical studies, there is 
also a downside when debt levels become too high. Accordingly, firms weigh up the costs 
and benefits of debt in order to choose an optimal debt level in a competitive environment. 
Furthermore, corporate debt can play an important role in corporate control contests. Sev-
eral theoretical models argue unanimously that the managers of firms that become targets 
of a takeover attempt increase leverage in order to avoid losing control over the firm as 
well as their job-related personal benefits. In Harris and Raviv (1988a), managers issue 
debt and subsequently repurchase equity in order to increase their fraction of voting rights 
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 Other early theoretical papers on this topic include Titman (1984); Maksimovic (1988); Maksimovic and 
Titman (1991). An extensive review on this branch of research is offered by Maksimovic (1995). 
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in the firm. In Stulz (1988), one possibility to obtain a higher equity stake for the manage-
ment is also to increase leverage. The optimal leverage ratio maximizes the value of out-
side shareholders’ equity in order to make it more expensive for the bidder to buy the re-
maining shares outstanding and thus less likely to complete the takeover. Likewise, the 
model by Israel (1991) predicts higher gains to the target firm’s shareholders and a lower 
probability of a successful takeover in response to leverage increases but for somewhat 
different reasons.
34
 However, these changes in capital structure are mostly temporary and 
do not affect the long-term capital structure of the firm (Harris/Raviv 1991). Overall, these 
models predict increases in leverage in response to a takeover threat. This enhances the 
expected shareholder value because target shareholders capture the gains of a rising stock 
price in case of a successful takeover. For failed takeover attempts, Safieddine and Titman 
(1999) also find superior stock performance. They conclude that, by increasing leverage, 
managers do not entrench themselves but commit themselves to delivering a higher per-
formance. This is consistent with the free cash flow theory. In line with the aforementioned 
models, Garvey and Hanka (1999) show that firms that are protected by antitakeover laws 
decrease their leverage ratios while unprotected firms do the opposite. This provides em-
pirical evidence for the view that managers dislike debt-induced performance pressures but 
are willing to accept them when their firm faces a takeover threat that could endanger their 
position.
35
 
2.4 Ownership structure and firm performance: The role of equity own-
ers 
As set out above, the separation of ownership and control constitutes the major feature of 
the modern corporation and might lead to inefficiencies resulting in firm value reduction.
36
 
The reason is that the costs and benefits of control do not accrue to the same extent to the 
respective decision maker (Jensen/Meckling 1976; Fama/Jensen 1983). The monetary in-
centives set by share ownership reveal two basic ways of how ownership might influence 
firm performance. First, ownership in the hands of the management partly reunifies owner-
ship and control. Thereby, the problems arising from their separation in the first place 
mostly disappear. Managerial incentives are aligned to those of other shareholders and 
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 For an insightful description of the three models as well as their predictions and underlying assumptions, 
see Harris and Raviv (1991, pp. 319-325).  
35
 See also the model by Zwiebel (1996). 
36
 Unless otherwise indicated, I refer to ownership as the resulting cash flow rights from owning shares of a 
company. In the base case, I assume no difference between cash flow and voting rights. 
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inefficiencies are reduced because the differential accrual of costs of and benefits from 
management’s decisions diminishes. When managers’ wealth is directly related to firm 
value the objectives of shareholders and managers become congruent. Unfortunately, per-
fect incentive alignment is rarely feasible. This emphasizes the necessity of the second 
channel of impact, i.e. monitoring. External shareholders, who own the firm, monitor the 
managers, who control the firm, in order to prevent inefficient managerial decisions caused 
by managers’ self-interest and too much discretion. As small shareholders likely face free 
rider problems, monitoring is primarily carried out by owners of larger stakes in the firm. 
This is due to two reasons. First, large shareholders combine sufficient voting rights in 
order to intervene. Second, the absolute wealth invested in the respective firm fans the fear 
of potentially huge losses and thereby fosters the desire for control which makes active 
monitoring more likely. As Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 758) have put it, large sharehold-
ers “have both the interest in getting their money back and the power to demand it.” In the 
following, I will initially elaborate on these two basic lines of corporate ownership litera-
ture, i.e. managerial and large shareholdings.
37, 38
 Subsequently, I will address another as-
pect of corporate ownership, namely takeovers. A takeover which is related to changes in 
ownership structure or the threat of a looming takeover also acts as a disciplining mecha-
nism to the management. Leveraged buyouts as a special type of takeovers are additionally 
related to changes in capital structure which makes them particularly relevant in the con-
text of this literature review. 
2.4.1 Managerial ownership 
As explained in subsection 2.2.2, the concept of incentive alignment through managerial 
ownership has been put forward by Jensen and Meckling (1976).
39
 However, the relation 
between managerial ownership and performance thereby established is not linear. Manag-
ers’ effort to engage in firm value maximization cannot be increased continuously merely 
by granting them a greater stake in the firm. At higher ownership levels, other incentive 
mechanisms set in which may finally outweigh the beneficial incentive alignment effect. 
The existence of a non-linear relation between ownership and firm value has been found by 
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 Of course, corporate ownership structures are not solely determined by the interests of different sharehold-
er groups. External factors, such as the political system, legal restrictions, or economic (de-)regulation, etc. 
also influence corporate ownership (as well as capital structure) (e.g. Roe 1990; Shleifer/Vishny 1997). But 
for the purpose of this literature review, I focus on firm-related governance issues and only briefly touch on 
the impact of environmental differences or changes. 
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 The terms large shareholders and managerial shareholders are used mutually exclusive in this literature 
review. 
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 Morck et al. (1988) as well as some other studies refer to the same concept as “convergence of interests”. 
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Morck et al. (1988); Wruck (1989); McConnell and Servaes (1990); Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991); McConnell and Servaes (1995), among others. The two studies by 
McConnell and Servaes document an inverted U-shaped relation between managerial own-
ership and value supporting the notion that there are two opposing effects.
40
 Moreover, a 
bell-shaped relation suggests the existence of a value-maximizing level of managerial 
ownership. At lower ownership levels, the incentive alignment effect leads to a rising firm 
value when managerial ownership is increased. However, beyond the optimum, a further 
increase in ownership has a negative impact on firm value. This can be attributed to mana-
gerial entrenchment effects (e.g. Shleifer/Vishny 1989; Claessens et al. 2002). Entrenched 
managers make “themselves valuable to shareholders and costly to replace” 
(Shleifer/Vishny 1989, p.123). They engage in activities to secure their positions. This sub-
sequently enables them to extract private benefits of control. Such behavior may include 
the choice of a lower-than-optimal leverage ratio because managers want to reduce risks 
since they are relatively undiversified (e.g. Berger et al. 1997; Brailsford et al. 2002), the 
expropriation of minority shareholders (Shleifer/Vishny 1997), the consumption of corpo-
rate resources (e.g. Fama/Jensen 1983; Yermack 2006), making manager-specific invest-
ments (Shleifer/Vishny 1989), or the prevention of value-enhancing takeovers (e.g. 
Dann/DeAngelo 1988; Harris/Raviv 1988a; Malatesta/Walkling 1988; Ryngaert 1988; 
Stulz 1988; Slovin/Sushka 1993). All of these activities can lead to decreases in firm value. 
Benson and Davidson III (2009) and Kim and Lu (2011) suggest risk aversion as the rea-
son for the value discounts at higher managerial ownership levels. When the CEO possess-
es a huge ownership stake and accordingly a sizeable portion of voting rights she will 
choose a low-risk strategy for the firm and only invest in low-risk projects. Thereby, she 
reduces the risk of her own portfolio which is relatively badly diversified given her equity 
stake in the firm. However, the firm will forgo risky but profitable investment opportuni-
ties and thereby suffer from value decreases. Accordingly, an optimal choice of managerial 
ownership is imperative in order to maximize the value of the firm.
41
 In the context of 
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 The results of Morck et al. (1988), Wruck (1989), and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) also find a positive 
relation between firm value and ownership at low ownership levels and a negative relation at higher owner-
ship levels. However, the relation turns positive again at even higher ownership levels. The three papers 
estimate piecewise linear regression models instead of a quadratic model, as in McConnell and Servaes 
(1990, 1995). This makes a direct comparison difficult. 
41
 It should be noted that there are different empirical approaches to determining “managerial ownership”. In 
some cases it includes only the shares owned by the CEO, other papers use the shares owned by the entire 
board of directors. However, the underlying concept of incentive alignment versus entrenchment, or risk 
aversion, is the same. I deal with problems arising from an inconsistent definition of ownership categories in 
section 2.7. 
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stock market returns, Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) provide additional evidence of the 
importance of managerial ownership. They show that a trading strategy that is long in high 
managerial ownership firms and short in no ownership firms yields considerable abnormal 
returns. Likewise, they are able to show that their findings are attributable to incentive ef-
fects of managerial ownership. 
2.4.2 Large shareholders 
Large shareholders might have a considerable influence on the firm. They are able to dis-
cipline the managers, e.g. by the threat of replacing them in case of insufficient perfor-
mance or incompetence (Cornelli et al. 2013). In this way, they can influence the firm’s 
operations and its performance. Naturally, a substantial amount of research has been de-
voted to this topic. It has been argued that dispersed ownership makes monitoring costly 
and inefficient (Berle/Means 1932). That is why this task is primarily left to large share-
holders. Through the concentration of cash flow and voting rights, large shareholders are 
able and willing to control and discipline the management. Thereby, agency problems be-
tween managers and external shareholders are mitigated which can lead to enhanced per-
formance as well as increases in shareholder value. However, the term large shareholder 
can comprise many different owner types such as individual or corporate shareholders, 
families, or the State. As discussed in subsection 2.2.2, different types of shareholders pur-
sue different objectives and thus might have a differential impact on performance. Hence, 
it is crucial to identify the type of large shareholder when investigating its performance 
impact (Short 1994). Furthermore, distinguishing between controlling majority sharehold-
ers and large minority shareholders seems imperative.  
For the latter type, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) develop a model showing that those share-
holders have a positive impact on firm value. If the management is not maximizing profits, 
large shareholders can step in and implement operational improvements either through 
negotiations with the current management or by replacing it after a takeover. Large share-
holders are willing to bear those monitoring costs because they participate in the resulting 
value increases. For majority shareholders, Holderness and Sheehan (1988) empirically 
find no significant differences in accounting returns and valuation as compared to firms 
characterized by a diffuse ownership structure.
42
 This finding is consistent with entrench-
ment effects of the largest shareholder (Claessens et al. 2002). They do, however, find 
                                                 
42
 According to their classification, every firm that does not have a shareholder owning at least 20 % of the 
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some differences based on the identity of the major shareholder, i.e. whether it is an indi-
vidual or a corporate owner. 
Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) emphasize the necessity to distinguish between firms from 
industries with low or high asset specificity, as measured by research and development 
intensity. They argue that efficient monitoring by large shareholders becomes increasingly 
difficult for firms with highly specific assets because management’s decisions are hard to 
understand and evaluate from the outside investors’ perspective. Hence, in this case large 
shareholders might not be able to contribute to a better performance through monitoring.
43
 
Confirming their hypothesis, they report a positive effect by large shareholders only for 
firms from industries with low asset specificity.  
In addition to their findings on managerial ownership, McConnell and Servaes (1990, 
1995) document a positive impact by institutional shareholders on firm value. On the other 
hand, the presence of block holders does not seem to play a crucial role. On the contrary, 
Pound (1988) provides evidence for two hypotheses regarding the collusion of large insti-
tutional shareholders with the firm’s management. This contradicts the concept of efficient 
monitoring. According to their strategic alignment and their conflict of interest hypothesis, 
large institutional block holders vote in favor of the current management during a proxy 
contest. This is either due to strategic cooperation with the management, or because of an 
“asymmetric” disclosure of the voting.44 As a consequence, the probability that a proxy 
fight takes place as well as that the dissident succeeds decrease. Anticipating this, a poten-
tial dissident is less likely to initiate a proxy fight. Thus, the pressure on inefficient manag-
ers should be lower in the presence of large institutional investors allowing for more man-
agerial discretion. This suggests a negative relation to firm performance which is exactly 
what Pound finds. Further evidence of institutional shareholders voting in favor of the 
management can be found in Brickley et al. (1988) who analyze votings concerning anti-
takeover amendments. Their findings indicate that institutional investors might neglect 
their monitoring role in favor of an existing or potential business relationship with the firm. 
However, if the management’s proposal seems to be detrimental to shareholders’ interests, 
institutions more likely oppose (Brickley et al. 1988). Likewise, foreign or independent 
                                                 
43
 Quite similarly, Kahn and Winton (1998) suppose that the “transparency” of a firm, i.e. whether it is large 
and covered by many analysts, influences the decision of institutional investors to intervene when manage-
ment is doing poorly. 
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 According to Pound (1988), the firm’s management can observe the institutional investor’s voting whereas 
the shareholders of the institution cannot. This incentivizes the institutional shareholder of the firm to vote in 
favor of the management in order not to endanger the business relationship. 
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institutional investors, such as mutual funds, who are less likely bound to the firm have 
been documented to be more active monitors (e.g. Chen et al. 2007; Cornett et al. 2007; 
Ferreira/Matos 2008) and can therefore adopt riskier investment strategies in order to foster 
performance and growth (Boubakri et al. 2013). These findings highlight the important 
distinction between dependent and independent institutional investors when investigating 
their role as monitors. Further support for the heterogeneity of institutional investors is 
provided by Woidtke (2002). She documents a differential impact on firm value by private 
versus public pension funds as institutional shareholders. She argues that this difference is 
likely due to different objectives that the fund administrators pursue. While private pension 
fund managers are incentivized to monitor the firm by performance-based compensation, 
public funds’ actions are also driven by political and social motives (Woidtke 2002). Con-
cerning the question as to how block holders exercise influence over the management, 
Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that institutional shareholders alleviate agency problems 
through their influence on executive compensation. Moreover, it has been documented that 
higher institutional ownership is associated with lower informational asymmetries and 
greater stock liquidity which can facilitate monitoring (Boone/White 2015). 
Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) further emphasize the heterogeneity within the group of 
large investors. By studying individual block holders of firms, the authors conclude that 
large shareholders have distinct approaches of how to invest and govern a firm. These dif-
ferences among large shareholders can lead to variation in firm performance. Specifically, 
block holders who possess a larger share of the firm, who are members of the board, or 
who are directly involved in the management exhibit a larger effect on financial policies, 
such as the choice of leverage, and firm performance. The authors interpret these features 
as characteristics that determine the block holder’s ability to monitor and intervene effec-
tively. 
Another essential distinction concerns the prevailing level of shareholder protection. In 
countries with weak investor protection the impact of ownership concentration in general 
(Boubakri et al. 2005; Durnev/Kim 2005) as well as the impact of block holders (Lins 
2003) on performance is more pronounced.
45,46
 Moreover, McConnell and Servaes (1995) 
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 In this sense, Lins (2003) suggests that ownership concentration might act as a substitute for alternative 
means of corporate governance, such as investor protection. The issue as to whether alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms act as substitutes or complements will be addressed in section 2.7. 
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 La Porta et al. (2002) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) develop models that directly investigate the link 
between investor protection and firm valuation. 
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suggest that a firm’s investment opportunity set, i.e. whether it has many profitable pro-
jects to invest in or not, could determine the influence of institutional investors, and large 
shareholders. They conjecture that large shareholders could mitigate the overinvestment 
problem prevailing in low growth firms. However, splitting their sample into low- and high 
growth firms, they find only limited support for their hypothesis. 
So far, I have only considered active intervention by large shareholders in response to 
managerial inefficiencies. However, there is a second possibility of how large shareholders 
can react to mismanagement: they could simply sell their stake in the firm (e.g. 
Kahn/Winton 1998; Maug 1998; Faure-Grimaud/Gromb 2004; Chen et al. 2007; 
Ferreira/Matos 2008; Bharath et al. 2013). If managerial remuneration (partly) depends on 
the stock price the threat of a large shareholder selling her stake could discipline the man-
agement if it implies a credible threat of a stock price drop (Faure-Grimaud/Gromb 2004; 
Admati/Pfleiderer 2009). By means of buying or selling on the basis of private infor-
mation, the block holder can make the firm’s stock price converge towards its fundamental 
value instead of reflecting only current earnings (Edmans 2009). In this way, large share-
holders force the management to adopt a long-term perspective instead of running after 
short-term profits. Edmans and Manso (2011) refer to this as “disciplinary trading”, Kandel 
et al. (2011) as “voice through exit”. 
In a liquid stock market, the option to “sell and run away” could reduce large shareholders’ 
incentives to intervene actively, supposedly creating a tradeoff between liquidity and con-
trol (Bhide 1993; Bolton/von Thadden 1998).
47
 The exit option seems attractive because 
the block holder bears the entire costs of monitoring but captures only a part of the benefits 
of a successful intervention (proportional to the size of her equity stake). However, Maug 
(1998) shows that liquidity actually enhances the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
According to his model, the large shareholder can benefit from her monitoring activities 
because her transactions have no price impact in a liquid stock market. Thus, she can in-
crease her stake in the firm before the stock market learns about her value-increasing inter-
ventions (Maug 1998). In this way, she can capture a greater stake of the benefits from 
future stock price rises. Bharath et al. (2013) as well as Edmans et al. (2013) provide em-
pirical support for the link between liquidity and governance through exit by analyzing 
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exogenous liquidity shocks. Furthermore, their results reveal that active intervention and 
exit are two different mechanisms of corporate governance. 
Another strand of literature introduces multiple large shareholders as opposed to conven-
tional models that usually assume either dispersed ownership or one large shareholder in 
combination with many small ones. In firms with several large owners, different forms of 
interaction between these block holders seem plausible: a classical free rider problem could 
arise (Winton 1993), large shareholders could form controlling coalitions in order to ex-
tract corporate resources for private benefits (Zwiebel 1995; Bennedsen/Wolfenzon 2000), 
or block holders could monitor each other (Pagano/Röell 1998; Maury/Pajuste 2005). De-
pending on which interaction mechanism is assumed to prevail, different predictions about 
the effect on firm value and performance emerge. Although the presence of several block 
holders might be harmful to monitoring and intervention due to free rider problems, 
Edmans and Manso (2011) show that through competitive disciplinary trading the firm’s 
stock price incorporates more information. Eventually, the disciplining effect on the man-
agement is greater as compared to the case of one large shareholder, or several colluding 
block holders. In another model, Dhillon and Rossetto (2015) theoretically show that a 
second smaller block holder can emerge endogenously when agency conflicts and the dif-
ference in risk preferences between one big block holder and many small shareholders are 
severe. Unlike small shareholders, the biggest block holder is relatively undiversified and 
therefore prefers less risk. In this situation, a smaller block holder is able to mitigate the 
conflict of interest. This leads to a more risky investment strategy and ultimately to higher 
firm value.
48
 Empirically, Laeven and Levine (2008) show that a sizeable proportion 
(about one third) of European firms have multiple large owners. They find that firms with 
several large shareholders have higher firm values than firms with a single block holder. 
However, the difference between the cash flow rights of the two largest owners seems to 
play a crucial role as the documented results only apply to firms with a small difference. 
Conversely, a large difference in cash flow rights is associated with a negative impact on 
firm value. The authors argue that their results are consistent with the model by Bennedsen 
and Wolfenzon (2000). Furthermore, Noe (2002) shows that activism by strategic investors 
does not increase monotonically in the size of the stake. In fact, when there are several 
large shareholders the smallest shareholders are most active. This is consistent with en-
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trenchment effects governing the behavior of the largest shareholder (Claessens et al. 
2002). 
One notable exception to the large shareholder literature has emerged. In the standard 
models of corporate ownership structure, the impact of small shareholders is often neglect-
ed due to their allegedly little voting impact, the lack of coordinated action, and the result-
ing free rider problem. Hence, these standard models draw the conclusion that small share-
holders have no influence on corporate governance. Kandel et al. (2011) question this 
widespread belief and hypothesize that a homogenous group of small shareholders reacts to 
information in the same way as one large shareholder. On the basis of similar characteris-
tics, a hidden coordination mechanism is formed which makes those shareholders act joint-
ly as one group. Due to a similar age, wealth level, or location, the small shareholders’ 
actions unintentionally become coordinated and a credible threat of a stock price decrease 
arises if all small shareholders sell on the same piece of negative information. In this way, 
they can actually discipline the firm’s management, and influence the decision making 
process and finally firm performance. Kandel et al. (2011) identify shareholders’ age as 
“unifying” characteristic. 
The presence of large shareholders likewise comes at a price.
49
 So far, it has been argued 
that large investors can mitigate managerial inefficiencies by means of their power to con-
trol the management and to intervene. In consequence, their presence is supposed to cause 
performance increases. However, the objectives they pursue need not always coincide with 
those of all other shareholders (Shleifer/Vishny 1997). Instead, large shareholders may 
exploit their control power and try to generate private benefits of control. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) identify three types of costs of large investors: direct expropriation, en-
gagement in non-value-maximizing behavior (just like managerial shareholders), and the 
resulting effects on the incentives of other stakeholders. The pursuit of private benefits of 
control may include large shareholders initiating payments of special dividends to them-
selves, entrenchment effects (Berger et al. 1997; Claessens et al. 2002), preventing value-
increasing takeovers (Stulz 1988; Slovin/Sushka 1993), or the preference of an existing 
business relationship to the firm over disciplining its inefficient management (Brickley et 
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al. 1988; Pound 1988).
50
 Moreover, incentives of stakeholders, such as those of managers 
and employees, could suffer if the block holder cannot credibly convince them that she will 
not act for her private benefit ex post (Shleifer/Vishny 1997). In anticipation of an impend-
ing exploitation, stakeholders reduce their effort ex ante causing firm performance to dete-
riorate. For example, Burkart et al. (1997) present a model in which the prospect of discre-
tion incentivizes the management to search for valuable investment opportunities or, more 
generally, to make firm-specific investments which is beneficial to firm value. However, if 
the management is exposed to excessive monitoring by large shareholders, managers will 
probably not exert the same effort. The model thus derives a “tradeoff between control and 
initiative” (Burkart et al. 1997, p. 694). In the case of small shareholders, the threat of ex-
propriation might make the investors demand a higher return on their investment. This can 
lead to an increase in the firm’s cost of capital, or in the extreme case make small share-
holders unwilling to supply equity capital to the firm. The same applies to potential credi-
tors if they perceive a credible threat that the large shareholder will expropriate them, e.g. 
by undertaking highly risky projects (risk shifting) (Shleifer/Vishny 1997).
51
 In summary, 
it should be noted that despite their often cited role as performance enhancing monitors, 
large shareholders may be motivated by different incentives depending on their specific 
type and their relation to the firm. Furthermore, their presence is also associated with the 
disadvantages of a more concentrated ownership. Accordingly, their overall effect may not 
always be beneficial. 
2.4.3 Changes in ownership over time 
Many of the aforementioned empirical studies have drawn their conclusions on the relation 
between ownership and performance based on cross-sectional analyses. This can be prob-
lematic for several reasons, such as uncertainty about the direction of causality (see e.g. 
Jensen/Warner 1988). I will elaborate on this issue in much more detail in section 2.6. One 
possible remedy is to look at changes in ownership and the associated changes in firm val-
ue (McConnell et al. 2008; Fahlenbrach/Stulz 2009). Therefore, in a first step, this subsec-
tion presents both theoretical and empirical papers on corporate takeovers and block pur-
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 Barclay and Holderness (1989) find an average premium of 20% paid in block trades which they attribute 
to the existence of private benefits of control accruing solely to the owner of the block. 
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 For example, Anderson et al. (2003) show that publicly traded companies with a founding family owner 
have lower costs of debt financing since these owners are committed to the firm. On the contrary, outside 
block holders do not have such a lowering impact on the cost of debt. Furthermore, if the largest ultimate 
owner has control rights significantly in excess of cash flow rights the costs of borrowing to the firm increase 
(Lin et al. 2011). In general, firms with government ownership likewise face higher costs of borrowing 
(Borisova et al. 2015). 
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chases and their respective performance impact. This allows gaining additional insights 
into the relation between ownership and performance. Moreover, in the sense of my corpo-
rate governance framework takeovers can be viewed as an external control mechanism for 
disciplining the firm’s management when internal mechanisms, such as monitoring by the 
board of directors or by shareholders, have failed (e.g. Jensen/Ruback 1983; Morck et al. 
1989; Köke 2004). Again, there is such large body of literature on this very topic that I can 
only consider a few papers in this subsection of my review. Comprehensive literature re-
views that specifically focus on corporate ownership changes comprise Jensen and Ruback 
(1983), Jarrell et al. (1988), and Martynova and Renneboog (2008) on takeovers, or Palepu 
(1990) on leveraged buyouts (LBOs); see also Jensen (1988) for a summary on the causes 
and consequences of takeovers. 
In the context of takeovers, the theoretical model by Stulz (1988) relates the probability of 
a successful tender offer and the premium offered to the proportion of voting rights the 
management controls. Since the management does not want to give up control, managers 
try to accumulate a greater stake in the firm when they face a takeover threat. Thus, a po-
tential bidder has to pay a higher premium at low to moderate levels of managerial owner-
ship. This premium will be reflected in the firm’s market valuation ex ante. At very high 
levels of managerial ownership, however, any takeover attempt is unlikely to succeed. 
Hence, the firm’s market valuation no longer incorporates a takeover premium. Thus, Stulz 
(1988) derives the inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and firm val-
ue from a takeover model. This relation has also been documented empirically (see subsec-
tion 2.4.1). Slovin and Sushka (1993) also provide supportive empirical evidence. They 
analyze firms that become targets of takeover bids following the death of an inside block 
holder and find a positive share price effect around this time. The authors thus conclude 
that their findings are consistent with the model by Stulz (1988) in the sense of entrenched 
managers preventing valuable takeovers. A somewhat similar model has been proposed by 
Harris and Raviv (1988a). It also focuses on managerial behavior when the firm faces a 
takeover bid. Similarly, a looming takeover leads to an increase in managerial ownership 
resulting in a positive shareholder wealth effect due to the expected takeover premium. 
However, the model’s emphasis is on capital structure. Managers repurchase outside equity 
in order to increase their stake in the firm. The necessary funds are raised by issuing debt. 
In this way, leverage in combination with managerial ownership serves as a takeover de-
fense. Another model by Israel (1992) assumes that managers set both ownership structure 
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and capital structure in order to profit from potential takeover attempts. The voting rights 
enable managers to block undesirable takeovers whereas leverage increases the price a 
potential bidder has to pay. Israel (1992) emphasizes that capital and ownership structure 
are related to the outcome of corporate control contests and thus to firm value and should 
therefore not be analyzed in isolation. 
Empirically, mergers and acquisitions have been found in numerous studies to increase 
target shareholder value and performance (e.g. Jensen/Ruback 1983; Servaes 1991; Healy 
et al. 1992). Typically, researchers argue that value creations are caused by (expected fu-
ture) productivity increases (e.g. Maksimovic/Phillips 2001; Maksimovic et al. 2011). Re-
cently, in a more detailed analysis, Li (2013) finds that this is achieved through more effi-
cient use of capital and labor input whereas output remains fairly constant. 
Leveraged buyouts and management buyouts (MBO) are special types of corporate control 
transactions. These buyouts are typically financed by a considerable amount of debt which 
has a disciplinary effect on the management (Jensen 1986, 1997). After the LBO, leverage 
typically remains at augmented levels (Cohn et al. 2014). Additionally, the transactions 
substantially change the firm’s ownership structure. First, they are usually characterized by 
a significant increase in managerial ownership which fosters incentive alignment (Palepu 
1990). Second, large equity investors, so-called buyout specialists, hold a significant equity 
stake in the firm which enhances active monitoring (Cotter/Peck 2001). In line with this 
reasoning, buyouts have consistently been found to increase performance and value (e.g. 
Kaplan 1989; Lichtenberg/Siegel 1990; Smith 1990). However, Ofek (1994) raises the 
question whether this is actually due to organizational changes implemented following the 
buyout or whether the management has inside information about the future prospects of the 
firm and simply profits from it by taking the firm private. This questions the direction of 
causality. The author finds evidence in support of the former hypothesis since failed MBOs 
do not generate any performance improvements.
52
 Following a successful restructuring of 
the firm that was taken private, managers and buyout specialists want to cash in their gains 
and either sell the firm to a private investor or conduct an initial public offerings (IPO). For 
the latter case, called reverse LBOs, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) find increases in 
profitability over the years when the firm has been private (as this information is disclosed 
in the IPO prospectus). This is again consistent with the view that LBO-induced organiza-
                                                 
52
 Lee (1992) arrives at a similar conclusion with a somewhat different study design. 
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tional changes create a more efficient governance structure. Similar evidence is provided 
by Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993).
53
 
However, most of the aforementioned studies have analyzed transactions of the 1980s 
wave of buyouts and takeovers. In a recent paper, Guo et al. (2011) raise the question 
whether these results still hold for a newer sample from 1990 to 2006. They document that 
operating performance improvements are not significantly superior to those of benchmark 
firms. Decomposing buyout returns, they additionally find that rising industry valuations as 
well as tax gains from higher leverage ratios have approximately the same relative im-
portance as enhanced operating performance. Thus, while part of the performance im-
provements can be attributed to less agency problems as a result of enhanced monitoring 
and incentive alignment, a sizeable proportion of the financial success comes from industry 
development and the exploitability of debt-related tax advantages. This casts doubt on the 
persistence of value creation through buyouts, especially in periods of financial and credit 
crises (Guo et al. 2011). Moreover, Cohn et al. (2014) conclude that improved operating 
performance documented in previous studies is restricted to the sample of LBOs with pub-
licly available financial statements. In contrast, the performance improvement over all 
LBOs is only slight. 
Another important aspect in this line of research is the market for partial corporate control. 
As changes in corporate governance are not only accomplished by a complete change of 
control, purchases of minority equity blocks are also relevant. Empirical evidence indicates 
that these transactions are accompanied by increases in shareholder value as well as operat-
ing performance (Holderness/Sheehan 1985; Barclay/Holderness 1991; Bethel et al. 1998; 
Drees et al. 2013). This is especially true when the new block holder takes on an active 
controlling role. This supports the notion of value increases due to monitoring activities by 
the new block holder which eliminates prevailing inefficiencies in the target firm (see also 
Cornelli et al. 2013).
54
 
In a theoretical model, Burkart et al. (2000) show that assuming corporate control through 
public block trades is better suited to enhance firm value than negotiated trades are. This is 
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 Post IPO performance of reverse LBOs is studied e.g. by Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993), and 
Holthausen and Larcker (1996). 
54
 Germany constitutes a notable exception. In this market characterized by concentrated ownership and 
weaker shareholder protection (as compared to the US), share block sales do not induce similar control 
changes that lead to overall shareholder value increases (Franks/Mayer 2001a). Hence, the legal environment 
has to be taken into account when evaluating the effectiveness of the market for corporate control. 
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because the former mechanism increases ownership concentration and thereby lowers the 
level of extractable private benefits. Additional related evidence is provided by Wruck 
(1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993) who find positive value effects following private 
placements of equity (as opposed to negative effects when public offerings are announced, 
see e.g. Masulis and Korwar (1986)). This is consistent with the notion that increases in 
ownership concentration lead to enhanced monitoring activities. 
2.5 The relation between leverage and ownership 
Apart from a few exceptions, the focus of this chapter has been on how both leverage and 
ownership individually impact the performance and/or value of a firm.
55
 However, these 
two financial policies could also be interdependent which would further increase the com-
plexity of the relation between capital structure, ownership structure, and performance. 
Assuming that firms have an optimal capital structure (independent of the underlying theo-
ry), managers could have several motives for deviating from the optimal leverage ratio. 
These motives arise due to managers’ pursuit of personal objectives instead of adhering to 
shareholder value maximization. First, low leverage ratios could be preferred because risk-
averse managers are typically relatively undiversified since they often hold a notable frac-
tion of the firm’s equity and have their entire human capital invested in the firm (e.g. Fama 
1980; Friend/Lang 1988; Berk et al. 2010).
56
 Hence, they try to limit the risk of their own 
portfolios by lowering leverage.
57
 Second, managers dislike the performance pressure im-
posed on them by corporate debt in the sense of the free cash flow theory (Jensen 1986). 
As entrenched managers’ discretion is restricted by debt they prefer lower leverage ratios. 
Alternatively, in corporate control contests managers might choose to increase leverage 
beyond optimal levels in order to augment their voting power (Harris/Raviv 1988a; Stulz 
1988). 
The empirical findings on this issue have been somewhat contradictory. A negative rela-
tion between leverage and managerial ownership has been documented by Friend and Lang 
(1988) as well as Berger et al. (1997). They attribute this to managerial entrenchment. On 
the other hand, some studies find evidence of a positive relation between leverage and 
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 These exceptions comprise the signaling model by Leland and Pyle (1977), or the takeover models by 
Harris and Raviv (1988a), Stulz (1988), and Israel (1992). 
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 Holderness et al. (1999) point out that due to lower volatility and better hedging opportunities managerial 
equity holdings have actually increased during the course of the twentieth century (contrary to the 
Berle/Means hypothesis). Nonetheless, diversification remains an issue of concern for top managers. 
57
 Put differently, managers face “human costs of bankruptcy” (Berk et al. 2010). 
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managerial ownership (e.g. Kim/Sorensen 1986; Agrawal/Knoeber 1996; Short et al. 
2002), or a non-monotonic inverted U-shaped relation (Brailsford et al. 2002). In an effort 
to reconcile these empirical findings, several theoretical models have been proposed. 
Zwiebel (1996) and Morellec (2004) suggest a trade-off theory in which managers balance 
their personal incentive to build empires and their wish to remain in control. Hence, they 
still issue sufficient debt in order to avoid challenges from the market for corporate control. 
In a further model, Morellec et al. (2012) demonstrate that moderate agency costs can ac-
tually account for the low leverage ratios observed empirically. Thus, a tradeoff model 
seems to reconcile the contradictory findings. On the one hand, managers are entrenched 
and pursue their own objectives. On the other hand, they do not deviate too much from 
optimal financing policies in order to avoid being replaced (see also Wang 2011). Thus, 
leverage first rises with increasing managerial ownership. However, beyond a certain own-
ership level the threat of a control challenge decreases because managers control a suffi-
ciently large fraction of voting rights and, consequently, leverage also decreases. 
In the presence of large shareholders, however, leverage ratios are significantly higher 
(Friend/Lang 1988; Brailsford et al. 2002). This is consistent with the view that large 
shareholders monitor and discipline the management which mitigates agency problems. On 
the other hand, if the block holder has control rights in excess of cash flow rights she tries 
to avoid too much lender monitoring by banks and instead prefers financing through public 
debt (Lin et al. 2013). This supports the view that large shareholders likewise entrench 
themselves (Claessens et al. 2002). Moreover, Berger et al. (1997) document that manage-
rial entrenchment reducing shocks, such as takeover attempts, dismissal of the CEO, intro-
duction of higher performance incentives, or the appointment of a large stockholder to the 
board, increase firms’ leverage ratios. By analyzing the relation in the light of external 
shocks, the authors also dissipate concerns for endogeneity. In the following section, I deal 
with this issue in more detail. 
2.6 Endogeneity 
“[E]ndogeneity [...] can [be] loosely define[d] as a correlation between the explanato-
ry variables and the error term in a regression. Endogeneity leads to biased and incon-
sistent parameter estimates that make reliable inference virtually impossible. In many 
cases, endogeneity can be severe enough to reverse even qualitative inference.” 
(Roberts/Whited 2012, p.6) 
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In the previous sections, the employed empirical methodologies have mostly been disre-
garded. Thus, it has not been considered whether researchers have controlled for potential 
endogeneity or not. However, as suggested by the above citation, the applied methodology 
can have a critical impact on the results of empirical corporate finance studies and conse-
quently on the conclusions that can be drawn. The majority of the aforementioned early 
papers did not address this issue. These studies use ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sions (e.g. Morck et al. 1988; McConnell/Servaes 1990) and do not consider the potential 
pitfalls to this approach (in detail).
58
 This does not necessarily mean that these results are 
incorrect, but the papers do often not consider alternative explanations for their regression 
results. Applying additional tests could uncover spurious results and disprove causal rela-
tions. 
Considering the relation between capital structure, ownership structure, and performance, 
how does endogeneity change or affect the results from the previous sections? In order to 
answer this question, I focus again on a few prominent papers selected from renowned 
finance journals that have addressed this issue in this specific field. Hence, I do not intend 
to provide a complete overview on endogeneity in the field of corporate finance.
59
 The 
reason why I deal with this issue in a separate section is to highlight its importance and 
provide some insights as to how the research field has evolved over time. As econometric 
methodologies continue to progress, it seems natural that the results of older studies are 
challenged. However, still today there are proponents of both lines of research: Those who 
believe in a causal relation between, for example, ownership and firm value and those who 
deny it. To begin with, I review the causes and consequences of endogeneity (2.6.1) as 
well as some remedies that have been proposed (2.6.2). In subsection 2.6.3, I briefly deal 
with two popular papers and their contribution to the debate on endogeneity. First, I briefly 
present a theory that tries to reconcile the two aforementioned opposing academic opinions 
(subsection 2.6.3.1). Second, subsection 2.6.3.2 presents a structural model by Coles et al. 
(2012) that challenges most of the previous literature on endogeneity and the suggested 
standard methodologies to overcome it. 
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 Morck et al. (1988) note that ownership and firm value might be jointly determined by various external 
factors and add control variables to their regression, such as research and development expenditures, adver-
tising expenditures, and the leverage ratio. 
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 The interested reader is referred to the extensive survey by Roberts and Whited (2012). 
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2.6.1 Causes of endogeneity 
In the research field of financial policies and firm value, endogeneity may arise due to 
simultaneity, unobservable heterogeneity, and reverse causality (Wintoki et al. 2012).
60
 
First, simultaneity occurs when the dependent and the independent variable are jointly de-
termined in equilibrium (Roberts/Whited 2012). Among the first to emphasize this issue in 
the context of firm ownership and performance were Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985).
61
 They argue that ownership is determined in a way that maximizes firm val-
ue. Each transaction in which shares of a (public or private) company are sold is guided by 
the overall objective of shareholders to maximize profits. Accordingly, the emerging own-
ership structure reflects the profit maximizing behavior of the firm’s shareholders 
(Demsetz/Villalonga 2001). Therefore, firms with inefficient ownership structures should 
disappear in efficient capital markets and there should be no predictable patterns between 
ownership and performance. Empirical evidence in support of this notion is provided by 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). 
A second cause of endogeneity can be unobserved heterogeneity. It occurs when the de-
pendent and the independent variable in a regression are affected by the same (exogenous) 
factor that cannot be measured directly. This suggests that empirically documented patterns 
between ownership and performance could be spurious due to the failure to account for 
unobservable firm characteristics and/or the environment in which the firm operates. 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) emphasize the importance of this topic. They provide an example 
in which a firm’s market power might simultaneously affect its performance, since the firm 
can extract higher rents from its customers, and its ownership structure. As the disciplinary 
effect of market competition on managers is impeded by the firm’s market power, manag-
ers enjoy a higher level of discretion. Therefore, higher levels of managerial ownership are 
required in order to align managers’ incentives. Hence, higher market power causes higher 
managerial ownership as well as higher performance. If the heterogeneity in market power 
between firms is not accounted for empirical tests will show a positive relation between 
ownership and performance which is, in fact, spurious. Related theoretical argumentation 
and empirical evidence can also be found in Palia (2001). Both papers conclude that there 
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 Roberts and Whited (2012) also name omitted variables and measurement errors as sources of endogeneity. 
I assume these to be subcategories of heterogeneity. That is, in trying to account for (unobserved) heteroge-
neity some variables might be either omitted or measured incorrectly. 
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 Jensen and Warner (1988) also raise concerns about the validity of cross-sectional analyses in order to 
infer causal relations between ownership and firm value. 
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is in fact no relation between ownership and performance even though OLS regressions 
show statistically significant coefficient estimates. 
Third, reverse causality also causes endogeneity. In the context of ownership and perfor-
mance, researchers have often assumed that the former causes the latter, e.g. through con-
vergence of interests and entrenchment effects. However, the causality might also run in 
the opposite direction. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) as well as Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) illustrate this with two examples: insider trading and management compensation. If 
managers know the future prospects of the firm and buy shares on the basis of their private 
information high expected future performance will induce higher managerial ownership, 
not vice versa.
62
 Likewise, when managers get compensated with stock options good firm 
performance can lead to increases in managerial ownership when managers exercise their 
options, everything else being equal. Evidence in support of this notion is provided by 
Loderer and Martin (1997), and Cho (1998). Although I have focused on the relation be-
tween ownership and performance to illustrate the issue of endogeneity, it also applies to 
the relation of performance and leverage (see e.g. Berger/Bonaccorsi di Patti 2006; 
Parsons/Titman 2011), performance and other financial policies (e.g. Jensen et al. 1992; 
Wang 2011), as well as performance and other aspects of corporate governance (e.g. 
Agrawal/Knoeber 1996; Wintoki et al. 2012). Ultimately, the argument by Demsetz (1983) 
implies that all financial policies of the firm are set in a way to maximize shareholder val-
ue. 
2.6.2 Remedies for endogeneity 
In consequence, a lot of tests, alternative methodologies and research designs as well as 
more sophisticated models have been proposed in order to remedy the effects of potential 
endogeneity. An initial approach was to study time-series evidence.
63
 In comparison to 
cross-sectional analyses, it is less likely flawed simply because “time does not run back-
ward” (Koop 2005, p. 187). This means that due to their chronological order, it is clear that 
past events can cause present or future ones, not vice versa. This is why subsection 2.4.3 
on corporate control transactions is included in this survey. When such a transaction takes 
place and organizational restructurings are subsequently implemented, performance in-
creases are likely caused by the preceding events. Another way to circumvent the 
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 Ofek (1994) investigates this hypothesis for the performance of firms after MBOs (see subsection 2.4.3). 
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 Some early studies used cross-sectional data from different individual years (e.g. 1976 and 1986) in order 
to check their results for robustness (e.g. McConnell/Servaes 1990; Hermalin/Weisbach 1991). 
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endogeneity problem is to study the effects of unpredictable exogenous shocks (e.g. 
Kole/Lehn 1997; Zingales 1998; Garvey/Hanka 1999; Campello 2003). In such situations, 
exogenous environmental changes (e.g. (de-)regulation or macroeconomic shocks) provide 
an opportunity to study changes in leverage and/or ownership and their subsequent impact 
on performance. Difference-in-differences estimators are a popular tool to investigate the 
effect caused by exogenous environmental shifts. Alternatively, it has been suggested to 
examine samples of firms in which financial policies are less likely to suffer from 
endogeneity. In a study of non-listed Chinese firms, the authors argue that ownership is 
predominantly exogenously determined due to the restrictive institutional market charac-
teristics and the non-existence of a secondary market for the firm’s shares (Hu/Zhou 2008). 
In contrast to US studies on ownership and performance, concerns for endogeneity are al-
leviated and the assumed direction of causation seems more robust. 
The use of panel data in regressions takes the idea of time-series evidence one step further 
(e.g. Himmelberg et al. 1999; Palia 2001; King/Santor 2008). Moreover, these regression 
models can incorporate (firm) fixed or random effects in order to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity. However, Zhou (2001) questions the conclusion of Himmelberg et al. 
(1999) by illustrating that by using their methodology, it would be highly unlikely to detect 
any relation between ownership and performance even if it actually existed.
64
 The author 
agrees that endogeneity is an important issue, but the use of panel data regressions with 
firm fixed effects (FE) does not solve the problem. Additionally, Börsch-Supan and Köke 
note that even if firm fixed effects are constant over time (which is a necessary condition 
for their application) “estimating fixed effects does not explain why there is variation be-
tween firms” (2002, p. 303). In the context of corporate governance, this leaves the most 
relevant question unanswered, i.e. which differences in firm policies and/or characteristics 
are the main drivers of performance enhancement (Börsch-Supan/Köke 2002). 
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 Zhou (2001) argues that the use of firm fixed effects eliminates any cross-sectional variation from the 
sample. However, since cross-sectional differences in managerial ownership are substantially greater than 
yearly changes within the same firm, they are the main reason for differing managerial incentives. Accord-
ingly, when managers maximize their expected long-term utility, small year-to-year changes in ownership do 
not alter managerial incentives remarkably and hence do not significantly influence the firm’s performance. 
Zhou thus concludes that the results of Himmelberg et al. (1999) do not prove that managerial ownership 
may not have an influence on performance through the alignment of incentives. In order to alleviate this 
concern, Benson and Davidson III (2009) apply pay-performance semi-elasticity as a measure for managerial 
incentives which exhibits a greater within firm variation. In this way, the authors confirm the finding of an 
inverted U-shaped relation, even after controlling for endogeneity. 
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Furthermore, it has been criticized that former studies analyze levels of ownership and lev-
els of performance (in the cross-section of firms) in order to draw inferences on how 
changes in managerial ownership might lead to changes in firm performance. However, 
different levels of managerial ownership could be caused by unobserved heterogeneity 
between firms (Demsetz 1983; Himmelberg et al. 1999). In this case, changing the level of 
managerial ownership would not improve performance in the predicted manner. In order to 
overcome this problem, it has been proposed to directly examine changes in ownership and 
the related changes in firm value (McConnell et al. 2008; Fahlenbrach/Stulz 2009). The 
latter study investigates the impact on firm value by previous year’s changes in managerial 
ownership. The authors argue that changes in managerial ownership do not become public-
ly known instantaneously. Thus, the ownership change and the resulting alignment of in-
centives will only have an effect in the subsequent year. In contrast, it is unlikely that 
changes in firm value in year t+1 cause changes in ownership in year t which alleviates 
concerns for endogeneity.
65
 McConnell et al. (2008) employ event study methodology to 
measure the abnormal share price effect when insider share purchases are announced. By 
measuring the effect over a time period of only 6 days, the short-term change in sharehold-
er value can be directly attributed to the purchase announcement because confounding 
events less likely occur during a 6-day event window or can be controlled for. 
Another econometric tool that has been proposed to account for endogeneity is the use of 
instrumental variables (IV). An IV replaces the endogenous independent variable in the 
regression and should be sufficiently correlated to it.
66
 However, the IV must not be corre-
lated to the error term (Roberts/Whited 2012). While a lot of researchers in accounting and 
corporate finance use IVs (e.g. Himmelberg et al. 1999; Palia 2001; Anderson et al. 2003; 
Bhagat/Bolton 2008), they rarely justify their use economically or by appropriate diagnos-
tic tests (Larcker/Rusticus 2010). Larcker and Rusticus (2010) point out that if the em-
ployed IVs are also (slightly) endogenous, the resulting estimates could be even more bi-
ased than those received from standard OLS regressions without adjustments. They also 
draw the attention to a common pitfall when IVs are used as a robustness check: Just be-
cause the IV results are similar to those obtained from OLS regressions does not necessari-
ly mean that endogeneity is not an issue. Instead, the IV could be invalid and thus fails to 
remedy the endogeneity bias. Accordingly, the remaining challenge to the researcher is to 
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 IVs are often used in two-stage least square regressions, see below (Roberts/Whited 2012). 
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find valid instruments. In this context, Börsch-Supan and Köke note that “potentially all 
firm-specific variables are endogenous” (2002, p. 303).67, 68 They thus conclude that only 
variables that are actually determined outside the firm, such as variables concerning the 
macroeconomic or the regulatory environment, are reliable instruments. This refers back to 
the above mentioned exogenous shocks as ideal natural situations to investigate the relation 
between leverage, ownership, and performance. 
If endogeneity problems are caused by simultaneity, the model to be estimated can consist 
of several simultaneous equations.
69
 In this case, OLS estimates are inconsistent and re-
searchers often apply two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation (Gujarati/Porter 2009). In 
the first stage, the endogenous variable is regressed on all predetermined (exogenous) vari-
ables of the system of simultaneous equations. In the second stage, the resulting fitted val-
ues of the endogenous variable are used as instruments in the other equation(s) (Gujara-
ti/Porter 2009). Papers employing 2SLS regressions include Jensen et al. (1992); Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996); Kovenock and Phillips (1997); Loderer and Martin (1997); Cho 
(1998); Demsetz and Villalonga (2001); Palia (2001); Woidtke (2002); Harvey et al. 
(2004); Campello (2006); Bhagat and Bolton (2008); Gompers et al. (2010); Kandel et al. 
(2011); Kim and Lu (2011) among others. However, caution should be exercised since the 
application of 2SLS to small samples or the existence of further endogenous independent 
variables may produce biased coefficient estimates (Gujarati/Porter 2009; Roberts/Whited 
2012). 
2.6.3 Two selected models concerning endogeneity 
2.6.3.1 Transaction cost theory 
As illustrated above, the use of econometric refinements casts doubt on the formerly estab-
lished relations between capital structure, ownership structure, and performance as well as 
firm value. Nonetheless, the former results are based on the solid theoretical foundation of 
agency theory, or more specifically the hypotheses of convergence of interests and mana-
gerial entrenchment (e.g. Morck et al. 1988; McConnell/Servaes 1990). Thus, they have an 
economically intuitive appeal which makes it difficult for researchers to discard them be-
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 Cheung and Wei (2006) provide support for this view by showing that firm characteristics that are usually 
significant determinants of insider ownership become insignificant in their model specification that allows 
for ownership adjustment costs. Such a model is presented in subsection 2.6.3.1. 
68
 Campello (2006) tries to tackle this problem by using GMM estimation. 
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 Typically, there is one equation for each endogenous variable in which this variable is the regressand 
(Gujarati/Porter 2009). 
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cause of simultaneity concerns, consistent with the equilibrium approach by Demsetz 
(1983). The transaction cost theory by Core and Larcker (2002) attempts to reconcile these 
two competing lines of research. It adds two important assumptions to the existing litera-
ture. First, optimal managerial ownership may change over time, i.e. it is dynamic rather 
than static.
70
 Second, firms face costs when they want to adjust their ownership structure 
(just like they bear costs for adjusting their capital structure). In line with the equilibrium 
approach, the theory by Core and Larcker (2002) implies that the ownership structure of a 
firm (including managerial ownership) is set in a way to maximize firm value. Hence, ini-
tially they assume no cross-sectional relation between managerial ownership and firm val-
ue. However, after the contracts are fixed, managerial ownership may diverge from its op-
timum. This could cause distortions in managerial incentives and consequently a decline in 
firm value (consistent with the agency literature). Thus, in order to re-establish equilibrium 
firms need to adjust their contracts. However, as firms incur costs they will only adjust 
their ownership structure when the associated costs are offset by the subsequent gain in 
firm value. In consequence, the firm value can remain below its maximum due to a subop-
timal ownership structure when transaction costs prevent continuous rebalancing.
71
 Empir-
ical evidence in support of this view is also provided by Core and Larcker (2002) who ana-
lyze the adoption of target ownership plans. Subsequent to these mandatory executive 
ownership increases, the authors find enhanced stock and accounting performance. Tong 
(2008) analyzes share purchases and sales by CEOs in order to determine the impact of 
persistent suboptimal ownership on firm value. While Core and Larcker (2002) as well as 
McConnell et al. (2008) only provide evidence that increases in managerial ownership are 
associated with subsequent increases in firm value, Tong (2008) shows that deviations 
from optimal ownership levels in both directions are related to a lower firm value. In turn, 
when CEO ownership changes towards the optimum level positive abnormal stock returns 
can be observed (Tong 2008). Further support for the transaction cost theory is presented 
by Cheung and Wei (2006) who use a system-GMM (generalized method of moments) 
approach to analyze the relation between insider ownership and firm value. However, the 
transaction cost theory has also been challenged for exaggerating the importance of such 
costs. Using a simple numerical example, Coles et al. (2012) illustrate that it is highly un-
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 See e.g. Helwege et al. (2007) for a detailed analysis of the dynamics of managerial ownership over the 
lifetime of a firm. 
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 Core and Larcker (2002) point out that the theory by Demsetz (1983) can be interpreted as a model without 
adjustment cost wherein continuous re-contracting of ownership is possible. In contrast, the view by Morck 
et al. (1988) (among others) implies infinite adjustment costs and consequently no re-contracting at all. 
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likely that the observed range of variation in managerial ownership can be explained by the 
existence of reasonable adjustment costs. 
2.6.3.2 A structural model of the firm 
Finally, a model is briefly presented that has gained considerable attention. Based on the 
idea by Demsetz (1983) that ownership and firm value are jointly determined in equilibri-
um, Coles et al. (2012) specify a structural model of the firm. In an agency setting, they 
suppose that shareholders jointly select the size of the firm (as a result of aggregate in-
vestment decisions) and managerial ownership (as part of the compensation contract) such 
that firm value is maximized. These three items are thus endogenous and depend on exog-
enous firm parameters. The authors determine the (unobservable) productivity of manage-
rial input and of investment (the input parameters of the firm’s production function) such 
that the outcome of the structural model (the optimal choices of CEO ownership and in-
vestment) is consistent with their actual sample data. With the productivity parameters 
thereby obtained, their model produces the inverted-U shape between managerial owner-
ship and firm value that has often been documented. However, the relation is spurious 
since the two variables are simultaneously determined by the unobservable productivity 
parameters. Moreover, the authors show that none of the standard remedies for simultanei-
ty (i.e. proxy variables for unobservable heterogeneity, panel regressions with firm fixed 
effects, or instrumental variables) are able to uncover the spuriousness of the relation. 
When these standard techniques are applied the results still suggest the existence of an in-
verted-U shape. This emphasizes the importance of the use of adequate econometric meth-
ods and even more crucially an underlying model of the firm that is able to incorporate all 
relevant issues. 
2.7 Open issues and discrepancies in the literature 
After having dealt with methodological issues in the previous section, this section reviews 
papers that address issues concerning the measurement of the key variables of interest of 
this review, i.e. capital structure, ownership and firm performance. Emphasis is put on the 
questions which difficulties can arise and why popular estimation methods could be 
flawed. Differences in the measures used or the estimation procedures applied can also 
complicate direct comparisons between empirical studies. Finally, further governance-
related aspects that might have an impact on the corporate governance function of capital 
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and ownership structure will be discussed as well as whether these different mechanisms 
can be viewed as substitutes or complements. 
To begin, I focus on the variables used and how they are typically defined. The definitions 
of all three variables of interest usually differ across studies. First, the definition of owner-
ship is probably the one with least congruence.
72
 Concerning managerial ownership, the 
ownership of the CEO only (e.g. Zhou 2001; Tong 2008; Kim/Lu 2011), of all current and 
previous CEOs who are still on the board (Hermalin/Weisbach 1991), of all directors of the 
firm (Morck et al. 1988), or of all directors and officers (e.g. McConnell/Servaes 1990; 
Agrawal/Knoeber 1996; Himmelberg et al. 1999; Helwege et al. 2007; Fahlenbrach/Stulz 
2009) have been investigated. This can be problematic for several reasons. On the one 
hand, to consider only CEO ownership essentially assumes that solely the incentives of the 
CEO matter. According to this view, shareholders would only try to incentivize the CEO 
and assume that this would prevent any non-value-maximizing behavior within the firm.
73
 
On the other hand, taking into account the share ownership of the entire board of directors 
and the firm’s top management assumes that all directors and officers pursue the same ob-
jectives. This is somewhat unlikely considering the potential heterogeneity of the board, 
e.g. representatives of large shareholders versus top managers (Demsetz/Villalonga 
2001).
74
 In a recent study of bank ownership and corporate governance, Benson and 
Davidson III (2009) highlight the importance of lower-level managerial ownership (e.g. of 
vice presidents). They distinguish this measure from higher-level managerial ownership (of 
chief officers) and conclude that only the former has a significant impact on a bank’s risk 
taking behavior and, finally, on its probability of default. As lower-level management has 
typically more direct influence on a firm’s daily operations, this approach seems promising 
for future research on the relation between leverage, ownership, and firm value as well. 
Moreover, other papers promote the idea that the commonly used ownership measure, i.e. 
managerial stock ownership as percentage of shares outstanding, is an insufficient proxy 
for managers’ incentives. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) point out that not all shifts in rela-
tive managerial ownership cause changes in incentives. Managers’ stake can also decrease 
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 A similar issue in the context of large shareholders has been raised in the survey by Short (1994, pp. 223-
224). 
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 On the contrary, Kim and Lu (2011) argue that CEO ownership is a more relevant determinant of firm 
value as the top executive is involved in all decisions. Total insider ownership, on the contrary, can be biased 
e.g. by a fluctuating number of insiders. The authors argue that such effects complicate the analysis of the 
impact of ownership on firm value and performance. 
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 Similar concerns are raised by Morck et al. (1988) and Short (1994). 
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e.g. when the firm issues shares. This does not necessarily imply that managerial incentives 
deteriorate. According to the authors, it is the sensitivity of managers’ personal wealth to 
firm value that matters. When this sensitivity is unaffected, changes in relative managerial 
ownership do not matter. Thus, it is not sufficient to analyze changes in (relative) manage-
rial ownership but instead to distinguish between different reasons for those changes, e.g. 
whether managers actively sell or purchase shares (Fahlenbrach/Stulz 2009). In addition to 
stocks, Palia (2001) also considers CEO stock options. He argues that his measure, called 
pay-performance sensitivity, is better suited as a proxy for the provided performance in-
centives than stock ownership only. Based on Hall and Liebman (1998), Benson and 
Davidson III (2009) propose another measure that focuses on the dollar value of manageri-
al ownership (stocks and options) and how this dollar value changes if firm value varies by 
1%. Their so-called pay-performance semi-elasticity accounts for the fact that small per-
centage-wise changes in the value of large firms can cause the dollar value of managerial 
stakes to vary substantially. The risks and chances of portfolio value changes in dollar 
terms, rather than changes in the fractions of managerial ownership, motivate managers. 
Thus, the authors deem their proxy more accurate to measure managerial incentives. Fur-
thermore, it is less vulnerable to the Zhou critique (see subsection 2.6.2). 
Second, the definition of other shareholder groups is not consistent in the literature either. 
There is no unique threshold value for defining large shareholders which might be a reason 
for conflicting empirical results regarding their performance impact (Short 1994).
75
 More-
over, such inconsistent empirical definitions can facilitate data mining in the sense that 
researchers employ those ownership levels that produce the desired results. Furthermore, 
distinctions within one group of shareholders are crucial as they might pursue different 
objectives. As documented above, different behavior and performance patterns have been 
found for dependent versus independent institutional investors (e.g. Woidtke 2002; Chen et 
al. 2007). Likewise, family firm performance might depend on the issue whether the firm 
is owned, controlled, or only managed by a family and whether the founder is still involved 
(e.g. Villalonga/Amit 2006). 
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 To give some examples: ownership of at least 15% of common stock (Zeckhauser/Pound 1990), or at least 
5 % of common stock (McConnell/Servaes 1990); for institutional investors: the fraction of shares owned by 
the largest block holder (i.e. ≥ 5% of equity) (Cremers/Nair 2005), the five largest block holders 
(Hartzell/Starks 2003), or the sum of all block holdings (Ferreira/Matos 2008). Chen et al. (2007) use all 
three prior measures. 
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A third important issue concerns the distinction between cash flow and control rights in 
general (e.g. Claessens et al. 2000; King/Santor 2008) as well as whether simple or ulti-
mate ownership is analyzed (La Porta et al. 1999). When ownership is only defined as the 
percentage of shares outstanding (of one of the aforementioned groups/individuals) the 
potential existence of multiple share classes (or other control-enhancing mechanisms) and 
the resulting effect on managerial incentives and firm value is neglected. Finally, the 
source of ownership data could also influence the insights generated by empirical investi-
gations (Anderson/Lee 1997). On the contrary, Kole (1995) concludes that while differ-
ences in ownership databases exist it is unlikely that they cause contradicting empirical 
findings in the context of ownership and performance. 
Measures of leverage likewise contain pitfalls. First, Welch (2011) points out that most 
capital structure studies use the ratio of financial debt-to-assets as a proxy for leverage 
which is not equivalent to one minus the equity-to-assets ratio. The reason is that in addi-
tion to equity and financial liabilities, non-financial liabilities can make up a considerable 
part of the right-hand side of firms’ balance sheets. In consequence, excluding non-
financial liabilities from a firm’s leverage ratio implicitly adds them to the residual, which 
is equity. Thus, measures of firms’ indebtedness are biased downwards. Furthermore, 
Graham and Leary (2011) suggest adding the interest part or the capitalized value of oper-
ating leases to the numerator of leverage ratios in order not to understate firms’ debt ratios. 
They find several papers that consider this measure to be better suited (Graham et al. 1998; 
Rauh/Sufi 2010, 2012; Rampini/Viswanathan 2013). Second, treating corporate debt as 
homogeneous neglects the existence of different types of debt with distinct features (see 
subsection 2.3.1). The use of one single leverage ratio in empirical studies thereby ignores 
the debt dynamics that can occur even when the total debt ratio remains constant 
(Rauh/Sufi 2010). Third, since market values of debt are commonly approximated by their 
book values, the findings of cross-country studies could be influenced by the presence of 
different accounting standards (Myers 2001). Fourth, Welch (2007) documents that longer-
term capital structure studies might suffer severely from survivorship biases. According to 
him, about one tenth of the firms disappears during the course of one year (and is replaced 
by a roughly similar proportion of firms that newly appears). Particularly the omission of 
disappearing firms which are presumably often highly indebted might bias the results of 
long-term investigations. Finally, it might be wrong to suppose that all underlying relations 
in the context of capital structure are linear. Equivalently to ownership studies, non-
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linearity could be present in the relation of capital structure and its determinants (Welch 
2007). 
Strebulaev (2007) emphasizes a potential pitfall in the interpretation of the results of cross-
sectional capital structure studies if the prevailing dynamics are neglected. According to 
the dynamic tradeoff theory, firms do not adjust their leverage ratios continuously but only 
at certain points in time. At these so-called “refinancing points” (Strebulaev 2007, p. 
1748), firms rebalance their capital structure in a way predicted by theory. However, as the 
“refinancing cycles” (Strebulaev 2007, p. 1748) of firms are not synchronized it is difficult 
to interpret cross-sectional results and to compare them to theoretical predictions.
76
 By 
using simulated data from a structural model, Strebulaev (2007) demonstrates that such 
results can even be in contradiction to the underlying model. 
In the context of firm performance, a variety of different measures have been used. Widely 
employed measures comprise the return on assets (ROA) or the return on equity (ROE) as 
measures of accounting profitability, cumulative abnormal (stock) returns (CARs), buy and 
hold (excess) stock returns, and Jensen’s alpha (e.g. Holthausen/Larcker 1996), the earn-
ings-price ratio (e.g. Zeckhauser/Pound 1990), firms’ production efficiency (e.g. 
Margaritis/Psillaki 2010), or a firm’s sales growth relative to its industry peers as measure 
of product market performance (Campello 2003, 2006). These measures represent different 
aspects of firm performance and can be broadly grouped into operating and market-based 
performance. Taking into account different studies thus provides a more complete view of 
firm performance. However, accounting performance measures should always be interpret-
ed carefully as accounting practices may vary and the management may be able to manage 
earnings to some extent (“window dressing”).  
The most widely used measure for firm performance is Tobin’s Q. It is calculated as the 
ratio of the firm’s market value of assets to the replacement value of assets. The numerator 
is typically calculated as the book value of debt and of preferred stock (as estimates of their 
market values) plus the market value of common equity (e.g. Demsetz/Villalonga 2001).
77
 
The replacement value of assets in the denominator is often approximated by the book val-
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 At a certain point in time, one firm could be rebalancing its capital structure towards its optimum. On the 
other hand, at the same time 100 firms passively move farther away from their optimal leverage ratio (e.g. 
Welch 2004). In the cross-section, such dynamics could be interpreted as firms adjusting their capital struc-
ture in the “wrong” direction. 
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 Gompers et al. (2010) use a slightly different calculation for the numerator by summing up the book value 
of assets and the market value of common stock and then deducting the book value of common stock and 
deferred taxes.  
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ue of assets. While Tobin’s Q enjoys great popularity, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
point out that it is not free from biases either. First, through the inclusion of the market 
value of equity it can be biased by investor psychology to some extent. Second, it may sim-
ilarly suffer from accounting-related issues since book values enter the calculation for the 
replacement costs of assets and the market value of debt (Demsetz/Villalonga 2001). Simi-
lar concerns regarding the use of book values are raised by Gompers et al. (2010) who ar-
gue that due to discrepancies between book values and market values of intangible assets, 
Tobin’s Q can be flawed especially in the denominator (the replacement costs of assets). 
The authors infer that such errors will cause greater standard errors in regressions, wherein 
Tobin’s Q is the regressand. Consequently, statistical inference becomes more complicat-
ed. In case the flaw in Tobin’s Q is concentrated within certain industries, e.g. due to the 
reliance on intangible assets, the authors suggest to use an industry-adjusted measure. Ad-
ditionally, the effects of outliers could be alleviated by using logarithmic transformation of 
Tobin’s Q in regressions (Gompers et al. 2010). Perfect and Wiles (1994) as well as 
Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) provide in-depth analyses of different approaches to esti-
mate Tobin’s Q. They present findings of how robust rankings of firms and regressions are 
when different estimation procedures of Tobin’s Q are employed. The latter paper also 
suggests a new method to estimate Tobin’s Q that is able to determine the replacement 
costs of fixed assets and inventories more accurately. Furthermore, due to significant dif-
ferences between the estimates from various procedures, the authors raise the question 
whether a thorough reexamination of older studies would be in order (see also Perfect et al. 
1995).
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Finally, the question arises whether alternative corporate governance mechanisms can be 
viewed as complements or substitutes. In this literature review, I have focused on leverage 
and managerial as well as block ownership as internal governance mechanisms. While 
stock ownership and stock-based compensation incentivize the management to maximize 
firm value, monitoring by debt holders and external shareholders further increases this per-
formance pressure. As illustrated by the structural model by Coles et al. (2012) (see sub-
section 2.6.3.2), capital structure and ownership structure are jointly optimized in equilib-
rium in order to maximize firm value. However, one may wonder, for example, whether 
the shareholders of zero-leverage firms balance the missing debt-related pressure on the 
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management by granting managers a greater ownership stake. Alternatively, the firm’s 
environment could provide sufficient incentives such that the low leverage ratio is induced 
by environmental factors. I.e. there are external governance devices offsetting the lack of 
internal mechanisms.
79
 Consistent with this argumentation, Giroud and Mueller (2011) find 
out that weak-governance firms underperform, but only in industries that can be classified 
as non-competitive.
80
 This indicates that competition serves as additional mechanism to 
incentivize managers. Moreover, Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) show that managerial 
ownership is especially valuable when external governance and product market competi-
tion are weak. This suggests a complementary role. Kim and Lu (2011) document that 
product market competition (which they use as a proxy for external governance) can alle-
viate the negative firm value effects occurring when managerial ownership is high. Addi-
tionally, at low levels of ownership the positive incentive alignment effect disappears in 
the presence of strong external governance. This supports the substitution hypothesis. On 
the contrary, Cremers and Nair (2005) present evidence for a complementary interaction of 
institutional shareholder monitoring (internal governance) and the threat of takeovers (ex-
ternal governance). Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) conclude that the presence of 
block holders and legal investor protection are complementary ingredients of corporate 
governance.
81
 In a theoretical model, Cohn and Rajan (2013) conclude that the prevailing 
level of external governance determines whether internal (through the board of directors) 
and external governance (through an activist shareholder) interact as complements or sub-
stitutes. Certainly, there are many more governance mechanisms.
82
 In addition to owner-
ship-related mechanisms and leverage, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) analyze the influence 
of outside directors, managerial labor markets, and the market for corporate control on firm 
performance. In a simultaneous estimation setting, they find evidence in support of the 
notion that all control mechanisms are jointly optimized except for outside directors.
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Holderness et al. (1999) directly analyze whether higher managerial ownership replaces 
other governance mechanisms. However, they find no supportive evidence and conclude 
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 Note that in subsections 2.3.2 and 2.4.3, several papers were discussed wherein the relation runs in the 
opposite direction. That is, how do managers make use of leverage and their shareholdings (internal mecha-
nisms) to weaken external governance, such as the threat of takeovers and product market competition? 
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 See also Giroud and Mueller (2010). 
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 The authors argue that which mechanism is more prevalent varies across countries, e.g. Germany vs. the 
USA. Thereby, one mechanism may substitute for the lesser presence of the other. However, both are essen-
tial components of corporate governance. See also Lins (2003) for emerging markets evidence. 
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 For an overview of corporate governance mechanisms see Denis (2001). 
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 It seems to be worth mentioning that the authors also show that the results from standard OLS regressions 
suggest the existence of cross-sectional relations which are in fact spurious. 
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that alternative means of corporate governance are complementary, i.e. if the use of one 
mechanism rises the others are also used more and vice versa. Holderness et al. (1999) 
propose the explanation that different types of governance mechanisms reward different 
aspects of managerial behavior. Consequently, an imbalance in governance mechanisms 
could lead to undesirable outcomes since managers might put their efforts only into certain 
activities. 
To sum up, leverage and ownership structure are two of the most important corporate fi-
nancial policies that constitute complementary internal corporate governance mechanisms. 
Both have a significant impact on managerial incentives and thereby on firm performance. 
But in order to determine their impact empirically, one should bear in mind that they are 
jointly optimized and thus endogenous. Two other aspects are crucial. First, market fric-
tions can keep firms from adjusting towards an optimal capital and/or ownership structure. 
Second, other internal as well as external governance mechanisms also influence the 
choice of capital and ownership structure. 
2.8 Conclusion 
The ownership structure and the capital structure of a firm are means of internal corporate 
governance to optimize firm performance and to maximize firm value. Evidence based on 
methodology that accounts for endogeneity indicates that these two financial policies are 
jointly optimized in equilibrium. That means capital and ownership structure are set con-
sistently to maximize firm value taking into account the specific characteristics of the firm 
and the environment it operates in. These environmental factors comprise, among others, 
product market competition (Hart 1983), institutional settings such as the legal system and 
investor protection (La Porta et al. 1997; Shleifer/Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1998; La 
Porta et al. 2002), the threat of takeovers (Jensen/Ruback 1983), and managerial labor 
markets (Fama 1980).
84
 Since these factors serve an external governance role, they can 
influence the optimal choice of capital structure and ownership structure of the firm. Fail-
ure to account for differences in these factors across firms could therefore produce spuri-
ous empirical results concerning the relation of capital structure, ownership structure, and 
firm performance. Based on inadequate methodology, some papers have suggested the 
existence of inefficient corporate financial policies and management incapable of eradicat-
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ing this flaw. However, as Demsetz and Lehn (1985) have argued in the context of diffuse 
ownership, any structure that persists in the long-run is supposedly optimal since otherwise 
rationally functioning capital markets would force it to disappear. Nevertheless, deviation 
from the optimum of capital and ownership structure can always occur due to changes in 
the firm’s environment. This deviation persists as long as the costs for readjustment exceed 
the loss in value caused by the deviation. As soon as the benefits outweigh the costs, firms 
rebalance their capital and ownership structure in order to regain their equilibrium state. 
The present literature review has focused on two specific financial policies of the firm. I 
have emphasized the importance of considering endogeneity in the context of internal cor-
porate governance. Future surveys could build on this work and review studies that consid-
er additional endogenous variables that might also serve a governance role, such as the 
firm’s payout policy, corporate cash holdings, or the composition of the board of directors. 
Furthermore, one may criticize that the choice of literature could be biased. Since the pa-
pers were primarily selected from US journals (JF, JFE, RFS), the vast majority of these 
articles are based on samples that predominantly comprise US firms which could bias the 
results. A future literature review could therefore focus on cross-country differences and 
thereby highlight the importance of institutional settings (see e.g. Durnev/Kim 2005; 
Öztekin/Flannery 2012), or alternatively address the question as to how capital and owner-
ship structure interact with other internal and external corporate governance mechanisms in 
detail. 
Several avenues of future empirical research open up. First, adding measures of middle 
management ownership as an explanatory variable to studies on the relation of leverage, 
ownership, and performance might provide new insights. Second, regression discontinuity 
design (RDD) seems a useful econometric methodology that becomes increasingly popular 
in corporate governance as well as corporate financial policy research (e.g. Roberts/Sufi 
2009; Black/Kim 2012; Irani/Oesch 2013; Boone/White 2015). Since it alleviates 
endogeneity issues (Roberts/Whited 2012), its empirical application seems promising for 
further clarification of the relation between leverage, ownership, and performance. 
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3 Seasoned equity offerings and corporate governance: Evi-
dence from European real estate companies  
3.1 Introduction 
In the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, Switzerland, Japan, and several other 
OECD countries have suffered from fierce real estate crises (e.g. Renaud 1997; Brown 
2000; Van den Noord 2006; Borowiecki 2009). More recently, the US subprime crisis 
marked the beginning of a worldwide financial crisis (see e.g. Demyanyk/Van Hemert 
2011). Accompanied by the bursts of housing bubbles in Ireland and Spain, the sovereign 
debt crisis in Europe deteriorated the situation on real estate markets (e.g. Conefrey/Gerald 
2010). Financing conditions aggravated and made European real estate companies struggle. 
Several firms, such as German IVG Immobilien, Spanish Reyal Urbis and Martinsa Fadesa 
had to file for bankruptcy during or in the aftermath of the crisis. Tightening credit condi-
tions, the write down of property assets as well as equity investors unwilling to supply new 
capital are usually cited as the main reasons for the difficulties firms have faced (e.g. 
Acharya et al. 2009; Duchin et al. 2010).
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In this chapter, I investigate whether the latter reason that market participants refrain from 
investing in real estate firms’ equity is generally true or alternatively, whether investor 
behavior depends on firm characteristics and quality indicators. Therefore, I analyze a 
sample of 142 seasoned equity offerings by European real estate companies from 1997 to 
2013 and the related stock market effects. Usually, announcements of SEOs are associated 
with negative stock price reactions (see e.g. Asquith/Mullins 1986; Masulis/Korwar 1986; 
Mikkelson/Partch 1986; Bayless/Chaplinsky 1996). The announcement is bad news for 
shareholders since their claims are diluted. According to the pecking order theory, manag-
ers would only issue equity when internal or debt-related funds do not suffice to meet the 
financing needs (Myers 1984; Myers/Majluf 1984). Additionally, shareholders might per-
ceive a SEO announcement as a signal of insufficient current as well as future earnings, as 
suggested by the implied cash flow hypothesis (Miller/Rock 1985). In both models, outside 
shareholders try to infer inside information from corporate actions as information is asym-
metrically distributed. The stock price generally drops when negative information is con-
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veyed, but the level of information asymmetry might be distributed unevenly over time and 
companies. 
In the presence of information asymmetries and possibly diverging incentives, corporate 
governance is a crucial mechanism for ensuring shareholder value maximization. It is 
widely accepted that managerial share ownership and external block ownership are two of 
the most important means of corporate governance (e.g. Shleifer/Vishny 1997; 
Lemmon/Lins 2003; Lins 2003). While the former works through aligning managerial in-
centives with those of outside shareholders, the latter is based on active monitoring by 
blockholders. Thereby, managers are prevented from spending SEO proceeds on unprofit-
able projects or other value-reducing activities. The central motive for this empirical re-
search is thus to investigate whether corporate governance is able to limit SEO-related de-
creases in firm value and hence to increase the success of equity offerings as perceived by 
managers and shareholders. 
The recent financial crisis provides a perfect opportunity to analyze this question. The level 
of asymmetric information has likely increased, shareholders are much more parsimonious 
than they are during market upswings, and managers try to avoid capital increases when 
equity prices have depreciated. If corporate governance turns out to be a success factor, 
this is good news for all stakeholders. Well governed firms would therefore not face con-
strained access to equity markets. This would also alleviate concerns of governments and 
central banks with respect to the issue of pro-cyclical equity markets. My research question 
thus tackles an issue of particular importance to both managers and regulators: the role of 
corporate governance with respect to the functioning of equity markets. 
In order to answer this question, I focus on listed real estate companies because the effect 
of asymmetric information might be most pronounced in this industry due to its specific 
characteristics. Property assets represent the major part of the balance sheets of real estate 
companies. They are mostly illiquid and traded on relatively opaque markets. As the 
American market has been scrutinized extensively (see e.g. Howe/Shilling 1988; 
Allen/Rutherford 1992; Ghosh et al. 1999; Ghosh et al. 2013), the focus of this chapter is 
on the European real estate sector. For initial public offerings, Ritter (2003) points out that 
there are significant differences between European and US equity offerings. Thus, I con-
tribute to the literature in several ways. First, I analyze the impact of corporate governance 
on shareholder wealth effects surrounding SEO announcements in general and during the 
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recent financial crisis. This could provide useful insights to the more fundamental question 
of how managers and regulators should behave during business cycles. Second, I conduct a 
4-factor model event study to estimate shareholder wealth effects. In this way, expected 
returns can be determined more accurately and the resulting abnormal returns are not due 
to the failure to account for the size, value, or momentum effect. Third, I focus on the Eu-
ropean market which differs substantially from the US market with respect to general insti-
tutional characteristics (e.g. Shleifer/Vishny 1997; Enriques/Volpin 2007). Further, Europe 
is not (yet) dominated by the legal form of real estate investment trusts (REITs) which are 
more transparent than other property companies. Finally, the analysis of a European sam-
ple provides a unique opportunity to analyze the effects of corporate governance in very 
different legal systems and institutional settings at the same time. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first study that analyzes this specific sample during this highly rele-
vant time period. 
The findings show negative announcement effects of -1% throughout the entire sample 
period. Considering the 3-day period ending on the event day, the average abnormal price 
drop is even -1.5%. Market timing in general and the recent financial crisis in particular do 
not have an impact on the observed announcement effects. Most importantly, firms that are 
subject to active monitoring by inside blockholders and that do not have abundant cash 
reserves experience less negative announcement effects. Excess cash holdings might be 
interpreted as a threat of managerial overinvestment or the potential to extract private ben-
efits of control (Pinkowitz et al. 2006; Dittmar/Mahrt-Smith 2007; Harford et al. 2008). In 
evaluating the implications of a capital increase, investors seem to focus on effective cor-
porate governance as well as the absence of alternative sources of financing. If a firm lacks 
both, it is more likely to suffer from overinvestment problems according to the free cash 
flow hypothesis (Jensen 1986). Moreover, the intended use of the offering proceeds ex-
pressed by the management in the disclosure statement does not play a role. Apparently, 
the management does not succeed to dispel shareholders’ concerns regarding overinvest-
ment with the help of this measure. In contrast to prior empirical evidence, a negative size 
effect is found. Hence, larger firms experience more negative announcement effects. This 
seems to be unique to the real estate sector which is still perceived to be a “people’s busi-
ness”, at least for smaller and medium-sized companies. 
In summary, access to equity capital markets has not been limited during the sample peri-
od. Firms are thus not forced to engage in pro-cyclical financing if they are able to con-
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vince investors of their funding need as well as of the soundness of their corporate govern-
ance to prevent overinvestment and other value-reducing corporate actions. It is reassuring 
to both managers and regulators that even during a fierce financial and confidence crisis 
equity capital markets do not cease to function. 
These results extend recent capital market research on real estate firms. The finding of cor-
porate governance as a mitigating factor complements the results of Goodwin (2013) con-
cerning the value uncertainty hypothesis. If asymmetric information between corporate 
insiders and outsiders is high prior to a SEO, corporate governance might be a comple-
menting factor to large offer price discounts. Accordingly, if shareholders can rely on ac-
tive monitoring and incentivized managers, they might require less discounting to partici-
pate in the SEO. Furthermore, Anglin et al. (2011) provide evidence that sound REIT gov-
ernance serves to reduce asymmetric information. My results show that this might also 
apply to equity issues where reduced levels of asymmetric information are associated with 
attenuated shareholder wealth losses. Thereby, my research also supports the general idea 
of corporate governance as a value enhancing factor in the real estate sector 
(Friday/Sirmans 1998; Feng et al. 2005; Kohl/Schaefers 2012). The chapter proceeds as 
follows. In the first part of section 3.2, I review the relevant literature with a particular fo-
cus on the real estate sector. Based on this, hypotheses are developed in the second part of 
section 3.2. Subsequently, the sample data (section 3.3) and the empirical methodology 
(section 3.4) are described. Section 3.5 presents descriptive statistics and the results before 
section 3.6 summarizes the findings and concludes. 
3.2 Theoretical background 
3.2.1 Theory and empirical evidence of seasoned equity offerings 
Fundamental research on the capital issuance process began in the 1980s. The most popu-
lar model has been developed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984). According 
to their pecking order theory, internal funds (i.e. retained earnings) are the first choice 
when firms want to finance new investments. If external funds are necessary to meet the 
firm’s financing needs, debt is preferred over equity. Thus, stock issues are the financing 
choice of last resort. This pecking order results from asymmetrically distributed infor-
mation between managers and external investors. The latter are not able to reliably deter-
mine the value of the firm. Since the management has inside information and acts in the 
interest of the firm’s existing shareholders, equity would only be issued if the firm is cur-
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rently overvalued by the market. In consequence, equity issue announcements are per-
ceived as negative signals. In contrast to equity, debt claims are fixed and thus less sensi-
tive to uncertainty about the firm’s true value. However, solely internal financial resources 
minimize the expected funding costs (e.g. issuance costs) making it management’s first 
choice. 
Furthermore, the implied cash flow hypothesis has been derived from the Miller and Rock 
(1985) model which is also based on informational asymmetries. It states that if a firm un-
expectedly increases external financing, this might reveal that the management is more 
pessimistic about current as well as future earnings. If the market draws this very infer-
ence, the stock price drops at the time of the SEO announcement (Miller/Rock 1985; Jain 
1992; Ghosh et al. 1999). A further model that is often related to capital increases is the 
free cash flow hypothesis by Jensen (1986). It implies that if firms have abundant free cash 
flows at their disposal, managers might be tempted to overinvest and thereby reduce the 
value of the firm. In the context of equity issues, investors should thus consider whether 
the firm has valuable investment opportunities and whether there is a lack of internal 
funds. Otherwise, empire building motives could be suspected. In sum, all three theories 
predict negative stock market reactions to SEO announcements. A point all theories have 
in common is the predicted negative relation between internal funds and capital market 
reaction. 
Empirical research of security issues is extensive. In a review of empirical studies, Smith 
(1986b) provides evidence for the pecking order theory. Common stock issue announce-
ments show by far the most negative stock price reactions. Prominent studies of SEOs 
comprise Asquith and Mullins (1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986), as well as Mikkelson 
and Partch (1986). They document negative abnormal returns around the announcement 
day of -1.6% to -3.6%. Subsequently, those results were confirmed by several other papers, 
such as Kalay and Shimrat (1987), Korajczyk et al. (1991), Eckbo and Masulis (1992), Jain 
(1992), Jegadeesh et al. (1993), Denis (1994), Slovin et al. (1994), Bayless and Chaplinsky 
(1996), Altınkılıç and Hansen (2003), D'Mello et al. (2003), Heron and Lie (2004), and 
Demiralp et al. (2011). All these studies find negative announcement effects between -1% 
and -3%.
86
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 More SEO literature including both theoretical models and empirical studies are to be found in the com-
prehensive literature reviews by Eckbo and Masulis (1995) as well as Eckbo et al. (2007). 
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Further empirical research thereafter tried to uncover the reasons and determinants of nega-
tive value effects. It focuses on firm characteristics as well as performance and behavior 
prior and subsequent to SEOs. The latter analyzes long-run performance patterns of SEO 
firms. As this chapter studies short-term stock price effects, I only briefly review some 
prominent articles that can also be related to the explanation of short-term effects. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) document that firms conducting an IPO or SEO subsequently 
underperform a matching sample of non-offering firms in terms of stock market perfor-
mance (see also Spiess/Affleck-Graves 1995; Kang et al. 1999). They label their finding 
the “new issues puzzle”. In a follow-up study, they also find declining operating perfor-
mance after equity offerings (Loughran/Ritter 1997). This decrease is in sharp contrast to 
improvements in stock as well as operating performance prior to the offering. It could 
therefore be interpreted as managers exploiting the opportunity to issue overvalued equity 
(Spiess/Affleck-Graves 1995; Lee 1997). Lee (1997) argues that free cash flow problems 
in the sense of Jensen (1986) aggravate after the proceeds of the equity offering are availa-
ble to the firm’s management. Thereby, managerial discretion over free cash flows and 
subsequently overinvestment could cause inferior performance (Fu 2010). This would be in 
line with theoretical models that try to explain short-term effects. Denis and Sarin (2001) 
argue that poor earnings announcements in the years following the SEO might account for 
the underperformance, at least for small firms. They contend that investor overoptimism 
regarding firms’ prospects diminishes over time when poor earnings are realized after the 
SEO. Accordingly, the performance decline would be due to biased investor expectations 
that slowly disappear when uncertainty resolves. 
Related papers attribute the puzzle to methodological issues concerning risk adjustment. 
Eckbo et al. (2000) argue that the technique of matching firms prior to the offering to com-
pare issuing and non-issuing firms ex post is flawed (see also Jegadeesh 2000). Through an 
equity issue, a firm lowers its leverage ratio and increases its stock’s liquidity. Thereby, 
default and stock liquidity risk decrease which lowers the firm’s systematic risk and thus 
its expected return. Therefore, the observed return pattern only reflects a decrease in sys-
tematic risk and is not an indication of investor underreaction (Eckbo et al. 2000). A simi-
lar explanation to the new issues puzzle is based on real option theory. Firm value can be 
considered as the sum of the firm’s assets in place and its growth opportunities which can 
be valued as real options (Carlson et al. 2006). If firms use the offering proceeds to invest, 
the real option is exercised and it is converted into assets in place (Carlson et al. 2006). 
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Therefore, the risk of the firm is reduced and its expected return decreases (see also 
Carlson et al. 2010).
87
  
A further strand of literature analyzes firm characteristics and other determinants that af-
fect the short-term stock price reactions to SEO announcements. According to the theoreti-
cal predictions by Myers and Majluf (1984), negative announcement effects are caused by 
asymmetrically distributed information between the management and outside investors. 
Hence, the number of SEOs conducted might have an impact on the observed effect. Fre-
quent equity issuers could succeed in mitigating informational asymmetries through infor-
mation disclosure in offering prospectuses and during road shows, or through increased 
analyst coverage (D'Mello et al. 2003). Thereby, negative value effects could be reduced. 
D'Mello et al. (2003) corroborate this hypothesis. The decrease in shareholder value be-
comes smaller with each following SEO announcement, which they attribute to reduced 
informational asymmetry.
88
 Furthermore, business cycles as well as equity market up- and 
downturns might play a role if managers try to time the market (Baker/Wurgler 2002). In 
expansionary periods, managers predominantly issue equity in order to maximize the pro-
ceeds when share prices have appreciated. There is less uncertainty about firm value and 
thus less asymmetric information. In line with this prediction, Choe et al. (1993) and 
Henderson et al. (2006) find more capital increases during these periods. The former also 
document less negative announcement effects. 
Korajczyk et al. (1991) provide evidence that SEOs preferably take place shortly after 
earnings announcements when asymmetric information has presumably decreased. Ac-
cordingly, they find that market reactions to announcements at a later date are more nega-
tive. Likewise, D'Mello and Ferris (2000) document that less analyst coverage and less 
consensus are related to stronger declines in prices. As analyst consensus and coverage 
may reduce informational asymmetries this mitigates negative wealth effects when SEOs 
are announced. Lee and Masulis (2009) use the quality and accuracy of firms’ accounting 
information as a proxy for asymmetric information. In line with their hypothesis, they find 
more negative announcement effects for firms with lower accounting quality. Another in-
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 Yet another risk-based explanation by Lyandres et al. (2008) is based on a low minus high investment 
factor that earns a positive return. Since issuing firms invest significantly more than non-issuing firms, this 
factor explains a major part of the new issues puzzle (Lyandres et al. 2008). 
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 On the contrary, Slovin et al. (1991) provide empirical evidence for commercial banks that repeat issuers 
experience negative announcement effects while first-time issuers do not. However, D'Mello et al. (2003) 
argue that these results may be due to the sample construction and different firm characteristics of first-time 
issuers and repeat issuers that the authors do not control for. 
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dicator of asymmetric information is management insider trading. Lee (1997) argues that if 
managers privately sell equity prior to a SEO and their firm subsequently underperforms, 
then they might intentionally have sold overpriced shares. He finds empirical evidence in 
support of his conjecture. Moreover, Loderer and Mauer (1992) find that dividend-paying 
firms experience more negative announcement effects than non-dividend-paying firms. 
This seems to be consistent with the idea that firms should only issue equity if they have 
profitable investment opportunities and otherwise rather forgo the costly issuance of 
shares. 
Starting with Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993), researchers tried to uncover 
whether all types of SEOs cause the same capital market reactions. Both papers find that 
capital increases via private placements are associated with positive stock price reactions 
as opposed to negative announcement effects in response to public offerings. Wruck 
(1989) documents that ownership concentration increases following private placements 
and concludes that the positive value effect is caused by increased monitoring activities by 
blockholders. Hertzel and Smith (1993) provide similar evidence, but additionally con-
clude that positive abnormal returns might be an indication of undervaluation of the firm. 
Managers might be able to credibly signal this during private negotiations prior to the 
placement. However, in the long run stock performance declines which can be attributed to 
investor overoptimism when private placements are announced (Hertzel et al. 2002). Sub-
sequent research casts doubt on the monitoring hypothesis. Wu (2004) finds that active 
blockholders, such as pension funds and venture capitalists, actually decrease their hold-
ings following private equity placements. Instead, evidence suggests that managers make 
use of private placements to increase their own holdings and wealth by participating in 
private placements that are issued at higher discounts. For a sample of Japanese firms, 
Kang et al. (1999) find positive short-term and negative long-term abnormal returns re-
gardless of whether equity is issued publicly or privately. At least for Japan, this also un-
dermines the private information as well as the monitoring hypothesis. 
After this brief overview of important cross-industry studies, the focus is shifted to SEO 
research in the real estate industry henceforth. The majority of studies deals with the 
American real estate sector, especially with REITs. Among the first articles on US REITs 
was Howe and Shilling (1988). They find negative announcement effects of -1.9% for eq-
uity issues while debt issues are associated with positive stock market reactions of 1.7%. 
Allen and Rutherford (1992) extend the investigation to US real estate corporations that 
Seasoned equity offerings and corporate governance 
62 
 
issue common stock, straight and convertible bonds, lines of credit, and mortgages. The 
latter two do not produce any significant announcement returns. On the contrary, converti-
ble bond (-2.5%) and stock (-1.9%) issue announcements are accompanied by significant 
share price drops whereas debt issues show positive wealth effects (0.6%). Thus, the re-
sults reinforce the findings of Howe and Shilling (1988) and are also broadly consistent 
with the empirical support of the pecking order theory in Smith (1986b). Ooi et al. (2010) 
present evidence in favor of the market timing hypothesis (see also Boudry et al. 2010). 
They show that financing decisions of REITs, i.e. the issue and repurchase of equity and 
debt, are predominantly driven by market timing considerations. But in the long run REITs 
also strive for a target leverage ratio which supports the tradeoff theory. Ghosh et al. 
(1999) also find negative announcement effects for a sample of SEOs by US REITs. The 
authors additionally show that the returns are positively related to underwriter rank and 
negatively influenced by percentage offer size, firm size, and insider ownership. Overall, 
their findings lend support to the information asymmetry hypothesis as well as the implied 
cash flow hypothesis (Ghosh et al. 1999). 
Consistent with the results of cross-industry studies, SEO underpricing is also an issue for 
REITs (Ghosh et al. 1998; Ghosh et al. 2000; Goodwin 2013). However, there seem to be 
some specific features to the real estate industry. For example, Friday et al. (2000) docu-
ment that operating performance does not deteriorate after REIT SEOs. The authors argue 
that their contrary results might be due to limited managerial discretion over internal funds 
as imposed by REIT legislation. Subsequently, Ghosh et al. (2013) reexamine this puzzle 
and find decreasing operating performance, consistent with cross-industry evidence. They 
contend that the findings by Friday et al. (2000) may be due to their particular sample peri-
od during which REITs have experienced a substantial upswing. Additionally, performance 
measures and benchmarks may be flawed. Ghosh et al. (2013) thus conclude that REITs’ 
operating performance after SEOs is not different from the one in other industries. Zhu et 
al. (2010) find evidence of earnings manipulation by REITs around the time of SEOs. This 
could be an indication of window dressing and therefore a reason for declining operating 
performance. For private equity placements by REITs, Marciukaityte et al. (2007) find 
negative announcement returns. This is inconsistent with evidence from other industries. A 
possible explanation could be that a more concentrated ownership structure following the 
offering is rather costly than beneficial (Shleifer/Vishny 1997; Friday et al. 1999). Howev-
er, in the long run operating as well as stock market performance ameliorate which the 
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authors attribute to managers’ market timing abilities and subsequent skills to invest in 
value-increasing projects.
89
 
3.2.2 Hypotheses 
Based on the previous literature review, hypotheses are developed to guide the empirical 
investigation. Finally, I intend to answer the following questions: When the four empirical-
ly well-documented factors in expected returns (i.e. market, size, value, and momentum) 
are accurately accounted for, which effects do capital increases have on the value of Euro-
pean real estate companies? Does corporate governance by means of active monitoring and 
insider ownership mitigate the typically documented wealth losses? 
Two main hypotheses result. First, SEOs produce negative announcement effects as pre-
dicted by Myers and Majluf (1984). One explanation for these wealth losses is that manag-
ers could overinvest if the firms’ free cash flows, including SEO proceeds, exceed their 
valuable investment opportunities (Jensen 1986). The second main hypothesis arises from 
the free cash flow theory. Each factor that decreases (increases) the potential for manageri-
al overinvestment, such as effective corporate governance, will alleviate (amplify) SEO-
related wealth losses. Therefore, I focus on variables that can be related to overinvestment. 
First, market timing is considered (see Baker/Wurgler 2002). It is tested whether abnormal 
returns during expansionary market phases are less negative because of good prospects of 
the overall economy. This investigation is particularly interesting in the light of the recent 
financial crisis as supportive evidence could be interpreted as a driver of pro-cyclical fi-
nancing. On the other hand, managers might consider the stock performance of their firm 
as compared to the overall market. If the decision to issue equity is solely driven by the 
firm’s market valuation instead of the existence of valuable investments, managers might 
also be suspected of market timing. If investors anticipate this behavior, more negative 
announcement effects can be expected if a firm has previously outperformed the market. 
Second, I consider insider ownership as it is one of the most important means of corporate 
governance. If ownership is rather concentrated, a SEO could be perceived less negatively 
due to active monitoring by blockholders and thus less overinvestment problems. On the 
other hand, firms with low insider holdings could suffer from less effective governance due 
to a lack of blockholders and missing managerial incentives. Hence, announcement returns 
could be more negative. As ownership effects have been shown to be non-linear due to 
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opposing effects such as incentive alignment and entrenchment (e.g. McConnell/Servaes 
1990; Friday et al. 1999), I will also control for this possibility. Third, problems associated 
with excessive free cash flows seem more likely if a company has alternative sources of 
funds. Excess cash holdings might be interpreted as a threat of managerial overinvestment 
or the potential to extract private benefits of control (Pinkowitz et al. 2006; Dittmar/Mahrt-
Smith 2007; Harford et al. 2008). Therefore, I test whether corporate cash holdings and 
operating profitability (funds from operations), as a measure of the capability of generating 
internal funds, have a negative impact on SEO announcement effects. Fourth, the uses of 
SEO proceeds might also have an impact on announcement effects. The price-to-book ratio 
is often interpreted as a proxy for firms’ investment opportunities (e.g. Denis 1994). Thus, 
high price-to-book firms might suffer less from overinvestment problems because they 
have profitable investment opportunities. So I suppose that these firms’ stock prices react 
less negatively. In line with Loderer and Mauer (1992), I assume high dividend paying 
firms to experience more negative returns. If the management is reluctant to cut or omit 
dividends, but instead issues costly equity to finance operations, this could reduce firm 
value. Fifth, less negative capital market reactions are expected if firms actively reduce 
asymmetric information by providing information to dispel shareholders concerns regard-
ing overinvestment. One possibility is to place shares privately. By means of private nego-
tiations, the management could credibly convey information with respect to valuable in-
vestment opportunities. Alternatively, firms can publicly announce the intended use of the 
offering proceeds. Thereby, managerial discretion over the offering proceeds is limited and 
shareholders’ fears of overinvestment could be alleviated. Finally, it is a common view that 
Germany’s corporate governance system is weaker in terms of shareholder protection 
rights as compared to the one of other countries (see e.g. Shleifer/Vishny 1997; Porta et al. 
1999; Franks/Mayer 2001b). Therefore, I expect a more negative reaction when the issuing 
firm is from Germany. 
In order to determine the importance of the aforementioned governance-related factors 
accurately, additional factors are controlled for that have turned out to be important in 
cross-sectional analyses. Large firms are assumed to be more transparent due to higher 
analyst coverage and stricter accounting standards. So the firm’s market capitalization is 
added to control for possibly different levels of asymmetric information. Leverage is also 
an important factor as it is an indicator of firms’ financial flexibility and risk. Moreover, it 
might play a role in the real estate sector whether an issuer is focused on commercial or on 
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residential real estate. Issuers with a focus on commercial properties likely face a higher 
business risk because cash flows in the commercial sector usually exhibit a higher volatili-
ty. Additionally, I control for issuers that are REITs. Since REITs have high mandatory 
payout ratios, they mainly have to rely on external financing. Finally, offer size as meas-
ured by the percentage increase in the number of shares outstanding is controlled for. 
Greater offers could indicate a lack of other financing sources or even financial emergency. 
3.3 Data 
The sample of firms consists of the components of the real estate indices Ellwanger & 
Geiger (E&G) Dimax 70 and E&G Epix 50 which comprise German and European real 
estate companies, respectively.
90
 Since seven firms are included in both indices, a sample 
of 113 firms results. In order to be included in E&G indices, these firms have to generate at 
least 75% of their revenues from real estate activities and be publicly listed with an appro-
priate level of free float, according to E&G. For these 113 firms, I search for capital in-
creases that occurred between 1 January 1997 and 31 December 2013 in the Thomson One 
Banker database. I manually validate all the resulting events by confirming their an-
nouncement dates, and all offering characteristics such as offer price, number of shares 
offered etc., as well as whether there have been confounding events.
91
 Events which were 
wrongly classified as SEOs, such as block sales of secondary shares, sales of treasury 
shares, and exercises of management or employee stock options or convertible bonds are 
excluded. Likewise, equity issues in exchange for a different company’s stocks or assets as 
well as mixed offers are removed from the sample. I thereby obtain a sample of 142 events 
that have been verified. Each of these events additionally fulfills the following criteria: 
stock price data has to be available for at least 260 trading days prior to the announcement 
day; the capital increase is in exchange for cash; country-specific data has to be available 
in order to calculate abnormal returns (for further details see the following section 3.4). 
The stock price data for the respective firms is obtained from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream.
92
 For further analyses, company-specific data is also required, e.g. the firm’s 
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 The indices are calculated and published by the German private bank Ellwanger & Geiger and can be 
downloaded from their website. I use the index composition as of November 2013. 
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 For this purpose, I conducted an extensive search on the respective corporate website, Nexis (formerly 
LexisNexis), and the website of the respective national exchange commission, such as French Autorité des 
Marchés Financiers (AMF) and Spanish Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV), or the web-
site of German Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ad-hoc-Publizität (DGAP) where all ad-hoc announcements are 
published. In some cases, a google web search has also been conducted. 
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 The total return index is used in order to adjust for dividend payments, stock splits, etc. 
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leverage ratio or its market-to-book ratio, which are received from Worldscope as well as 
business cycle data from Datastream. All issue-related data has been verified with the re-
spective corporate announcements. Finally, data for calculating 4-factor model abnormal 
returns are obtained from Andrea Frazzini’s data library.93 
3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Event study 
By means of event study methodology, one can quantify the effect a corporate announce-
ment has on the announcing company’s value. According to the (semi-strong) efficient 
market hypothesis, stock prices adjust immediately as soon as new information is publicly 
released (Fama 1970). Thus, by estimating the expected return E(Ri,t) of stock i on day t 
and subtracting it from its actual return on this day Ri,t, one can determine the abnormal 
return of a stock on the day of information disclosure, as well as on the days surrounding 
the announcement (i.e. the event window). This abnormal return can be interpreted as the 
change in firm value induced by the released information. As actual returns are readily 
available, the challenge is to estimate expected returns. A 4-factor return model is em-
ployed for this purpose which is well suited to describe the cross-section of expected re-
turns (Carhart 1997; Asness/Frazzini 2013). Mathematically, the concept is an extension of 
the 1-factor market model as described in MacKinlay (1997): 
titiciticiticiticiiti vUMDHMLSMBMKTR ,),(),(),(),(,    (3.1) 
ticiticiticiticiiti UMDHMLSMBMKTRE ),(),(),(),(,
ˆˆˆˆˆ)(    (3.2) 
MKTc(i),t is the return of the market index in excess of the risk-free rate on day t of country 
c where firm i is located. The daily returns of the other three factors size SMBc(i),t, value 
HMLc(i),t, and momentum UMDc(i),t are obtained by forming value-weighted zero-
investment portfolios in each country.
94
 The portfolios are long in small (value; high re-
turn) stocks and short in big (growth; low return) stocks. Portfolios are rebalanced on a 
monthly basis. Breakpoints for portfolio classification are updated each year. For further 
details on this procedure see Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996) as well as Asness and 
Frazzini (2013) and Asness et al. (2014). All four factors are obtained from Andrea 
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 The data can be downloaded from http://www.econ.yale.edu/~af227/data_library.htm. 
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 I use the HML factor according to the Fama and French (1996) methodology. However, the results do 
hardly change when the HML factor based on the Asness and Frazzini (2013) methodology is employed. 
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Frazzini’s data library. From equation (3.1), the parameters , , ,  and  for each firm i 
are estimated by regressing the returns of the respective factor portfolios for all days t of 
the estimation period on the corresponding actual returns Ri,t. Inserting the estimated pa-
rameter values into equation (3.2) yields the expected return E(Ri,t) of firm i on day t of the 
event window. 
 The length of the estimation window is set to 250 trading days. It thus covers an entire 
year and thereby controls for seasonal factors in the calculation of abnormal returns. The 
abnormal return results simply from subtracting the expected return E(Ri,t) from the actual 
return Ri,t on day t: 
)( ,,, tititi RERAR   (3.3) 
Finally, the individual abnormal returns ARi,t are averaged over all N events and T days of 
the event window which extends from day t1 to t2, denoted as [t1/t2]. This produces the cu-
mulative average abnormal returns (CAAR): 
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The main event window has a length of 21 trading days from 10 days before to 10 days 
after the announcement day t=0 [-10/10]. The null hypothesis assumes that all abnormal 
returns are equal to zero. For hypothesis testing different statistical tests are employed. 
First, I use a standard two-sided t-test. Second, the Boehmer et al. (1991) [BMP] test statis-
tic is calculated which accounts for event-induced variance increases. Third, the non-
parametric test by Corrado (1989) is also employed in order to ensure that the results hold 
regardless of the underlying assumptions concerning the distribution of returns.  
3.4.2 Regression analysis 
In the second part of the empirical analysis, the abnormal returns are regressed on several 
explanatory variables in order to identify determinants of shareholder wealth effects. The 
abnormal return on the event day (t=0) of firm i are used to run the following cross-
sectional OLS regression with clustered standard errors. This is to account for a potential 
firm effect since several firms in the sample announce multiple SEOs (Petersen 2009): 
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Varj represents the k independent variables,  0 is the regression constant, j are the regres-
sion coefficients, and  is the error term. An overview of all variables, their definitions, and 
their expected influence is provided in Table 3.1 below. The third column summarizes the 
hypotheses from subsection 3.2.2. Since I conjecture a non-linear relationship between 
insider shareholdings and announcement effects, the variable is included in both linear and 
squared form. 
Table 3.1: Explanatory variables for the multiple regression analysis 
Variable Definition 
Expected 
influence 
Exp Dummy: 1 if announcement is during expansionary market 
phase as indicated by the Centre for Economic Policy Re-
search (CEPR), 0 otherwise95 
+ 
ExcR Excess Return: Return of the firm’s stock in excess of the 
market index return during the estimation window96 
- 
%Insider Percentage of shares held by insiders97 Non-linear 
Cash Cash and short-term investments relative to total assets - 
FFO Funds from operations relative to total assets - 
P/B Price-to-book ratio + 
DivY Dividend yield - 
PP Dummy: 1 if private placement, 0 otherwise + 
Purp_# Dummy: 1 if firm announces what the offering proceeds 
will be used for, 0 otherwise (# indicates a specific catego-
ry: 1 – mergers & acquisitions (M&A); 2 – capital expendi-
tures (CapEx); 3 – leverage; 4 – general) 
+ 
GER Dummy: 1 if German issuer, 0 otherwise - 
Ln(Size) Logarithm of market capitalization + 
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 The data can be obtained from the CEPR website: http://www.cepr.org/content/euro-area-business-cycle-
dating-committee. 
96
 The excess return is thus calculated as:                   
              
      . 
97
 Insider shareholdings include shares held by officers, directors, pension or benefit plans, shares in trust, 
shares held by other corporations (except insurance companies), and shareholdings by individuals that exceed 
5%. 
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(Table 3.1 continued) 
Lev One minus the proportion of equity relative to total assets - 
Commercial Dummy: 1 if announcing firm’s business is mainly focused 
on commercial real estate, 0 otherwise 
- 
REIT Dummy: 1 if announcing firm is a REIT, 0 otherwise + 
Offer size Number of shares issued as percentage of shares outstand-
ing 
- 
 
All firm-specific explanatory variables (e.g. funds from operations) are from the fiscal year 
prior to the year when the SEO was announced. The leverage ratio is calculated according 
to Welch (2011) as 100% minus equity over total assets. All announcement-specific varia-
bles originate from the respective corporate announcement or related press releases. In the 
following section, the empirical results are presented and discussed. To begin with, some 
descriptive statistics are shown. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
As mentioned above, the sample period from 1997 to 2013 is characterized by some sub-
stantial ups and downs in the real estate sector. Figure 3.1 illustrates the development of 
the real estate indices E&G Epix 50 and E&G Dimax 70 as well as the quarterly number of 
SEO announcements. Graphically, it seems as if the real estate indices and the number of 
SEO announcements commove to some extent. Furthermore, from 2003 on there are only 
four quarters in which none of the sample firms has announced a SEO: Q2 2003, Q3 2006, 
Q1 2008, and Q3 2008.
98
 These points in time coincide with some of the major downturns 
of the real estate indices. Managers seem to be reluctant to increase capital during market 
turmoil. Particularly in Q3 2008, firms probably postponed equity issues in order to attract 
higher investor demand after the stock market would recover. This could be an indication 
of market timing behavior by European real estate companies. When equity prices rise, 
conditions for a capital increase improve and firms are more likely and willing to issue 
new equity. In subsection 3.5.3, I will test whether this observation is also confirmed by a 
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 The apparent lack of SEO announcements from 1997 to 2002 is also due to limited data availability on 
corporate websites and Nexis. 
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significant relationship between the market phase and SEO announcement returns as sug-
gested by the market timing hypothesis. 
Figure 3.1: Development of real estate indices and quarterly number of SEO an-
nouncements during the sample period from 1997 to 2013 
 
Moreover, the level of asymmetric information likely varies depending on the market 
phase. Therefore, the management could prefer a different offering method in order to pro-
vide more information to investors during times of allegedly high informational asymme-
tries. Table 3.2 shows the distribution of public and private offerings over expansionary 
and recessionary market phases according to the CEPR. 
Table 3.2: Distribution of events across offering type and market phase 
 Offering type   
 Public offering  Private placement Total 
Recessionary  
market phase 
21 
(53.85%) 
18 
(46.15%) 
39 
(100%) 
Expansionary  
market phase 
73 
(70.87%) 
30 
(29.13%) 
103 
(100%) 
Total 94 
(66.20%) 
48 
(33.80%) 
142 
(100%) 
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In line with my assumption, only 29% of SEOs are privately placed during expansionary 
phases. On the contrary, almost half of the offerings (46%) are conducted privately when 
the market is in a recessionary state. Apparently, managers prefer private placements when 
the level of asymmetric information is high prior to the offering. By means of private nego-
tiations, the management can reduce information asymmetries by providing detailed in-
formation to investors. The following subsections will offer an insight as to whether the 
offering type also affects the associated shareholder wealth effects. 
Table 3.3 illustrates the distribution of equity offerings across countries as well as offering 
type. The sample of 142 capital increases consists of 48 private placements and 94 public 
equity offerings. Public offerings (predominantly in the form of rights offerings) represent 
the dominating offering type accounting for approximately two thirds of the sample. Since 
the majority of the sample firms is from Germany (the Dimax 70 firms), it is not surprising 
that approximately half of the equity offerings are announced by German real estate com-
panies. This will be accounted for in the subsequent analysis. Furthermore, the inclusion of 
the Dimax 70 provides the opportunity to investigate private placements in detail as Ger-
man firms frequently make use of this offering method. Second most equity offerings are 
announced by Austrian firms, followed by Finnish and UK firms. Announcements by real 
estate companies from other countries represent only a minor fraction of the sample with 2 
to 5 offerings per country. With the exception of Finland, the Netherlands, and Norway, 
public offerings are the dominating type in the sample under investigation. 
Table 3.3: Distribution of events across countries and offering type 
  Public offerings Private placements Total 
Austria 18 0 18 
Belgium 3 0 3 
Denmark 3 1 4 
Finland 6 7 13 
France 3 0 3 
Germany 44 30 74 
Greece 2 0 2 
Netherlands 0 3 3 
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(Table 3.3 continued) 
Norway 2 3 5 
Spain 2 0 2 
Switzerland 4 0 4 
UK 7 4 11 
Total 94 48 142 
 
Table 3.4 provides an overview of the offering characteristics: the mean and median num-
ber of offered shares, the relative size of the offering, and the offer price discount relative 
to the share’s closing price two days prior to the SEO announcement. The number of of-
fered shares is substantially skewed. Some exceptionally huge equity offerings seem to 
boost the mean number of shares while the median number amounts to a relatively moder-
ate 5.6 million and 3.1 million shares for public offerings and private placements, respec-
tively. In terms of relative offer size, the skewness is less pronounced. Public offerings are 
relatively larger than private placements. The median offer is one new share for three old 
shares for the former, but only one for ten for the latter offering type. 
Table 3.4: Sample characteristics by offering type 
  Public offerings 
(N=94) 
Private place-
ments (N=48) 
Overall 
(N=142) 
Number of 
shares offered 
Mean 191,950,279 16,168,638 132,531,132 
Median 5,596,212 3,141,744 5,289,039 
Relative offer 
size99 
Mean 44.93%*** 11.88% 33.76% 
Median 33.33%*** 10.00% 17.08% 
Relative dis-
count (t = -2)100 
Mean 12.39%*** 2.27% 8.78% 
Median 9.61%*** 3.90% 5.96% 
*** indicates statistically significant differences at the 1% level. 
                                                 
99
 The difference in means in relative offer size is statistically significant showing that the fractional capital 
increase is substantially larger for public than it is for private offerings (t-value 4.87). The same holds for the 
median test. The Wilcoxon rank sum test produces a z-score of 7.81. 
100
 The relative discount is calculated as the percentage spread of the issue price as compared to the stock’s 
closing price two days prior to the SEO announcement. It is significantly larger for public offerings (N=93) 
than for private placements (N=47) with a t-value of 3.69. Likewise, the medians of the two subsamples are 
significantly different (z-score 2.79). The number of offerings for which the discount could be calculated is 
reduced by one for each offering type due to missing data. 
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Since private placements often exclude existing shareholders’ preemptive rights, they di-
lute their claims. Therefore, the management seems to be cautious in these cases and limits 
the size of these offerings accordingly. Furthermore, private placements are offered at a 
lower discount than public SEOs are. This is probably due to the opportunity to provide 
additional information to investors during private negotiations. Thereby, asymmetric in-
formation can be reduced and less discounting is necessary (see Goodwin 2013). For the 
greater public offerings, investors demand has to be attracted by granting higher discounts 
on the issue price. 
3.5.2 Shareholder wealth effects of secondary offerings 
Table 3.5 provides an overview of abnormal stock returns in response to announcements of 
seasoned equity offerings. The results show that the stock market reacts highly negatively 
(columns 2 and 3). On the event day (t = 0), stocks of announcing real estate companies 
experience a statistically significant AAR of -1.03% (t-value -3.32). Approximately two 
thirds of the abnormal returns on this day are negative (column 7). 
Table 3.5: Announcement effects of seasoned equity offerings (N=142) 
Event 
window 
CAAR 
Median 
CAR 
BMP-test t-test Corrado-test 
%  
negative 
[-10/+10] -1.81% -1.46% -2.32 ** -2.07 ** -1.83 * 59.15% 
[-5/+5] -1.25% -1.47% -2.25 ** -1.89 * -1.44  60.56% 
[-3/+3] -1.00% -0.86% -2.19 ** -1.81 * -1.22  62.68% 
[-1/+1] -1.05% -0.58% -3.10 *** -3.01 *** -1.50  60.56% 
[-2/-2] -0.32% -0.16% -1.55  -1.41  -1.96 * 56.34% 
[-1/-1] -0.21% -0.13% -1.20  -1.14  -0.75  53.52% 
[0/0] -1.03% -0.51% -3.64 *** -3.32 *** -3.70 *** 64.79% 
[+1/+1] 0.19% 0.14% 1.21  1.02  1.84 * 42.96% 
[+2/+2] 0.01% 0.00% -0.13  0.04  0.14  50.00% 
[-2/-1] -0.54% -0.49% -2.11 ** -1.95 * -1.91 * 56.34% 
[-2/0] -1.57% -1.16% -4.11 *** -3.71 *** -3.70 *** 63.38% 
 
Table 3.5 shows the cumulative average and median abnormal return in response to SEO 
announcements over different event windows. Abnormal returns are tested for statistical 
significance using the Boehmer et al. (1991) [BMP]test, the cross-sectional t-test, and the 
non-parametric Corrado (1989) test. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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This emphasizes that the capital market reaction is significantly negative on average, even 
after accounting for the four well-documented factors in stock returns. The Boehmer et al. 
(1991) test that adjusts for event-induced variance increases and the non-parametric 
Corrado (1989) test also confirm the statistically significant effect on the event day. The 
significance also extends to the larger 3-, 7-, 11-, and 21-day event windows surrounding 
the announcement (rows 1-4). Scrutinizing the single-day abnormal returns before and af-
ter the announcement reveals that the statistical significance is substantially driven by the 
highly negative AAR on the announcement day t=0. Although there is weak evidence of 
post-announcement recovery on day 1, this effect is too small to be interpreted as indica-
tion of an initial overreaction. Besides, there is some evidence of negative pre-
announcement returns (t=-2). In both cases solely the Corrado test yields marginal signifi-
cance. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the CAARs over the entire event window [-10/+10]. The post-
announcement effect is negligible and amounts to only -0.13% over the [+1/+10]-period. 
The pre-announcement returns are slightly higher. Especially the [-2/-1]-window yields a 
cumulative abnormal return of -0.54% which is statistically significant at the 10% level 
according to all of the three tests. Thus, part of the negative shareholder wealth effect can 
be observed prior to the official announcement which could indicate an information leak-
age. This could occur if private negotiations become publicly known prior to the corporate 
announcement. Overall, there is some evidence that the entire announcement effect extends 
over three days [-2/0] and amounts to -1.54%. But most of the price drop occurs on the 
event day. By contrast, there is no evidence of abnormal post-announcement returns. It can 
thus be concluded that the market is efficient. It incorporates new information after the 
announcement immediately and does not over- or underreact. The results confirm the first 
main hypothesis and are in line with prior literature on seasoned equity offerings. Howev-
er, the decrease in value is not as severe as documented in prior cross-industry as well as 
real estate studies. Even over the entire event window the loss in value does not exceed 
2%. There could be several explanations for this finding. First, earlier research mostly em-
ploys 1-factor market models to estimate expected returns. Since I use a 4-factor model for 
this purpose, the resulting expected returns are more precise because more factors are ac-
counted for. The abnormal return which represents the difference between expected and 
actual return could thus be smaller. However, this is not the case. A standard market model 
event study produces very similar results. 
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Figure 3.2: Cumulative average abnormal returns over the event window [-10/+10] 
 
Second, one may argue that the results are due to the combined consideration of private 
and public offerings. But consistent with Marciukaityte et al. (2007), I find a uniformly 
negative capital market reaction in both subsamples when the sample is split to consider 
the two offering types separately. As the explanatory power of univariate tests is limited, I 
do not discuss these results here, but postpone the detailed discussion to the multivariate 
analysis in subsection 3.5.3. In sum, methodological and data-related explanations can be 
ruled out for these findings. Thus, although the sample contains a period of financial tur-
moil and a severely affected industry, SEO announcement effects are not as negative as 
documented by prior research. In the next subsection, I will try to uncover potential rea-
sons for this. 
3.5.3 The impact of corporate governance on shareholder wealth effects 
In the following, I intend to determine whether corporate governance is able to mitigate the 
observed negative announcement effects. As indicated above by descriptive statistics, sec-
ondary offerings are relatively heterogeneous. Certain offering or firm characteristics 
might foster managerial incentives to overinvest while other factors play a mitigating role. 
The following table shows the results of the multiple OLS regression from equation (3.5). 
Five different models are presented. Models 1 to 3 comprise the full sample, except for one 
observation dropping out due to data availability (one missing FFO value). Models 4 and 5 
are based on the subsample for which the variable insider ownership (%Insider) is availa-
ble. This leads to a sample of 99 observations. Model 5 serves as a robustness check.  
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Table 3.6: Results of the multiple OLS regression  
(Regression coefficients, t-values in parentheses) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Exp 0.0067   -   0.0086   0.0174   0.0114   
  (0.64)       (0.82)   (1.19)   (0.87)   
PP 0.0179 * 0.0070   0.0217 ** 0.0089   0.0067   
  (1.70)   (1.25)   (2.12)   (0.62)   (0.49)   
Exp&PP -0.0185   -   -0.0204 * -0.0192   -0.0189   
  (-1.56)       (-1.73)   (-1.14)   (-1.13)   
ExcR -   -0.0026   -   -   -   
      (-1.42)               
%Insider -   -   -   -0.0993 ** -   
              (-2.08)       
(%Insider)
2
 -   -   -   0.1261 ** -   
              (2.17)       
Cash -0.1089 *** -0.1190 *** -0.1034 *** -0.2773 *** -0.2590 *** 
  (-3.55)   (-3.91)   (-3.35)   (-2.98)   (-3.03)   
FFO -0.1304   -0.1271   -0.1374   -0.3694   -0.3341   
  (-1.26)   (-1.17)   (-1.23)   (-1.14)   (-1.09)   
P/B 0.0037   0.0071   0.0027   0.0045   0.0048   
  (0.90)   (1.33)   (0.70)   (1.06)   (1.04)   
DivY -0.0021   -0.0025   -0.0021   -0.0027   -0.0031   
  (-1.28)   (-1.48)   (-1.19)   (-1.25)   (-1.48)   
Purp_1 -   -   0.0125   -   -   
(M&A)         (1.22)           
Purp_2 -   -   -0.0023   -   -   
(CapEx)          (-0.24)           
Purp_3 -   -   0.0002   -   -   
(Leverage)          (0.02)           
Purp_4 -   -   -0.0055   -   -   
(General)          (-0.62)           
GER -0.0157   -0.0146   -0.0149   -0.0135   -0.0159   
  (-1.48)   (-1.55)   (-1.45)   (-1.05)   (-1.24)   
Ln(Size) -0.0071 *** -0.0074 *** -0.0074 *** -0.0092 ** -0.0100 *** 
  (-2.84)   (-3.05)   (-2.86)   (-2.49)   (-3.06)   
Lev -0.0678 *** -0.0738 *** -0.0706 *** -0.0722 * -0.0784 ** 
  (-2.79)   (-3.14)   (-2.88)   (-1.77)   (-2.07)   
Commercial -0.0163   -0.0161   -0.0161   -0.0071   -0.0059   
  (-1.56)   (-1.62)   (-1.53)   (-0.44)   (-0.33)   
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(Table 3.6 continued) 
REIT -0.0016   -0.0015   -0.0020   -0.0044   -0.0022 
   (-0.15)   (-0.15)   (-0.18)   (-0.32)   (-0.18)  
Offer size -0.0004   -0.0008   0.0007   -0.0080   -0.0064   
  (-0.06)   (-0.13)   (0.11)   (-1.13)   (-0.78)   
Constant 0.0935 *** 0.1015 *** 0.0959 *** 0.1262 *** 0.1266 *** 
  (4.46)   (4.33)   (4.41)   (3.96)   (4.28)   
N 141   141   141   99   99   
F-statistic 3.20 *** 4.14 *** 3.87 *** 4.85 *** 3.75 *** 
Adj. R
2
 19.74%   19.79%   18.68%   21.92%   19.23%   
 
Table 3.6 shows the regression coefficients and associated t-statistics (in parentheses) for 
the regression ARi,t = 0 +  j·Vari,t,j + t with standard errors clustered at the firm level 
(see equation 3.5). The dependent variable is the abnormal return of firm i on the event 
day t=0. Models 1 to 3 comprise the entire sample, whereas Models 4 and 5 contain only 
those events for which the announcing firm’s insider ownership (%Insider) was available. 
Detailed definitions of the independent variables j can be extracted from Table 3.1. ***, 
**, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
It contains the same subsample as model 4, but excludes %Insider and the squared term 
like the first three models. The regression results show mixed evidence with respect to all 
hypothesized determinants. However, the results overall confirm the importance of corpo-
rate governance to mitigate SEO-related value losses. Following the observation of a pos-
sible relationship between the offering type and the market phase (see Table 3.2), I includ-
ed an interaction term (Exp&PP) for private placements during expansionary market phas-
es in models 1, 3, 4, and 5.
101
 The interaction term shows the expected negative sign, but it 
is only marginally significant in model 3. Thus, private placements are not only conducted 
less frequently during expansionary market phases, but there is also some evidence that 
they are associated with more negative announcement returns during these times. On the 
contrary, the expected effect of market timing cannot be confirmed. In all regression speci-
fications the respective coefficient is statistically insignificant. Consequently, market tim-
ing does not affect the capital market reaction to real estate SEOs. This finding is robust to 
the different definitions of market timing that have been used: the overall business cycle 
(Exp) and the firm’s one-year excess return (ExcR in model 2). However, real estate man-
agers seem to time the market by choosing the appropriate offering method. When the dis-
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 The interaction term is also a dummy variable that is one if the SEO is a private placement during an ex-
pansionary market phase and zero otherwise. 
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tinct effect of private placements during boom phases is controlled for, the private place-
ment dummy (PP) has a significantly positive and hence mitigating effect on abnormal 
returns in models 1 and 3. Thus, managers seem to be able to employ private negotiations 
effectively in order to reduce the level of asymmetric information and alleviate negative 
announcement effects to some extent. By contrast, the statistical significance disappears 
entirely in models 4 and 5. So the results should be interpreted with caution. Further re-
search is necessary to shed light on this issue. My results indicate that the effects of market 
timing and offering method could be more complex and should therefore be analyzed in 
more detail.
102
 
Concerning insider ownership, both the linear and the squared term are statistically signifi-
cant at the 5% level in model 4. Moreover, this model has the largest F-value as well as the 
highest adjusted R
2
 with nearly 22%. While the linear term exhibits a negative sign, the 
squared term is positive. Therefore, a U-shaped relation between insider ownership and 
announcement returns results. The inflection point of the curve is at 39.4% insider owner-
ship. This indicates that SEO announcements are followed by even more negative price 
reactions if ownership is rather dispersed (i.e. at lower levels of insider ownership). On the 
contrary, if the firm’s ownership structure is concentrated at intermediate to high levels, 
announcement returns become less negative. This effect can be interpreted to be due to 
active monitoring by blockholders. Effective corporate governance by large shareholding 
companies or individuals might prevent overinvestment. Thereby, SEO-related wealth 
losses are alleviated. However, active monitoring cannot remedy negative announcement 
effects if ownership is too dispersed. Additionally, if the insider is an officer, high owner-
ship levels lead to the alignment of managerial interests with those of other shareholders 
(Jensen/Meckling 1976). If managers as well as other blockholders hold sizeable stakes in 
the firm prior to the announcement, they will be particularly interested in limiting the relat-
ed wealth loss. The results confirm the hypothesis and emphasize the role of corporate 
governance as a valuable factor. As opposed to other research on ownership structure, I do 
not face endogeneity problems. As the event study analyzes the short-term impact of un-
predictable corporate announcements on firm value, the relationship could not work in the 
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 When a financial crisis dummy is used instead of Exp or ExcR in models 1 to 3, the coefficients of Crisis, 
PP, and the interaction term (models 1 and 3 only) are not significant. The significances of other variables do 
not change. Since the financial crisis represents only part of the recessionary phases during the sample peri-
od, I prefer the Exp dummy and do not present the other results separately. 
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opposite direction. Besides, the lagged values of insider ownership from the year prior to 
the announcement are used. Therefore, endogeneity is not an issue in this study. 
The results for Cash also support the overall conjecture. The higher the proportion of cash 
and short-term assets, the more negative is the abnormal announcement return. Sharehold-
ers seem to fear overinvestment problems when firms raise additional funds in spite of hav-
ing a lot of cash (equivalents) at their disposal. Accordingly, the share price depreciates 
more at the time of announcement. This is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis by 
Jensen (1986) and with empirical evidence of excess corporate cash holdings as a possible 
indication of agency problems (Pinkowitz et al. 2006; Dittmar/Mahrt-Smith 2007; Harford 
et al. 2008). Similarly, funds from operations are a measure of operating profitability and 
thus firms’ capability of generating internal funds. Highly profitable firms that raise exter-
nal capital might therefore suffer from overinvestment problems. However, the present 
findings do not support this assumption. I document a negative sign for FFO in all regres-
sion specifications, but the coefficient lacks statistical significance. Thus, there is no em-
pirical support for the overinvestment hypothesis with respect to operating profitability. 
The next group of variables comprises factors related to the use of funds. First, the price-
to-book ratio (P/B) is often considered an indicator of firms’ investment opportunities. 
However, P/B has no statistically significant impact on SEO announcement returns. Thus, I 
find no support for the assumption that growth firms might suffer less from overinvestment 
issues. This finding is consistent with Denis (1994) who shows that positive effects associ-
ated with investment opportunities are spurious and driven by small firms that experience 
insignificant announcement effects. Second, dividends represent another potential use of 
funds. Equity issuing firms with high dividend yields might be suspected of sticking to 
their payout policy instead of having valuable investment opportunities. Although the sign 
of the coefficients of DivY seems to support this line of reasoning, the statistical tests do 
not. The respective p-values do not fall below 14%. Overall, there is no evidence that vari-
ables related to the use of funds affect the observed stock price reactions. 
However, firms frequently declare the intended use of the offering proceeds in the ad-hoc 
announcement. This additional information could alleviate investors’ concerns. In order to 
test this assumption, I scrutinize the firms’ announcements in detail. With respect to the 
purpose of the offering, i.e. the intended use of funds, five categories emerge. From these 
categories, four dummy variables are derived: Mergers and acquisitions (Purp_1, M&A, 
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mentioned 11 times), property acquisitions and investments (Purp_2, CapEx, 23 times), 
reduction of leverage or debt-related payments (Purp_3, Leverage, 35 times), general cor-
porate purpose (Purp_4, General, 48 times), and the default case no statement (25 times). 
Model 3 illustrates that these dummy variables have no significant influence on the an-
nouncement effects.
103
 Likewise, a partial F-test does not reject the null hypothesis of no 
explanatory power of the entirety of the four purpose dummies (F-value = 1.03).
104
 I inter-
pret this as follows. Since a SEO announcement is generally bad news to the market, the 
management frequently elaborates on what the offering proceeds will be used for (in the 
present sample in more than 80% of the cases). In this way, managers attempt to dispel 
shareholders’ concerns regarding overinvestment or market timing issues. However, the 
results indicate that the market does not trust this information. It rather relies on key indi-
cators of the firm, such as relative cash holdings, to infer management’s motives to issue 
new equity. There is no reaction to the explicit statements on the intended use of funds. 
Thus, the market seems to be efficient in that it evaluates the firm’s fundamentals and can-
not be misled by positive prospects expressed by the management. This finding is in line 
with Masulis and Korwar (1986) for SEOs as well as with Dann and Mikkelson (1984) for 
convertible and straight debt issues. 
Finally, it was tested whether German SEOs are perceived more negatively due to the al-
legedly weaker corporate governance system. The German dummy variable consistently 
exhibits a negative sign, but is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Thus, 
there is no evidence for the assumption that weak shareholder protection rights in Germany 
are a driver of negative SEO announcement effects. Accordingly, the German corporate 
governance system seems to work effectively. Alternative mechanisms, such as the pres-
ence of block shareholders, ensure the maximization of shareholder value (Shleifer/Vishny 
1997). 
Among the control variables, the most surprising finding is the negative coefficient of firm 
size (Ln(Size)). The effect is highly statistically significant throughout all estimated mod-
els. The strongly negative impact on shareholder wealth effects contradicts previous expec-
tations as well as most empirical findings. However, it is in line with the results of Ghosh 
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 The same results are obtained when the purpose dummies are included in the smaller sample of models 4 
and 5. The t-values of the coefficients are always below 1 in absolute value. 
104
 Several different specifications of the purpose dummies were also tried (e.g. one dummy variable for 
investments (Purp_1, 2, and 4) and one dummy for debt-related payments (Purp_3); or only one dummy if a 
purpose was stated (i.e. all four purpose categories)). However, the result of no additional explanatory power 
of the purpose dummy/dummies remained unchanged. 
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et al. (1999) for SEOs by US REITs. The results indicate that larger firms experience more 
negative abnormal returns in spite of potentially higher transparency and greater analyst 
coverage. A possible explanation could be access to debt financing. Small firms have typi-
cally only access to bank lending, whereas larger firms can also issue bonds. In the context 
of the pecking order theory, large firms that announce a SEO would thus be regarded being 
unable to raise debt from two alternative sources. In contrast, small firms would only be 
unable to receive additional bank loans. Therefore, SEO announcements by large firms 
could be perceived more negatively. Additionally, the negative size effect could be related 
to the relatively low level of transparency in the real estate sector where the majority of 
transaction data is not publicly available. Thus, for analysts it might be easier to estimate 
the true value of a firm’s property assets if the number of assets is limited and more easily 
assessable. Accordingly, information asymmetry could be lower which would lead to less 
negative announcement effects for small firms. Furthermore, it should be noted that the 
sample firms are comparably small with a mean (median) market capitalization of only 980 
million (445 million) USD as of yearend 2013.
105
 Therefore, the finding of a negative size 
effect does not necessarily contradict earlier findings, but instead suggests that an overall 
size effect might be non-linear or industry-specific. 
The coefficient of the leverage ratio is negative and statistically significant in all models. 
This seems consistent with the view that highly levered firms might be forced to fund their 
operations by issuing new equity. This could be either due to pressure by banks and other 
lenders or because there is no other source of capital available. Both might be perceived as 
a negative signal causing stock prices to decline more heavily. Notably, the t-values of the 
leverage coefficients decline in models 4 and 5. In the former case, the coefficient only 
remains significant at the 10% level. This highlights the importance of the ownership vari-
able. Omitting an important determinant in the regression could create spuriously high sta-
tistical significances of other variables. The significance of all other variables in models 4 
and 5 except for the afore-noted PP remains virtually constant. This confirms the previous-
ly documented effects and interpretations. 
Furthermore, I have controlled for the issuer type, i.e. whether the issuer is focused on 
commercial real estate. The coefficient of Commercial is negative in all five models, but 
exhibits no statistical significance. This indicates that the respective real estate subsector 
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 In contrast, the German DAX30 companies had a mean (median) market capitalization of 47.5 billion 
(38.8 billion) USD as of yearend 2013. 
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and the associated risk have no impact on shareholders’ reaction. As a second issuer con-
trol variable, a REIT dummy was included in order to determine whether REITs and non-
REITs exhibit distinct announcement effects. The respective coefficient is not statistically 
significant either. Thus, REITs do not have an impact. Furthermore, only 28 of 142 sample 
SEOs have been announced by REITs. This emphasizes that REITs are not as established 
in continental Europe as they are in the US. 
In addition to firm characteristics, I have also controlled for the relative size of the offering 
(Offer Size). I discover no impact of this variable. Although this finding is consistent with 
the results of Masulis and Korwar (1986) for industrial firms, it is surprising. I expected a 
more negative reaction if the proportion of new shares to old shares is higher, as docu-
mented by Ghosh et al. (1999) for REIT SEOs in the US. I anticipated similar results for 
European SEOs due to greater dilution and the negative price effect when supply of shares 
is substantially increased and the respective demand function has a negative slope 
(Asquith/Mullins 1986). But the empirical results do not support this conjecture. The pre-
viously mentioned corporate governance considerations, most importantly those related to 
corporate cash holdings and insider ownership, seem to play a dominant role in this con-
text. Thus, if the management can convince investors that their cash contributions will not 
be squandered, the relative size of the offering has no impact on the announcement effect. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I analyze the shareholder wealth effects of SEO announcements by real 
estate corporations between 1997 and 2013. I find a significantly negative abnormal return 
of -1% on the event day. Considering the 3-day period ending on the event day, the aver-
age decline is even -1.5%. This result is relatively stable over time. The financial crisis that 
originated in the US real estate sector in 2006 does not seem to have changed the capital 
market reactions to SEO announcements in Europe. Moreover, there is no convincing evi-
dence of market timing behavior. Although credit conditions have tightened and the level 
of mistrust has increased, the supply of equity capital for real estate companies has not 
collapsed. These findings indicate that factors related to corporate governance and overin-
vestment issues are of particular importance in this context. Especially insider ownership 
and corporate cash holdings proved to be major determinants of the market reaction when 
real estate firms announce SEOs. I detect a U-shaped relation between abnormal an-
nouncement returns and the percentage of shares held by insiders. Accordingly, medium to 
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high levels of insider ownership produce less negative wealth effects on average. A rather 
concentrated ownership structure may thus be beneficial due to managerial incentive 
alignment and active monitoring. By limiting managerial discretion over SEO funds, the 
threat of overinvestment is reduced and announcement effects become less negative. On 
the contrary, with a more dispersed ownership structure this mechanism is attenuated 
which causes more negative wealth effects. Hence, the analysis reveals that firms that are 
less likely subject to overinvestment problems experience more favorable announcement 
effects due to sizeable insider shareholdings. In support of this argument, I find that con-
siderable cash holdings are perceived as indication of internally available funds and thus 
lead to more negative investor reactions. Furthermore, there is evidence that SEOs by high-
ly levered firms are associated with more severe price decreases. The most surprising re-
sult, however, is a highly negative firm size effect. Possibly, this finding is unique to the 
real estate sector which is still perceived to be a “people’s business” and suffers from a 
lack of transparency and publicly available data regarding transactions and valuation. Fu-
ture research on a different sample of real estate companies and time period could help 
explaining this counterintuitive finding. 
In summary, shareholders care most about governance and the availability of alternative 
sources of funds. However, they do not consider the intended use of the offering proceeds 
expressed in the disclosure statements. This is because badly governed firms could still 
squander the proceeds for value destroying purposes. Thus, even during periods of finan-
cial turmoil, the capital market remains accessible for real estate corporations with good 
corporate governance. This finding is important in the light of the extensive discussions 
about the recent financial and confidence crisis as to how investors, firms, and regulators 
should prepare for future bursts of housing and equity bubbles. Sound management and 
corporate governance are thus the cornerstones for successful development of real estate 
corporations through the cycles of the property and the stock market. 
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4  What drives expectations of future monetary policy? Evi-
dence from federal funds derivatives and the zero lower 
bound 
4.1 Introduction 
For the last 30 years, the Federal Reserve has pursued its monetary policy objectives pri-
marily by setting the target federal funds rate (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System 2005). At eight regular meetings per year, the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) decides whether the target rate needs to be adjusted in order to promote price sta-
bility and ensure a high level of employment. By tightening (easing) conditions in the in-
terbank market, the Fed intends to influence overall credit market conditions (e.g. 
Cook/Hahn 1989; Kuttner 2001) in order to ultimately slow down (stimulate) the real 
economy. 
Derivatives on the federal funds rate have been proven to be an effective tool for extracting 
market expectations of future monetary policy actions by the Fed in the past. By analyzing 
prices of federal funds futures and options, the expected path of future monetary policy can 
be predicted (e.g. Krueger/Kuttner 1996; Robertson/Thornton 1997; Carlson et al. 2005; 
Emmons et al. 2006). Further, it has been shown that monetary policy expectations react to 
the release of macroeconomic news as implied by the Taylor (1993) rule. Accordingly, 
inflationary and expansionary announcements lead to tighter expected monetary policy, 
whereas deflationary and recessionary news are associated with an expected decrease in 
the target rate (e.g. Kearney/Lombra 2003; Carlson et al. 2005; Taylor 2010; Smales 
2013). However, the vast majority of prior research analyzes time periods prior to the re-
cent financial crisis. This casts doubt on the general validity of previous results for two 
reasons. First, the severity of the following economic downturn led the Fed to lower the 
target rate to nearly zero percent. This is in contrast to previous periods under considera-
tion. The respective analyses were based on the assumption of an unconstrained policy rate 
that could be altered in both directions in response to changes in the macroeconomic envi-
ronment. The zero lower bound possibly undermines previously documented relations of 
monetary policy expectations and macroeconomic news due to the new constraint to policy 
makers (Bauer/Rudebusch 2015). Second, recent research provides evidence that monetary 
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policy follows different regimes during normal times and financial crises (Martin/Milas 
2013). The arrival at the ZLB in the US in 2008 might indicate such a regime switch. The 
Federal Reserve was forced to apply unconventional measures of monetary policy in order 
to pursue its objectives (Gertler/Karadi 2011). This raises the question whether the way in 
which monetary policy expectations are formed has likewise changed due to the financial 
crisis and the resulting recession in the US. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to investigate this topic using expecta-
tions as implied in the prices of federal funds derivatives. Thus, this analysis represents the 
main contribution of the chapter. Besides, I contribute to the literature in two additional 
ways. First, I directly assess the impact of 28 macroeconomic indicators on option implied 
probabilities of future target rates. While Carlson et al. (2005) run a dummy regression to 
determine the effect of only four types of macroeconomic news, I consider solely the un-
expected component of economic indicators. It has been concluded that this is more appro-
priate since market participants should not react to announcements that coincide with their 
expectations (Balduzzi et al. 2001; Kuttner 2001; Fatum/Scholnick 2008). Second, this is 
one of the first studies to simultaneously analyze federal funds futures and options. In this 
way, it is possible to cross-check whether the documented announcement effects on federal 
funds options are also perceptible with federal funds futures and vice versa. Furthermore, 
futures and options implied expectations complement each other very well. By making use 
options, one is able to recover precise expectations of the outcome of the upcoming FOMC 
meeting. On the other hand, futures are limited to extracting the broad direction of future 
monetary policy, but they can be employed to recover market expectations for the more 
distant future. Prior literature mostly focuses only on one derivative type. 
My investigation comprises the following steps. Using an intraday data set from 2003 to 
2011, I first investigate federal funds futures in order to determine which macroeconomic 
announcements increase or decrease the expected future target rate. This provides an initial 
overview of expected monetary policy and its drivers. Second, I employ federal funds op-
tions in order to recover more precise measures of expected monetary policy. As first pro-
posed by Carlson et al. (2005), federal funds options can be used to estimate the risk-
neutral probability density function of the future target federal funds rate. After estimating 
these option implied probabilities, I analyze how they react to the release of important US 
macroeconomic indicators. This offers valuable insights as to which kind of macroeconom-
ic news drives the probability the market attaches to possible outcomes of the upcoming 
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FOMC meeting. Finally, the role of the financial crisis and the ZLB as a constraint to poli-
cy makers is scrutinized for both futures and options. 
The results of futures and options consistently show that the employment report is the most 
influential indicator upon announcement during normal times, i.e. prior to the crisis. This 
reveals a Taylor rule that emphasizes the importance of economic output as opposed to 
inflation. The Chicago Purchasing Manager Index (PMI) likewise has a considerable im-
pact. Subsequent to 2007, however, the picture changes completely. Previously document-
ed important indicators lose their significance. Option implied probabilities do not react in 
response to standard macroeconomic announcements anymore. Thus, the way in which 
expectations in the market for federal funds derivatives are formed has changed. Two al-
ternative ways of interpretation exist. First, monetary policy has become less predictable 
since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007. Financial turmoil, the stream of unex-
pected negative news as the crisis unfolded, and the Fed that even changed the target rate 
at unscheduled meetings caused a new regime as to how market participants form their 
expectations. The second interpretation offers an opposing line of argumentation. Since the 
arrival at the ZLB, the Fed can no longer make use of the target rate as its main policy in-
strument. As a further decrease was not possible and the economic outlook made an in-
crease extremely unlikely, the target federal funds rate actually became perfectly predicta-
ble for a considerable period of time. Hence, market participants expected the target rate to 
remain at the ZLB. This caused target rate probabilities not to react to the release of mac-
roeconomic news anymore. This interpretation is consistent with prior evidence from the 
UK (Martin/Milas 2013; Sihvonen/Vähämaa 2014). Particularly, it emphasizes the point of 
Martin and Milas (2013) who conclude that two monetary policy regimes exist since the 
1990s – “a ‘financial crisis’ and a ‘no-crisis’ regime” (p. 654). Thus, my results add new 
empirical evidence to the literature and indicate that the same applies to the United States. 
Recently, the first target rate hike since 2006 raises the question whether predictability will 
improve after the consequences of the Great Recession eventually tail off and the Fed re-
gains full flexibility in target rate setting. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides some back-
ground information on federal funds derivatives and briefly reviews the related literature. 
Section 4.3 presents the data set. Section 4.4 describes the methodology of estimating 
probabilities from federal funds option prices, and illustrates the event study methodology 
used for assessing the impact of macroeconomic announcements on future prices and on 
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option implied probabilities. Subsequently, sections 4.5 and 4.6 present the results of the 
recovered probabilities and the event studies of futures and options. Finally, section 4.7 
concludes. 
4.2 Theoretical background and literature review 
Initially, some terminology and conventions of the federal funds market and the associated 
derivatives are explained. The Fed obliges depository institutions to hold a predetermined 
amount of balances at their respective Federal Reserve Bank, called required reserve bal-
ances. Depository institutions can borrow (lend) balances from (to) each other at the feder-
al funds rate in case of a deficit (surplus). The Federal Open Market Committee sets the 
target federal funds rate for these overnight loans and controls the effective federal funds 
rate primarily through open market operations (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System 2005). By setting the federal funds rate, the Fed is able to influence the short end 
of the yield curve (Cook/Hahn 1989). Thereby, it tries to affect bank lending in order to 
enhance or decelerate consumption and investments to accomplish the overall objective of 
sustainable economic growth, employment, and stable prices. 
4.2.1 The market for federal funds derivatives 
Federal funds derivatives serve the primary purpose of managing risks associated with the 
required reserve balances. The underlying of federal funds futures (FFF) is the time-
weighted average effective federal funds rate (FFR) of the calendar month in which the 
respective future contract expires, henceforth the contract month. FFF are quoted as 100 
minus the average effective FFR. As this chapter is concerned with expectations of future 
monetary policy, I will not refer to the official price quote but instead to the average effec-
tive FFR implied in the future’s quote. Henceforth, I will refer to it as implied futures 
rate.
106
 Federal funds futures are subject to daily cash settlement. Settlement is calculated 
based on the implied futures rate and a notional amount of $ 5 million for the contract 
month (30/360 convention). 
Federal funds options are American-style futures options. The underlying of a federal 
funds option is a federal funds future that matures in the same month like the option.
107
 If a 
federal funds call (FFC) is exercised, the FFC buyer (call long position) is entitled to a 
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 Accordingly, the implied futures rate is calculated as F = 100 – future price. 
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 Recently, the CME has also introduced two types of so-called mid-curve options. The underlying of these 
options are federal funds futures that mature 6 or 12 months after the options expires. 
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cash payment amounting to the current settlement price of the future minus the strike price 
and delivery of the FFF. On the contrary, the federal funds put (FFP) buyer is entitled to 
sell a FFF at the strike price and receive a cash settlement equal to the strike price minus 
the future price (Hull 2012). Federal funds options are quoted in percentage points of the 
notional amount of $ 5 million for the contract month (30/360 convention). For example, 
the USD value of an FFC quoted at 1.65 is $ 5,000,000 x 30/360 x 0.01 x 1.65 which is 
equal to $ 6,875. 
Figure 4.1: Trading volume of 1-month federal funds futures contracts and federal 
funds target rate
108
 
 
Prior to the approach of the ZLB, federal funds derivatives enjoyed an increasing populari-
ty. Trading of futures on the federal funds rate (see Figure 4.1) and options on those futures 
was very active. As explained above, the main purpose of trading federal funds derivatives 
is to hedge interest rate risk in the interbank market. Besides, market supervisors and ana-
lysts use federal funds derivatives to extract market expectations about the future path of 
the target federal funds rate. The link between federal funds futures and expected monetary 
policy can be described as follows. The implied futures rate reflects expectations of the 
average effective FFR of the contract month. The actual effective FFR is usually equal to 
the target rate, although small deviations can occur. Thus, the implied futures rate can be 
interpreted as a measure of the market’s expectation of future monetary policy 
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 The trading volume data was obtained from www.quandl.com. It should be noted that this website is not 
listed among the officially licensed data distributors of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). 
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(Krueger/Kuttner 1996; Robertson/Thornton 1997). It is a market-based measure of the 
expected target rate in the contract month. However, several papers note that deviations 
can occur both between the implied futures rate and the future effective FFR and between 
the effective FFR and the target rate. Consequently, FFF can only approximately predict 
monetary policy. As the objective of this chapter is to analyze drivers of monetary policy 
expectations, I calculate changes in expectation over a short-time horizon when macroeco-
nomic news or monetary policy actions are announced. In the short-term, systematic biases 
of FFF-related measures cancel out (Piazzesi/Swanson 2008; Hamilton 2009). Therefore, 
the aforementioned deviations are of minor importance and the market-based expectations 
extracted from FFF are a useful measure in the context of this study (see also Gürkaynak et 
al. 2007). 
The general relationship between FFF prices and expected monetary policy can thus be 
summarized as follows. If prices of federal funds futures increase (decrease), this indicates 
a more accommodative (tighter) monetary policy in the future (e.g. Taylor 2010). Accord-
ingly, if investors expect a target rate increase (decrease), they will assume a short (long) 
position in the future or a long position in federal funds puts (calls) (see also Sultan 2012). 
Price changes of federal funds futures allow for an easy inference of monetary policy ex-
pectations. On the other hand, the benefits of futures are limited to extracting information 
about the broad direction of future monetary policy, i.e. whether the target rate is more 
likely to decrease or to increase. By using federal funds options, the entire probability den-
sity function of future FOMC meetings can be recovered. This is particularly useful if 
more than two distinct future target rates are considered to be likely (Carlson et al. 2005). 
4.2.2 Related literature 
This chapter touches on three strands of literature. First, the impact of macroeconomic an-
nouncements on different asset classes is a research area that has attracted a great deal of 
attention. Similar to the analysis in this chapter, recent papers usually use high-frequency 
(i.e. mostly intraday) data to analyze how quickly new information is incorporated into 
prices or how volatility measures react. For fixed income securities, Balduzzi et al. (2001) 
is one of the most relevant studies. The authors find that especially inflation and Non-farm 
Payrolls announcements have an immediate effect on the prices of Treasury bonds of dif-
ferent maturities. In contrast, increased volatility persists for some time after the an-
nouncement. With respect to stock markets, Hussain (2011) and Kontonikas et al. (2013) 
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have recently published evidence of macroeconomic announcements effects.
109
 Overall, 
their findings suggest that stock prices and volatility measures adjust immediately to mac-
roeconomic or monetary policy announcements. This highlights the benefits of using high-
frequency data to rule out confounding event issues (see also Fleming/Remolona 1997; 
Smales 2013). Concerning stock market volatility, Kearney and Lombra (2004) provide 
evidence for a significantly positive change in implied volatility to announcements of em-
ployment data but not to those of inflation. Vähämaa and Äijö (2011) find that implied 
volatility declines after FOMC meetings in the US. However, their results suggest a posi-
tive relationship between the surprises of monetary policy and the change in implied vola-
tility.
110
 
The second strand of literature represents forecasting future monetary policy actions. In 
their popular study, Krueger and Kuttner (1996) showed that federal funds futures can be 
employed to recover monetary policy expectations. Although some papers point out chal-
lenges to extracting expectations from futures, such as the existence of a term premium or 
the deviation of the target rate from the effective FFR, it has been concluded that federal 
funds futures are very useful for this purpose (Robertson/Thornton 1997; Hamilton 2009). 
Since federal funds options were introduced in 2003, they can also be employed for fore-
casting. Carlson et al. (2005) and Emmons et al. (2006) illustrate in detail how probability 
density functions for upcoming FOMC meetings can be extracted from option prices (see 
subsection 4.4.2.1 for a detailed description). However, evidence as to how these probabili-
ties are affected by macroeconomic news or events is only preliminary. This chapter in-
tends to fill this gap. Therefore, it represents an intersection of the first two strands of liter-
ature. 
Table 4.1 provides an overview of previous empirical investigations that also deal with the 
impact of macroeconomic announcements on US Treasury (derivative) securities or on 
comparable instruments from different countries. These papers are thus most closely relat-
ed to the present one. Their most important findings can be summarized as follows. First, 
the majority of past empirical literature suggests that, despite the Fed’s double target of 
monetary policy, the US employment situation is perceived as primary objective of the 
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 Important papers that investigate daily stock price reactions to monetary policy announcements include 
e.g. Schwert (1981), Pearce and Roley (1983), McQueen and Roley (1993), Jensen and Johnson (1995), 
Thorbecke (1997), Bomfim (2003), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), and Kurov (2010). 
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 Concerning foreign exchange markets, the most popular works comprise Ito and Roley (1987), Almeida et 
al. (1998), Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), and Andersen et al. (2003) among others. 
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Federal Reserve. Accordingly, employment-related announcements, i.e. mostly Non-farm 
Payrolls and Civilian Unemployment, induce more significant effects than inflation an-
nouncements do, i.e. Consumer and Producer Price Index (CPI, PPI), (e.g. Ederington/Lee 
1993; Kearney/Lombra 2003; Taylor 2010; Evans 2011). Apparently, inflation plays an 
inferior role in monetary policy considerations according to market perception. Second, 
announced information is immediately incorporated into prices, whereas volatility tends to 
remain at an increased level for a certain time after the announcement (e.g. Ederington/Lee 
1993; Fleming/Remolona 1999; Balduzzi et al. 2001; Smales 2013). The latter effect is 
particularly pronounced for unscheduled meetings (Ederington/Lee 1996). Third, macroe-
conomic announcements are a significant driver of (intraday) volatility (e.g. 
Ederington/Lee 1993; Bollerslev et al. 2000; Arnold/Vrugt 2010; Evans 2011). Among the 
papers in Table 4.1, the subsequent empirical analysis is most closely related to Carlson et 
al. (2005) and Taylor (2010). In a comparable analysis that also makes use of option im-
plied information, Beber and Brandt (2006) examine so-called state-price dependencies of 
longer-term Treasury bond futures options. State-price dependencies are combined 
measures of both preferences and expectations of market participants. The authors docu-
ment that uncertainty decreases in response to macroeconomic announcements, irrespec-
tive of whether the news is positive or negative. Additional analyses reveal that macroeco-
nomic announcements affect not only expectations but also market participants’ implied 
risk aversion. To draw an interim conclusion, there is abundant literature on fixed income 
securities and macroeconomic announcement effects. However, the majority of the papers’ 
periods under consideration does not contain the financial crisis and the following reces-
sion. This is a serious shortcoming which the present chapter tries to alleviate. 
Particularly, the research field of monetary policy expectations is highly affected by the 
ZLB which represents the third strand of literature this chapter is related to. Since the Fed 
has lowered its target rate to the range of 0 to 25 basis points in December 2008, plenty of 
papers studying the implications of the ZLB have emerged. The majority of these papers 
deals with the question as to how monetary policy can work around the alleged constraint 
imposed by the ZLB. Swanson and Williams (2014) emphasize that not only current actual 
interest rates but also expected future short-term rates matter. Accordingly, the Fed can 
still influence short-term rates by managing expectations of future monetary policy. The 
authors empirically illustrate that one- and two-year US Treasury yields were rather uncon-
strained by the ZLB until 2011. 
  
9
2
 
Table 4.1: Selected literature on macroeconomic announcements effects on fixed income securities and derivatives 
Study 
Sample 
period, 
Country 
Analyzed security  
(Number of macro-
economic indicators 
considered) 
Data  
fre-
quency Main results 
Ederington and Lee 
(1993) 
1988-1991, 
USA 
Treasury bond, Eu-
rodollar, and DM 
futures (19) 
Intraday Macroeconomic announcements are the key driver of (realized) futures volatili-
ty. Employment announcements have a greater impact on interest rate futures 
than those of inflation. Prices adjust quickly, but increased volatility persists 
after announcements. 
Ederington and Lee 
(1996) 
1988-1992, 
USA 
Treasury bond, Eu-
rodollar, and DM 
futures and futures 
options (12) 
Daily Implied volatility decreases after scheduled announcements, whereas it increases 
after unscheduled announcements. Employment announcements have the great-
est effect on Treasury bond futures, followed by PPI and CPI announcements. 
Fleming and Remolona 
(1999) 
1993-1994, 
USA 
5-year Treasury 
notes (3) 
Intraday Prices adjust immediately to announcements. In a second post announcement 
stage, there is increased trading volume and price volatility. 
Bollerslev et al. (2000) 1994-1997, 
USA 
US Treasury bond 
futures (27) 
Intraday US macroeconomic announcements are a major source of intraday volatility. 
Employment report and Humphrey-Hawkins testimony have the greatest impact. 
PPI, employment cost, retail sales, and NAPM survey follow. 
Balduzzi et al. (2001) 1991-1995, 
USA 
2-month, 2-, 10, and 
30-year US Treasur-
ies (26) 
Intraday Eight US macroeconomic announcements have a significant impact on prices of 
all Treasury instruments. Prices adjust immediately, whereas increased volatility 
persists after the announcement. The most influential announcements are Non-
farm Payrolls and PPI. 
Kuttner (2001) 1989-2000, 
USA 
Federal funds futures 
(1) 
Daily There is a significant price effect of FOMC announcement surprises on FFF. 
Kearney and Lombra 
(2003) 
1988-2002, 
USA 
Federal funds futures 
(2) 
Daily Employment announcements have a significant impact on futures, inflation an-
nouncement do not. 
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 (Table 4.1 continued) 
Carlson et al. (2005) 2003-2004, 
USA 
Options on federal 
funds futures (3) 
Daily The option implied probability of the next actual target rate decision increases 
significantly upon the announcement of employment and inflation figures, and 
upon speeches of the FOMC chairman. 
Emmons et al. (2006) 2003-2006, 
USA 
Options on federal 
funds futures  
(several, mostly 
single, events) 
Daily Detailed (graphical) analysis of changes in option implied probabilities: Specif-
ic events such as hurricane Katrina, congressional testimony of Chairman 
Bernanke, statements of the Federal Reserve to signal monetary policy inten-
tions, and single macroeconomic announcements seem to influence the recov-
ered probabilities. 
Faust et al. (2007) 1987-2002, 
USA 
2 US spot exchange 
rates and 7 interest 
rate futures (includ-
ing FFF) (10) 
Intraday Expansionary or inflationary US macroeconomic surprises lead to USD appre-
ciation and higher short- and long-term interest rates. Effects are stable over the 
sample period. 
Arnold and Vrugt 
(2010) 
1970-2005, 
USA 
1-, 5-, 10-, and 30-
year Treasury Bonds 
(7) 
Quarter-
ly 
Monetary policy uncertainty, extracted from macroeconomic survey data, is the 
major determinant of treasury bond volatility. 
Taylor (2010) 1998-2006, 
USA 
Federal funds futures 
(30) 
Intraday Employment and FOMC announcements are most important; 
GDP and inflation announcements play only a minor role. 
Evans (2011) 1998-2006, 
USA 
10-year treasury 
bond futures, S&P 
500 E-mini, and 
EUR-USD futures 
(32) 
Intraday One third of jumps in US future markets is associated with US macroeconomic 
news. GDP advanced, Non-farm Payrolls, and unemployment rate (among oth-
ers) significantly affect jump size. CPI and PPI play an inferior role. 
Smales (2012b) 
(see also Smales 2012a) 
2004-2010, 
Australia 
4 interest rate futures 
of different maturity 
(1) 
Intraday Especially short-maturity futures react significantly to monetary policy an-
nouncements; volatility is more affected by bad news. 
Smales (2013) 2004-2010, 
Australia 
4 interest rate futures 
of different maturity 
(24) 
Intraday Prices adjust quickly after scheduled announcements. Short-maturity contracts 
and the financial crisis period are associated with stronger price effects, in par-
ticular to CPI, GDP, and employment announcements. 
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Table 4.1 provides an overview of previous empirical studies that also deal with the impact of macroeconomic announcements on government or 
treasury fixed income (derivative) securities from different countries. These papers are thus most closely related to the analysis in this chapter. 
The table’s columns provide information on the papers’ sample periods and countries, the underlying fixed income (derivative) securities the 
price and/or volatility effects of which are studied, the number of macroeconomic indicators considered, the data frequency used for the analysis, 
and the main findings that are relevant for the analysis in this chapter. 
(Table 4.1 continued) 
Sihvonen and Vähämaa 
(2014) 
1993-2012, 
UK 
3-month Libor fu-
tures options (4) 
Monthly Expectations of future interest rates, implied in Libor futures option prices, react 
in line with Taylor rules of monetary policy. Expectations of output gap and 
inflation as well as perceived market uncertainty shape option implied proba-
bilities. Subsequent to 2007, the documented effects of inflation and output 
measures become insignificant. 
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Moreover, large asset purchase programs by the Fed, such as the maturity expansion pro-
gram, have also helped mitigate the effects of the ZLB through their influence on longer-
term yields (Wright 2012; Swanson/Williams 2014; Foley-Fisher et al. 2016). Gertler and 
Karadi (2011) develop a theoretical model for unconventional monetary policy. They illus-
trate how central bank intervention works, its advantages over private financial intermedia-
tion, and circumstances under which central bank intervention is optimal. Emphasizing the 
importance of such a model, Martin and Milas (2013) conclude that UK monetary policy 
followed two different regimes since 1990. Prior to 2007, UK policy followed a Taylor 
rule and responded to the output gap and inflation. However, since the beginning of the 
financial crisis monetary policy reacted to measures of financial stress, significantly less to 
the output gap, and not to inflation. While Martin and Milas (2013) model the policy rate 
using a GMM-approach, Sihvonen and Vähämaa (2014) employ option implied interest 
rate expectations to similarly analyze UK policy rate setting behavior. Using monthly data, 
they likewise document that interest rate expectations react to inflation, output gap, and 
financial uncertainty in accordance with a Taylor-type rule. Furthermore, they similarly 
find evidence of a regime switch since the beginning of the financial crisis and the entry 
into force of the ZLB. Comparable evidence of the stock market is provided by Kontonikas 
et al. (2013). Unlike during normal times, they find that stock prices did not rise in re-
sponse to target rate cuts during the financial crisis. Recently, a model for US monetary 
policy forecasting at the ZLB has been developed by Bauer and Rudebusch (2015). The 
authors use a shadow rate dynamic term structure model that accounts for the non-
negativity and thus asymmetrical distribution and variation of the target rate at the ZLB. 
Moreover, they emphasize that including macroeconomic information in their model con-
siderably improves forecasting power at the ZLB. This is due to the fact that at the ZLB, 
unlike during normal periods, interest rates cannot incorporate all relevant macroeconomic 
information as a consequence of the binding constraint. Taking this into account, the au-
thors are able to produce reasonable forecasts of the Fed’s departure from the ZLB.  
While most of the aforementioned papers dealing with the ZLB focus on evaluating alter-
native strategies of monetary policy making or, as in the latter case, policy rate forecasting, 
I intend to investigate how monetary policy expectations are affected by the ZLB and how 
the effects of public information releases have changed in this context. The next two sec-
tions describe the data and methodology used for this purpose. 
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4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Macroeconomic announcements 
I consider 28 macroeconomic announcements from Thomson Reuters Datastream called 
Reuters US IFR Survey. The data comprises the actual announcements as well as consen-
sus forecasts for a sample period from 24 November 2003 to 31 January 2011.
111
 The 
choice of macroeconomic indicators is largely in line with Taylor (2010). The exact an-
nouncement times were not included in Datastream. They are obtained from the Economic 
Calendar Archive of Briefing.com, Inc. Table 4.2 provides an overview of the macroeco-
nomic indicators used. Several announcement dates of macroeconomic indicators, such as 
those of Chicago PMI, Treasury Budget, and Consumer Credit, were flawed. Therefore, 
manual verification and correction of the time series was necessary. For the subsequent 
investigation of announcement effects only the unexpected component, i.e. the surprise, of 
a macroeconomic announcement is relevant (see e.g. Fatum/Scholnick 2008). According to 
the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis, a change in prices is only to be expected if the 
announcement deviates from analysts’ previous forecasts. Perfectly anticipated announce-
ments do not contain any new information and should thus not cause any market reaction. I 
therefore calculate the unexpected component of an announcement following Balduzzi et 
al. (2001): 
     
            
  
   (4.1) 
The surprise component of the announced macroeconomic indicator i at time t is computed 
as the difference between the actually announced value ai,t and a consensus forecast fi,t. To 
calculate Si,t, this measure is standardized by dividing by the standard deviation (σi) of the 
entire time series (ai – fi).
112
 Since macroeconomic variables are measured in different 
units, the standardization allows for easier interpretation of the regression coefficients. 
Following Taylor (2010), I define positive (negative) macroeconomic surprises Si to be 
expansive or inflationary (contractionary or deflationary) signs. Therefore, I adjust the cal-
culated surprise measures of Civilian Unemployment and Business Inventories through 
multiplication with minus one. Otherwise, a rise in these figures would imply a 
contractionary sign. 
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 The sample period is determined by federal funds derivatives data purchased from the CME. 
112
 Since the standard deviation of the time series of surprises in variable i is a constant, the standardization 
procedure neither affects the significance of coefficients nor the R
2
 of the regression (Balduzzi et al. 2001). 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of macroeconomic indicators 
                                                 
113
 In 2011, Kingsbury International was acquired by Deutsche Börse. 
114
 Since 2007 the Chicago PMI is announced at 9:45 a.m. (EST). 
Macroeconomic 
indicator 
Announcing institution 
Fre-
quency 
Announce-
ment time 
(EST) 
Number of 
announce-
ments 
Unit of  
measurement 
Std.  
deviation 
Surprise 
< 0 
Surprise 
= 0 
Surprise 
> 0 
GDP preliminary Bureau of Economic Analysis Quarterly 8:30 29 Change in % 0.3277 15 3 11 
GDP advanced Bureau of Economic Analysis Quarterly 8:30 29 Change in % 0.8563 18 1 10 
GDP final Bureau of Economic Analysis Quarterly 8:30 29 Change in % 0.3061 11 10 8 
Current Account Bureau of Economic Analysis Quarterly 8:30 29 Billion $ 49.2868 13 1 15 
Personal  
Consumption 
Bureau of Economic Analysis Monthly 8:30 87 Change in % 0.1876 35 19 33 
Personal Income Bureau of Economic Analysis Monthly 8:30 87 Change in % 0.3720 29 20 38 
Civilian  
Unemployment 
Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly 8:30 86 % Unemployed 0.1531 22 29 35 
Non-Farm Payrolls Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly 8:30 86 
Change in thou-
sands 
88.2645 56 0 30 
Consumer Price 
Index 
Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly 8:30 86 Change in % 0.1441 30 24 32 
Producer Price  
Index 
Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly 8:30 86 Change in % 0.4749 35 5 46 
Productivity 
 preliminary 
Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly 8:30 28 Change in % 1.0310 7 1 20 
Productivity revised Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly 8:30 29 Change in % 0.5387 12 3 14 
Consumer  
Confidence 
Conference Board Monthly 10:00 87 Index 5.1769 42 0 45 
Index of Leading 
Indicators 
Conference Board Monthly 10:00 86 Change in % 0.2266 36 23 27 
Chicago PMI 
ISM Chicago & Kingsbury  
International, Ltd.
113 
Monthly 9:45/10:00114 87 Index 4.2856 30 0 57 
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The table shows the 28 macroeconomic indicators under investigation as well as the respective announcing institution, frequency and time of announcements, 
the number of announcements during the sample period from 24 November 2003 to 31 January 2011, the indicators’ units of measurement, the standard devi-
ation σi of the time series of the total surprise, and the number of positive, negative, and zero-surprises. The surprise measures of Civilian Unemployment and 
of Business Inventories were multiplied by minus one in order to ensure that positive (negative) surprises indicate an expansionary (contractionary) sign. 
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 From 2000 to 2002, Business Inventories announcements took place at 8:30 a.m. (EST). Between 2003 and 2005 announcement times changed between 8:30 and 10:00 
a.m. (EST). Subsequently, the figures were permanently released at 10:00 a.m. (EST). 
(Table 4.2 continued) 
Macroeconomic 
indicator 
Announcing institution 
Fre-
quency 
Anounce-
ment time 
(EST) 
Number of 
announce-
ments 
Unit of  
measurement 
Std.  
deviation 
Surprise 
< 0 
Surprise 
= 0 
Surprise 
> 0 
Capacity Utilization Federal Reserve Monthly 9:15 86 % 0.3486 41 8 37 
Industrial  
Production 
Federal Reserve Monthly 9:15 86 Change in % 0.4002 35 11 40 
Consumer Credit Federal Reserve Monthly 15:00 86 Change in billion $ 6.1797 51 0 35 
Existing Home  
Sales 
National Association of  
Realtors 
Monthly 10:00 87 Million houses 0.2331 38 3 46 
New Home Sales U.S. Census Bureau Monthly 10:00 87 Million houses 0.0612 50 0 37 
Housing Starts U.S. Census Bureau Monthly 8:30 86 Million houses 0.0821 44 0 42 
Construction  
Spending 
U.S. Census Bureau Monthly 10:00 86 Change in % 0.9783 35 5 46 
Business Inventories U.S. Census Bureau Monthly 8:30/10:00115 86 Change in % 0.2729 37 15 34 
Durable Goods  
Orders 
U.S. Census Bureau Monthly 8:30 87 Change in % 2.9278 52 2 33 
Factory Orders U.S. Census Bureau Monthly 10:00 86 Change in % 0.7386 35 4 47 
Retail Sales U.S. Census Bureau Monthly 8:30 86 Change in % 0.6348 41 4 41 
Trade Balance 
U.S. Census Bureau/ Bureau 
of Economic Analysis 
Monthly 8:30 86 Billion $ 3.3462 39 1 46 
Treasury Budget U.S. Department of Treasury Monthly 14:00 86 Billion $ 25.1486 45 0 41 
Total       2,072     934 192 946 
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4.3.2 Federal funds futures 
For the analysis of the 30-day federal funds futures, I study prices of all electronically trad-
ed contracts (CME Globex) from 24 November 2003 to 31 January 2011. Data was pro-
vided by the CME Group. For the purpose of an intraday analysis, I preprocess the trading 
data as follows. First, I generate distinct time series of future contracts according to their 
time to maturity. The reason is that contracts of dissimilar maturity will certainly react dif-
ferently in response to macroeconomic announcements because they reflect monetary poli-
cy expectations of different duration. Federal funds futures always expire at the end of a 
calendar month. For instance, in January 2010 the time series with one month to maturity 
comprises all contracts that expire at the end of January 2010. At the beginning of Febru-
ary, the time series with one month to maturity is rolled over and subsequently contains all 
contracts that expire at the end of February 2010. Hence, the underlying of the one-month 
(1m) future time series is always the effective federal funds rate of the upcoming month. 
The 1m time series therefore contains market expectations of monetary policy one month 
ahead. This rolling procedure is applied analogously to contracts with longer time to ma-
turity in order to receive estimates of monetary policy expectations in two, three, four 
months and so on.  
Second, the constructed time series need to be equidistant. This is to ensure that the anal-
yses are based on uniform data such that future price reactions in response to macroeco-
nomic announcements can be measured over the same time period. For this purpose, 5-
minute intervals are formed. For example, the implied futures rate at 10.00 a.m. takes into 
account all trades carried out between 9:55:01 and 10:00:00 a.m. In line with the semi-
strong efficient market hypothesis, the 10 a.m. futures rate therefore reflects all infor-
mation available at that time. If there are several transactions with different implied interest 
rates in a single 5-minute interval, the last quote is used as the implied futures rate for this 
interval.
116
 On the other hand, if there is no transaction in a 5-minute interval, the futures 
rate of the most recent transaction is used. This procedure is based on the assumption that 
market participants only trade if new information is disclosed. If no transaction takes place, 
there was probably no new information and the most recent implied futures rate is accurate 
given the available level of information. 
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 The analysis has also been run when the trading volume weighted average of the implied futures rate in 
every 5-minute interval has been used. The results remained virtually identical. 
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A potential disadvantage of the aforementioned rolling procedure is that the time series 
have varying time to maturity. Continuing the prior example, on 1 January 2010 the time to 
maturity of a one-month contract amounted to 30 days. On 30 January, it decreased to only 
one day and subsequently rose to 27 days at the beginning of February 2010. Since this 
could pose a problem to the empirical analysis, I additionally create synthetic time series 
with constant maturity. For the synthetic one-month time series, the prices of the actual 
one-month and two-month time series and, if required, of the three-month time series are 
weighted using their remaining time to maturity.
117
 The resulting time series then has a 
constant maturity of 30 days. This is to ensure that futures react identically to announce-
ments at the beginning of the month and to those at the end of the month. The time to ma-
turity of the synthetic two-month time series amounts to 60 days; that of the three-month 
time series is 90 days and so forth. 
4.3.3 Federal funds options 
Federal funds option data covers the same period from 24 November 2003 to 31 January 
2011. Option data is also available on an intraday basis. However, the number of trades per 
day varies significantly over the sample period and is not sufficient to construct intraday 
measures of option implied probabilities. In order to create a valid time series of option 
implied probabilities, I conduct the analysis on a daily basis. For this purpose, I use federal 
funds calls and puts data in order to obtain one aggregate probability measure for each day. 
The detailed methodology of how daily probability measures are determined is explained 
in subsection 4.4.2.1. Similar to the conversion of future price quotes into implied futures 
rates, option data is also adjusted. This is to establish a straightforward link to the implied 
future target rate. Option data is transformed by first deducting the quoted strike price from 
100. Second, calls need to be reclassified as puts and vice versa. Option prices do not have 
to be converted (for the derivation see Carlson et al. 2005, Appendix 1).  
Two further issues exist with respect to the following analysis. First, federal funds options 
are American options which allow for early exercise. In line with Carlson et al. (2005), I 
assume that the American option premium is very small and can therefore be neglected 
(see also Beber/Brandt 2006). Second, a risk premium may exist in the option market. As 
this study is concerned with daily changes in options prices and the derived option implied 
probabilities, this should not pose a problem. Under the assumption that the risk premium 
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 For details on the methodology, see Appendix A1. 
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does not vary significantly in the short-term (see e.g. Hamilton 2009), this should not bias 
the results. The argument similarly applies to the American option premium. 
Prior to the empirical analysis, option price data is checked for validity by examining 
whether the following five criteria are met (see Carlson et al. 2005). First, an option’s price 
must be greater than or equal to its exercise value. Second, option prices have to be mono-
tone and, third, convex when considered as a function of the strike price. Fourth, the put-
call-parity of options with an identical strike and maturity that are traded on the same day 
needs to be fulfilled. Fifth, for two options which only differ in their strike price, the dif-
ference in the options’ prices must not be higher than the difference of the strike prices. 
With all these criteria in mind, I will next describe how option implied probabilities are 
estimated for the subsequent macroeconomic event study. Prior to this, the measurement of 
abnormal future price effects is addressed. 
4.4 Methodology 
4.4.1 Federal funds futures 
Initially, I determine the federal funds future reaction around macroeconomic announce-
ments. In order to receive a measure of the abnormal announcement effect, I subtract the 
average price change of federal funds futures on days without macroeconomic announce-
ments from the respective change on the announcement day. This approach is comparable 
to a constant mean model in stock event studies. This abnormal future price change is then 
regressed on the different macroeconomic surprises Si using robust standard errors. 
    
     
   
 
 
       
       
  
 
   
             
  
   
 (4.2) 
 
  
  denotes the implied rate of the future with synthetic maturity M at time t. The event 
window extends from 30 minutes (t1) prior to the announcement until 60 minutes (t2) after 
the event. For calculating the “normal” or expected price reaction, I use the future price 
change around the same time of the day on all non-announcement days b prior to the re-
spective announcement. However, a maximum of 250 days are considered, i.e. B  250. 
Subscript i refers to the macroeconomic indicator that is announced at time t. 
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4.4.2 Federal funds options  
4.4.2.1 Option implied probabilities 
The estimation procedure follows the seminal paper in this research area by Carlson et al. 
(2005). The price of a (European) call and a put option on a future can be determined by 
multiplying the discounted exercise value of the option by the probability that the option 
will be in the money at maturity. This requires an assumption of the density function f(FT) 
of the underlying future price FT. Assuming risk-neutrality, federal funds option prices can 
be expressed as illustrated in equation (4.3) for calls (C) and equation (4.4) for puts (P). 
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        (4.4) 
The option’s underlying is the future Ft the value of which depends on the average effec-
tive federal funds rate in the contract month. X denotes the strike price of the option. T-t 
refers to the remaining time to maturity and r is the short-term interest rate used for dis-
counting. 
Since it is common practice that the FOMC changes the target rate only in multiples of 25 
basis points, it is reasonable to assume that the number of possible values of FT is discrete. 
Therefore, the calculation of today’s option price simplifies to: 
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Thus, the option price is calculated as probability p of state j multiplied by the discounted 
exercise value of the option in state j summed up over all N states. All parameters are 
known except for the probabilities. Therefore, when several traded options are available, 
one can estimate the probabilities the market implicitly attaches to the implied futures rate 
FT and thus to future values of the target federal funds rate.
118
 Suppose a trading day on 
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 The underlying of federal funds futures is the day-weighted average of the effective federal funds rate in 
the contract month. If a FOMC meeting takes place during the contract month, the future value depends on 
the weighted average of the target rate before the FOMC meeting and the target rate after the meeting. If no 
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which five options with different strike prices are traded. Furthermore, one assumes three 
different FOMC meeting outcomes with associated probabilities pj (j = 1, 2, 3). By means 
of an OLS regression, one can estimate the daily probabilities using equation (4.7) (see 
Carlson et al. 2005). The extensive matrix notation can then be replaced by the general 
case in equation (4.8), where Y denotes the compounded option price matrix, X represents 
the payoff matrix, and p denotes the probability matrix (see also Carlson et al. 2005). 
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(4.8) 
 
However, not all option contracts traded on a specific day are used for probability estima-
tion. Since federal funds options expire in a specific calendar month and FOMC meetings 
are scheduled in advance, the following two criteria can be defined (see Carlson et al. 
2005). Only if these criteria are met, the respective option enters the estimation procedure 
in equation (4.8). First, during the remaining time to maturity of the option contract, there 
has to be only one FOMC meeting. This is to ensure that the target rate prior to the FOMC 
meeting is known with certainty.
119
 Therefore, no probability estimation is possible for 
trading days prior to an unscheduled FOMC meeting.
120
 In consequence, each option con-
tract is assigned to a single FOMC meeting the outcome of which it is to predict. On the 
other hand, the outcome of one FOMC meeting can be predicted by one or two option con-
tracts. Second, if an option contract expires after the FOMC meeting, this option contract 
will not be used for estimation on the days following the FOMC meeting it was to predict. 
                                                                                                                                                    
meeting takes place during the contract month, the future value depends solely on the after-meeting rate of 
the previous FOMC meeting. 
119
 The implied futures rate FT depends on the weighted average of the effective federal funds rate. If the 
target rate prior to the meeting was unknown, one could not calculate the underlying FT. 
120
 This is particularly relevant for the period of the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 when several unsched-
uled FOMC meetings took place (see Appendix A2 for an overview). 
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A detailed illustration of the assignment of option contracts to the respective FOMC meet-
ings can be found in Table A.1 in Appendix A2. 
The daily set of possible target rate outcomes j is obtained according to Carlson et al. 
(2005). The upper bound on a specific day is defined by the highest strike price of a call 
option rounded up to the closest multiple of 25 bp. The lower bound is determined con-
versely by rounding down the lowest strike price of a put option to the closest multiple of 
25 bp. The range of possible target rates for which probabilities are to be estimated is thus 
given by all 25 bp increments between (and including) the lower and the upper bound. 
Moreover, there have to be at least five validly priced options in order to estimate the 
probabilities correctly. With less options per day the estimation might become imprecise 
(Carlson et al. 2005). Since no other restrictions are imposed on the coefficient estimates, it 
may occur that single estimates are negative or that the sum of coefficients deviates slight-
ly from one. However, this does not pose a problem to the empirical investigation. 
4.4.2.2 The impact of macroeconomic announcements 
The recovery of daily probability estimates according to Carlson et al. (2005) constitutes 
the initial step. The main research interest of this chapter is to identify the drivers of daily 
probabilities changes. For this purpose, I focus on the daily probability of the target rate 
that was actually chosen at the upcoming FOMC meeting, referred to as p
A
. Thereby, I 
contribute to the literature by analyzing the dynamics of option implied target rate proba-
bilities and assess the role of macroeconomic surprises in this context. This is to answer the 
fundamental question as to which macroeconomic surprises actually drive market expecta-
tions towards the ex post actually chosen target federal funds rate. Put differently, I intend 
to identify the macroeconomic indicators which the market considers most important for 
monetary policy decisions.  
For this purpose, macroeconomic surprises, as defined in equation (4.1), need to be scaled. 
Three different monetary policy states have to be distinguished: target rate cut, target rate 
hike, or no change at the upcoming FOMC meeting. A positive surprise, e.g. an unex-
pected decrease in the unemployment rate, would increase the probability p
A
 of the actually 
chosen target rate if the Fed intends to raise the target rate soon. On the contrary, it would 
decrease probability p
A
 if the FOMC were to cut the target rate at the upcoming meeting. 
The expected impact of surprises thus depends on the prevailing monetary policy state. 
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This relationship can be summarized as follows. In case of a target rate increase at the up-
coming FOMC meeting, a positive (negative) macroeconomic surprise should increase 
(decrease) the probability p
A
. In case of a target rate decrease at the upcoming FOMC 
meeting, a positive (negative) macroeconomic surprise should decrease (increase) the 
probability p
A
. If the target rate remains unchanged at the upcoming FOMC meeting, a 
surprise equal to zero would increase the associated probability as it contains no further 
indication in support of a rate hike or cut. The following table illustrates the expected rela-
tionship: 
Table 4.3: Expected change in probability p
A
 of the ex post actually chosen target rate 
conditional on the sign of macroeconomic surprise and state of monetary policy  
Target rate decision 
at the upcoming 
FOMC meeting 
Macroeconomic  
surprise > 0 
Macroeconomic 
surprise = 0 
Macroeconomic  
surprise < 0 
Target rate hike p
A
  pA  or unchanged pA  
No target rate 
change 
p
A
  pA  or unchanged pA  
Target rate cut p
A
  pA  or unchanged pA  
 
Accordingly, surprise measures Si,t calculated as illustrated in equation (4.1) are multiplied 
by minus one if the target rate is lowered or remains unchanged at the upcoming FOMC 
meeting: 
    
                    
 
        
                                                         
            
  
(4.9) 
 
(4.10) 
 
Note that this definition implies that probability p
A
 is supposed to increase in case of a 
negative macroeconomic surprise when the target rate will not be changed at the upcoming 
FOMC meeting. The reason for this is the presence of the zero lower bound in the sample 
period (December 2008 until January 2011). During this period, the target rate is close to 
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zero and any negative information would therefore increase the probability that the target 
rate will further remain at the ZLB.
121
 
With these scaled surprise measures, I now analyze which macroeconomic surprises have 
the greatest impact on changes in the probability that the market attaches to the target rate 
that is actually chosen at the upcoming FOMC meeting. I therefore run the following panel 
regression with fixed effects using robust standard errors: 
     
            
  
   
    
                                 
       (4.11) 
 
ΔpA is the change in probability from day t-1 to t. Subscript f refers to the respective 
FOMC meeting that is to be predicted on day t. i represent the regression coefficients of 
interest. They measure the impact of macroeconomic surprises associated with indicators i. 
Due to the construction of the scaled surprise measures, the sign of  is expected to be pos-
itive. Thus, if an announcement implies a positive (negative) scaled surprise, probability p
A
 
should increase (decrease) such that ΔpA becomes positive (negative). Dayst refers to the 
number of days until the FOMC meeting takes place the outcome of which is to be predict-
ed. The variable captures all residual information that market participants process prior to 
the target rate decision. It controls for the fact that market participants might react differ-
ently to new information when the target rate decision is four weeks ahead as compared to 
a decision in only a few days. pf,initial indicates the first available daily probability estimate 
of FOMC meeting f. It is thus the estimate with the longest time distance to the meeting 
date. The reason to include this variable is to account for a possibly different effect condi-
tional on the market’s initial perception of the next monetary policy decision. If the market 
initially attaches a probability of 90% to the ex post actually chosen target rate, subsequent 
macroeconomic announcements might have a small impact. In contrast, the impact should 
be much higher when the market initially only attaches a probability of 50% to that target 
rate. 
                                                 
121
 As a robustness test, I adjusted the scaling measure for the ‘no target rate change’ state prior to the ZLB. 
This period comprises the first eight months of 2007 which were characterized by no-change monetary poli-
cy, but a target rate cut was forthcoming in September 2007. I adjusted the scaling measure such that both 
positive and negative macroeconomic surprises would now decrease probability p
A
 of an unchanged target 
rate. The results remained qualitatively the same. 
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4.5 Option implied probabilities estimates 
By estimating equation (4.8), the daily probabilities of possible future target rates of each 
FOMC meeting in the sample period are obtained. Due to variation in trading activity and 
after applying the aforementioned validation procedure of option prices, valid probability 
estimates could be recovered for 974 trading days in the sample period.
122
 Exemplarily, 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the results of the June 2005 meeting estimated using option data from 
May 6, 2005. The target rate had recently been raised to 3% and the upcoming FOMC 
meeting would vote for a further 25 basis points increase. Even seven weeks prior to the 
meeting date, the market implicitly attached a probability of approximately 74% to this 
outcome. A 50 bp hike was also considered, but the associated probability was perceived 
much lower. The implied probability of no target rate change amounted to only approxi-
mately 10%. In order to give a complete overview of the obtained estimates, the outcomes 
of a 25, 50, and 75 bp cut are also depicted. However, the probabilities of these outcomes 
were virtually zero. 
Figure 4.2: Estimated target rate probabilities for the FOMC meeting in June 2005 
 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the probability density function as of May 6, 2005 of the target federal 
funds rate to be chosen at the June 30, 2005 meeting of the FOMC. The current target rate 
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 See Appendix A3 for an overview of recovered probabilities over the years. 
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was at 3% by that time and the upcoming meeting would vote for a 25 basis points in-
crease in the target rate (i.e. p
A 
= 3.25%). 
Figure 4.2 only shows the estimated probabilities on one specific day. As the FOMC meet-
ing approaches, the probability estimates usually change. The probability of the actually 
chosen target rate typically converges towards one over time. Due to macroeconomic an-
nouncements and the collection of additional information, market participants gradually 
learn more about the current state of the economy. Therefore, they are able to improve 
their monetary policy forecasts and the option implied expectations converge towards the 
actual outcome of the upcoming FOMC meeting. Figure 4.3 illustrates the median devel-
opment of probability p
A
 associated with the actual target rate outcome until the meeting 
date. 
Figure 4.3: Development of the probability of the actually chosen target rate over 
time (p
A
) 
 
Figure 4.3 shows how probability p
A
 of the ex post actually chosen target rate typically 
changes prior to a FOMC meeting. The points depicted above represent the (cross-
sectional) median of all probability estimates p
A
 with identical time to the upcoming 
FOMC meeting, i.e. the median over all FOMC meetings. The solid black line is a fitted 
polynomial trend line to illustrate the development of probability p
A
. 
Finally, Figure 4.4 illustrates how different target rate probabilities change over time. For 
this purpose, the probabilities of three consecutive FOMC meetings in March, May, and 
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June 2005 are depicted. As can be seen from these three figures, the probability estimates 
usually vary from day to day. In the next section, I investigate whether announcements of 
macroeconomic indicators systematically contribute to these variations and to the usual 
convergence towards one of probability p
A
. Although there has been anecdotal evidence by 
Carlson et al. (2005) and to some extent by Emmons et al. (2006), this is the first study to 
analyze the impact of the news component of macroeconomic announcements over a long-
er period of time including the recent financial crisis. 
Figure 4.4: Development of target rate probabilities from February to June 2005 
 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the development of option implied probabilities for different target rates 
for a sample of three consecutive FOMC meetings (March 22, May 3, and June 30, 2005). 
The shaded area indicates the days subsequent to the first and prior to the second FOMC 
meeting. 
4.6 The impact of macroeconomic surprises on monetary policy expec-
tations 
Initially, I briefly discuss the macroeconomic announcement effects on federal funds fu-
tures. For the sake of brevity, these results have been moved to Appendix A4 (Tables A.3, 
A.4, and A.5). As expected, all significant coefficients show a positive sign indicating that 
expansionary (recessionary) announcements are indeed associated with expected tighter 
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(more accommodative) monetary policy. The results emphasize the importance of the two 
labor market-related indicators Non-farm Payrolls and Civilian Unemployment. This find-
ing is consistent with a number of previous studies such as Taylor (2010). For synthetic 
maturities of one to six months, these announcements are associated with highly significant 
effects on the implied futures rate. Hence, in the short- to medium-term market participants 
expect the FOMC to respond to developments on the labor market. The sentiment indica-
tors Chicago PMI and to a lesser extent Consumer Confidence also have a sizeable and 
statistically significant impact on the expected future target rate. Further, with increasing 
maturity of the analyzed futures additional macroeconomic indicators exhibit a significant 
reaction. The greatest effects are documented for Retail Sales, Durable Goods Orders, and 
Existing Home Sales. In line with these findings, the goodness of fit of the models with 
three to six months to maturity is greater than it is for the models with one or two 
months.
123
 This can be interpreted as market participants adjusting mainly their one-quarter 
ahead monetary policy expectations in response to macroeconomic news. Notably, with 
respect to real economic indicators GDP-related announcements do not seem to move the 
federal funds futures markets. This is noteworthy since GDP is often considered to be a 
good proxy for the output gap in the context of the Taylor rule. Furthermore, CPI and PPI 
announcements do not have a significant effect in any of the future contracts under consid-
eration either. This is astonishing given the Fed’s inflation objective. 
Following the futures event study, the regression model in equation (4.11) is run in order to 
examine whether the documented effects can be confirmed for federal funds options.
124
 
The daily change in probability p
A
 is the dependent variable in the regression analysis. The 
independent variables of interest are the scaled surprise measures of macroeconomic an-
nouncements. The set up of the analysis thus enables me to directly evaluate the im-
portance of macroeconomic surprises for the evolution of option implied monetary policy 
expectations. The results are shown in Table 4.4. Model (1) comprises the entire sample 
period. Models (2) and (3) represent subsamples of the years 2003 to 2006 and 2007 to 
2011, respectively. Initially focusing on models (1) and (2), Civilian Unemployment and 
Non-farm Payrolls announcements exhibit a statistically significant impact.   
                                                 
123
 The model fit has an inverted U-shape with a maximum adjusted R
2
 at the four-month futures model (see 
Table 7). 
124
 In order to verify that the option estimation procedure works reasonably and that there are no sample- or 
data-specific distortions, I reproduce the analysis of Carlson et al. (2005). The results are very similar for the 
period prior to the financial crisis and can be found in the Appendix A5. 
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Table 4.4: Regression results 
    (1) (2) (3) 
    
Change in 
probability p
A 
Change  
(before 2007) 
Change  
(after 2007) 
G
D
P
 
GDP preliminary -0.0056 0.0131 -0.0237 
  (-0.284) (1.398) (-1.067) 
GDP advanced -0.0022 0.0087 -0.0135 
  (-0.359) (0.535) (-1.011) 
GDP final -0.0135 -0.0308* 0.0212 
  (-1.067) (-1.871) (0.779) 
T
ra
d
e 
&
  
C
o
n
su
m
er
s 
Current Account 0.1120 0.0961 0.2500 
  (1.508) (1.181) (1.317) 
Personal Consumption 0.0071 0.0001 0.0392* 
  (0.576) (0.017) (1.831) 
Personal Income -0.0092 -0.0014 -0.0222 
  (-1.258) (-0.291) (-0.877) 
L
a
b
o
r 
 
M
a
rk
et
s Civilian Unemployment 0.0497** 0.0703*** 0.0234 
  (2.086) (2.900) (0.810) 
Non-farm Payrolls 0.0450* 0.0644** -0.0651 
  (1.785) (2.345) (-0.681) 
In
fl
a
ti
o
n
 
CPI 0.0046 0.0113 -0.0375 
  (0.686) (1.681) (-0.777) 
PPI -0.0007 0.0012 -0.0016 
  (-0.094) (0.287) (-0.0490) 
P
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y
 
Productivity preliminary 0.0016 -0.0035 0.0061 
  (0.171) (-0.266) (0.526) 
Productivity revised -0.1070 0.0056 -0.3900*** 
  (-1.013) (0.228) (-9.169) 
S
en
ti
m
en
t 
 
In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 
Consumer Confidence 0.0153 -0.0024 0.0453 
  (1.091) (-0.265) (1.216) 
Index of Leading Indicators 0.0102 0.0031 0.0157 
  (0.688) (0.126) (0.873) 
Chicago PMI 0.0144* 0.0235*** -0.0303* 
  (1.833) (3.130) (-1.739) 
F
ed
er
a
l 
R
es
er
v
e
 
Consumer Credit 0.0048 0.0042 0.0088 
  (0.594) (0.378) (0.639) 
Capacity Utilization -0.0004 -0.0135 0.0397 
  (-0.018) (-0.793) (0.667) 
Industrial Production 0.0084 0.0298 -0.0212 
  (0.367) (1.399) (-0.478) 
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(Table 4.4 continued) 
H
o
u
si
n
g
 
Existing Home Sales 0.0162 0.0060 0.0185 
  (0.680) (0.486) (0.542) 
New Home Sales -0.0034 0.0023 -0.0076 
  (-0.572) (0.406) (-0.475) 
Housing Starts 0.0029 0.0085 -0.0126 
  (0.532) (1.577) (-0.475) 
Construction Spending 0.0185 -0.0102 0.1140 
  (0.881) (-0.450) (1.684) 
O
rd
er
s 
&
 S
a
le
s 
Business Inventories -0.0019 -0.0034 0.0034 
  (-0.175) (-0.463) (0.110) 
Durable Goods Orders -0.0120 -0.0008 -0.0258 
  (-1.047) (-0.099) (-0.900) 
Factory Orders -0.0034 -0.0018 -0.0017 
  (-0.452) (-0.269) (-0.112) 
Retail Sales -0.0361*** -0.0277** -0.0494** 
  (-2.867) (-2.190) (-2.230) 
T
ra
d
e 
&
 
B
u
d
g
et
 Trade Balance 0.0060 0.0047 0.0151 
  (1.109) (0.829) (0.899) 
Treasury Budget -0.0009 0.0039 -0.0014 
  (-0.365) (0.267) (-1.299) 
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
Days until next FOMC 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0012** 
  (0.609) (0.922) (-2.374) 
Days until next FOMC x -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0010 
initial probability (-0.742) (-0.855) (1.549) 
Constant 0.0014 -0.0017 0.0243** 
  (0.254) (-0.308) (2.644) 
  Observations 929 592 337 
  Adjusted R2 0.84% 3.41% 2.79% 
  Number of FOMC meetings 43 22 22 
  FOMC FE Yes Yes Yes 
  Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table 4.4 shows the results of the panel regression model from equation (4.11) with robust 
t-statistics in parentheses. The regression controls for FOMC meeting fixed effects as well 
as year fixed effects. Model (1) comprises the entire sample. Models (2) and (3) represent 
subsamples. The former includes probabilities estimates between 2003 and 2006. The lat-
ter comprises estimates between 2007 and 2011. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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This result is also economically meaningful. It implies that a surprise of one standard devi-
ation (i.e. a deviation of ca. 88,000 in Non-farm Payrolls, or a 0.15 percentage points devi-
ation in Civilian Unemployment, see Table 4.2) increases the market-perceived probability 
of the actually chosen target rate by about 5 to 7 percentage points. This finding is con-
sistent with previous empirical evidence with respect to the importance of labor market-
related announcements for monetary policy expectations (e.g. Taylor 2010). In line with 
the findings of Taylor (2010) for futures but in contrast to Carlson et al. (2005), inflation 
announcements, i.e. CPI and PPI, do not seem to affect option implied probabilities. This is 
surprising given the twofold objectives of the Fed of full employment and stable prices. In 
terms of market expectations, however, only new information about the former seems to 
matter. 
Moreover, announcements of the Chicago PMI seem to have a significant impact on prob-
ability estimates of the actually chosen target rate. The results reveal that a surprise of one 
standard deviation increases the perceived probability by approximately 2 percentage 
points. This finding supports the notion of the index being a timely indicator of current 
economic sentiment. The finding of a consistently negative impact of Retail Sales an-
nouncements is counterintuitive. By definition, all macroeconomic indicators were ex-
pected to have a positive sign. The significantly negative coefficient implies a decrease in 
the target rate probability p
A
 in case of a positive surprise. This is in contrast to the expan-
sionary sign that a higher than expected Retail Sales announcement indicates. On the con-
trary, Retail Sales were found to have a significantly positive effect on the implied futures 
rate but only for maturities of two or more months (see Table A.3). As the maturity of the 
employed option contracts is typically smaller than six weeks (i.e. the usual time interval 
between two FOMC meetings), the results of futures and options are not necessarily con-
tradictory. Instead, they highlight that Retail Sales announcements matter for longer-term 
monetary policy expectations. 
To some extent, the overall results seem to be driven by the first half of the sample as can 
be inferred from the comparison of models (1) and (2). The latter contains only the years 
2003 to 2006 and the results are quite similar to those of the first model. In contrast, model 
(3) comprises only the subsequent years 2007 to 2011. Hence, it includes the financial cri-
sis as well as the approach and entry into force of the ZLB. During this period, the previ-
ously observed effects seem to vanish. Most macroeconomic indicators lose their statistical 
significance.  
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In model (3), solely surprises related to Retail Sales exhibit statistical significance and the 
same sign like in the former two models. However, as mentioned before significantly nega-
tive coefficients are not economically meaningful. Besides, there is merely one positive 
coefficient with marginal significance, i.e. the one of personal consumption. The only other 
relevant finding is the statistical significance of the number of days until the next FOMC 
meeting takes place. As this variable becomes smaller when the meeting’s date approaches, 
a negative sign is in line with expectations. The opposing results of the pre-crisis and crisis 
subsample in models (2) and (3) are consistent with Martin and Milas (2013) who docu-
ment that monetary policy making differs according to crisis and none-crisis regimes. 
The findings related to the crisis and the ZLB (model 3) can be attributed to two factors. 
First, due to methodological reasons fewer probability estimates could be recovered. Be-
cause of infrequent trading and a considerable number of unscheduled FOMC meetings, a 
lot of trading days had to be excluded from probability estimation (see Appendix A3). Se-
cond, the ZLB may be the cause of reduced trading activity in federal funds derivatives 
since the target rate could hardly decrease further and a quick liftoff from the ZLB was 
also unlikely. Thus, banks might reduce trading as federal funds risk management becomes 
less important. Overall, the results of model (3) support the notion that monetary policy 
expectations are less responsive to traditional indicators. Hence, federal funds options can-
not be applied as usual for recovering expectations during times of financial turmoil. The 
significance of the variable days until the next FOMC meeting could support this interpre-
tation. The variable captures all residual incoming information that is not explicitly includ-
ed in the regression models. Thus, other indicators or economic developments that are not 
accounted for in the analysis could possibly influence the target rate probabilities. Howev-
er, the identification of such indicators (if they exist) is beyond the scope of this study. 
The contrasting findings of the crisis and pre-crisis period are also supported by the analy-
sis of federal funds futures (see Tables A.4 and A.5). The pre-crisis results likewise em-
phasize the importance of the two labor market-related indicators as well as of the Chicago 
PMI. For longer-term implied futures rates, Durable Goods Orders, Retail Sales, Existing 
and New Home Sales, and notably GDP advanced also have an effect. For the crisis period, 
the same indicators exert an influence but statistical significance is considerably reduced. 
Most importantly, the maximum adjusted R
2
 of the models drops from approximately 30% 
(model (4): 4m futures) in the pre-crisis period to less than 6% in the crisis period (model 
(6): 6m future). Thus, the explanatory power is severely lower during the crisis. This sup-
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ports the hypothesis that monetary policy has become less predictable by standard indica-
tors since the beginning of the financial crisis. The findings of the crisis period are also 
consistent with Swanson and Williams (2014) with regard to the fact that longer-term fu-
tures are more responsive to macroeconomic announcements than short-term futures are. 
This is consistent with the notion that until 2011 market participants still expected the tar-
get rate to pick up in only a few quarters (see also Bauer/Rudebusch 2015). 
Less explanatory power of standard indicators also offers an additional interpretation. That 
is that the future target rate has become perfectly predictable. The Fed was no longer able 
to make monetary policy by setting the target federal funds rate. There was no further 
downside potential because the target rate was virtually at zero percent. Additionally, no 
one expected the Fed to increase the target rate soon. Thus, market participants expected a 
considerable period without any change in the target rate. Therefore, target rate probabili-
ties did not react to the release of macroeconomic information. Supporting this hypothesis, 
the initial probability p
A
 on the first day of estimation for each FOMC meeting amounts to 
81% on average since the target rate is at the ZLB. In contrast, it was only 77% prior to 
this period.
125
 Due to the ZLB, the Fed was forced to engage in unconventional monetary 
policy. Large asset purchase programs, such as the maturity expansion program, or active 
management of expectations concerning future monetary policy became the main instru-
ments of monetary policy then (Gertler/Karadi 2011; Wright 2012; Swanson/Williams 
2014; Foley-Fisher et al. 2016). As the Fed started to make unconventional monetary poli-
cy, expectations could no longer be recovered using federal funds derivatives. Recently, 
the first target rate increase in almost ten years fuels hopes that federal funds derivatives 
can again be employed to recover monetary policy expectations soon. 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I analyze the effects of macroeconomic announcements on monetary policy 
expectations as implied in federal funds future and option prices. Particular emphasis is put 
on the distinction between a period of economic upswing (2003-2006) and the financial 
crisis the combat of which led to the ZLB (2007-2011). My results provide evidence that 
the way in which expectations about future monetary policy are formed has changed dur-
ing the financial crisis. In particular, I find strong evidence for the importance of the em-
                                                 
125
 However, due to the relatively small sample size of 30 estimated FOMC meeting outcomes prior to the 
arrival at the ZLB and 15 estimated meeting outcomes afterwards, the difference in means is not statistically 
significant. 
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ployment report and the Chicago PMI during normal times. The findings are consistently 
reported for both federal funds futures and options. However, the documented effects van-
ish during the financial crisis. The impact of macroeconomic announcements on monetary 
policy expectations largely disappears. When the financial crisis unfolded and the ZLB 
was reached, market-based measures of monetary policy expectations ceased reacting to 
macroeconomic news. This can be interpreted as market participants expecting a consider-
able period of monetary policy without any target rate change irrespective of the develop-
ment of macroeconomic indicators. This seems reasonable in view of the overall negative 
economic outlook and a target rate virtually at zero percent. My results are consistent with 
findings of Martin and Milas (2013) and support the notion of differing US monetary poli-
cy regimes depending on the state of the economy. 
The question as to whether federal funds derivatives will regain their predictive power for 
monetary policy will be of particular interest as soon as the Fed regains full flexibility in 
target rate setting. As the first target rate increase in December 2015 is only the initial lift-
off from the ZLB, I leave this issue for future research. 
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5 Concluding remarks 
This dissertation has dealt with corporate governance and risk management from an empir-
ical corporate finance perspective. Three specific aspects have been scrutinized in detail: 
(1) the governance role of capital and ownership structure and their respective contribution 
to firm value, (2) the importance of corporate governance in the process of equity capital 
increases, and (3) the management of interest rate risk by means of forecasting target rate 
changes by monetary policy authorities. Corporate governance in general and interest rate 
risk management in particular have attracted great attention during the recent global finan-
cial and economic crisis which merits their detailed investigation in this dissertation. Over-
all, the results of the previous chapters have stressed that governance and risk management 
represent important corporate functions from the perspective of shareholders and other 
stakeholders. 
Chapter 2 has revealed that capital structure and ownership structure constitute important 
components of the overall corporate governance framework of the firm. Based on the pre-
vailing separation of ownership and control in (listed) corporations, the chapter has fo-
cused on the resulting agency problems and provided an overview of how capital and own-
ership structure can alleviate these problems. With respect to capital structure, the use of 
debt can restrict managers’ discretion over the use of free cash flows by means of the re-
sulting payment obligations. Likewise, managerial discretion can be reduced through cov-
enants that prevent excessive risk taking and/or require minimum performance levels. 
Concerning ownership structure, chapter 2 has provided a detailed overview of how differ-
ent types of shareholders can influence firm performance, how these types may interact, 
and how they might ultimately benefit or harm the overall objective of firm value maximi-
zation. Managerial ownership mitigates agency problems by aligning the incentives of the 
management with those of outside shareholders. Large or block shareholders that have 
sufficient voting power can monitor and discipline the management and thereby contribute 
to firm value maximization. The major contribution of chapter 2 is the finding that there is 
no single optimal financial policy applicable to all types of firms – neither for capital struc-
ture (i.e. a target leverage ratio) nor for ownership structure (i.e. concentrated versus dis-
persed ownership). Overall, it can therefore be concluded that managers cannot generate 
value simply by setting an optimal capital and ownership structure. Instead, corporate fi-
nancial policies are jointly optimized in equilibrium and additionally depend on the pre-
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vailing level of alternative internal and external corporate governance mechanisms and 
provisions. Moreover, the chapter emphasizes the importance of endogeneity in the context 
of empirical investigations in this research field. The literature review reveals that failure 
to account for endogeneity in the management’s choice of financial policies and pursuit of 
firm value maximization can lead to false conclusions. Recent empirical studies employ 
advanced methodology and/or study designs in order to account for endogeneity. This 
paves the way for future research on this highly relevant topic. 
In chapter 3, the role of governance in the context of seasoned equity offerings is scruti-
nized. As opposed to chapter 2, the focus is on changes in capital and possibly in owner-
ship structure caused by equity capital increases. Using a 4-factor model event study, aver-
age decreases in shareholder value of one percent are documented upon announcement of 
seasoned equity offerings. Further analyses illustrate that companies with a rather concen-
trated ownership structure, lower leverage, and less disposable cash experience less nega-
tive announcement effects. Therefore, the results suggest that firms with good corporate 
governance, as indicated by concentrated ownership which facilitates effective monitoring, 
and a lower probability of overinvestment problems, as indicated by lower cash amounts 
on firms’ balance sheets, are less likely suspected of squandering the offering proceeds. 
The chapter therefore concludes that investors evaluate the potential for active monitoring 
by shareholders on the one hand and the risk of empire building by the management on the 
other hand when they assess the impact of capital increases. Thus, companies with sound 
corporate governance and investment policy suffer lower losses in shareholder value. 
Moreover, they were consistently able to issue equity, even during periods of financial 
turmoil such as the financial crisis. This is not self-evident in the real estate sector which 
was among the most severely affected industries during the crisis. Therefore, the findings 
are a positive signal for both managers and regulators. Good corporate governance is thus 
not only a driver of firm value. It also facilitates the process of raising new external funds 
which in turn is a prerequisite for investments that safeguard the company’s existence and 
future success. 
Chapter 4 subsequently highlights the risk management perspective of this dissertation by 
focusing on interest rate changes as a major macroeconomic risk factor. The risk of chang-
ing interest rates and uncertain debt financing is fundamental in the field of corporate fi-
nance. The rapid deterioration of credit market conditions during the recent financial crisis 
has additionally emphasized that interest rate risk management should be an essential ele-
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ment of the corporate risk department. A suitable instrument for this purpose is presented 
in chapter 4 of this dissertation. More specifically, the chapter studies target interest rate 
decisions by the Federal Reserve. These monetary policy decisions significantly affect in-
terest rates on debt markets and thus the financing opportunities of companies (e.g. Kuttner 
2001; Swanson/Williams 2014). In order to predict changes of the federal funds target rate, 
market expectations of future monetary policy are recovered using the prices of federal 
funds derivatives. If these prices change upon the release of macroeconomic news, such as 
employment or inflation data, monetary policy expectations likewise vary. Establishing a 
systematic relationship between announcements of macroeconomic indicators and mone-
tary policy expectations is the central objective of chapter 4. Moreover, the chapter has put 
particular emphasis on differences of monetary policy expectations in the period of eco-
nomic upswing from 2003 to 2006 as compared to the subsequent years comprising the 
financial and economic crisis (2007 to 2011). The analysis reveals several important find-
ings. Prior to 2007, the results provide evidence that monetary policy expectations are gen-
erally consistent with a Taylor rule in which employment-related news dominate whereas 
inflation-related announcements only have a minor impact. However, the findings change 
significantly with the beginning of the financial crisis and the approach of the ZLB in 2007 
and 2008. Monetary policy expectations as implied by federal funds derivatives do hardly 
react to macroeconomic announcements anymore. These results suggest that market partic-
ipants expected a considerable period of monetary policy without any target rate changes 
irrespective of the macroeconomic development. This seems reasonable due to the overall 
negative economic outlook by that time and a target rate virtually at zero percent. The re-
sults contribute to previous empirical investigations and findings and provide new evi-
dence for the existence of different US monetary policy regimes depending on the state of 
the economy. The onset of the financial crisis seems to have triggered such a regime 
switch. Consequently, the chapter also stresses the importance of adapting interest rate 
forecasting tools to account for possible policy regime switches, asymmetric distribution of 
future interest rates, and the implementation of unconventional monetary policy by central 
banks. Only in this way, reasonable expectations of future interest rates and debt financing 
opportunities can be formed and firms are enabled to hedge interest rate risk and adjust 
their funding and investment strategy accordingly. 
In summary, corporate governance and risk management are of great importance in the 
context of corporate finance and the management of firms. Supportive evidence of their 
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relevance is provided across the three main chapters of this dissertation, the different topics 
and scopes of which eventually offer an integrated view on this subject. Especially the re-
cent financial crisis has emphasized the significance of corporate governance for both the 
financial policies of the firm and new external funding. In addition, careful monitoring of 
interest rate risk is similarly indispensable due to the overall relevance of debt financing. 
Shareholders, managers and other stakeholders should therefore focus on a sustainable 
implementation of corporate governance and risk management. Only in this way, resources 
can be allocated and employed effectively and efficiently in order to maximize the compa-
ny's value which ultimately benefits all stakeholders. 
.  
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Appendix 
A1. Weighting of future contracts 
The implied futures rates (fr) are linearly weighted using their remaining time to maturity 
(ttm). For the sake of clarity, the methodology is illustrated using the example of the one-
month synthetic time series (     
  ).      denotes the implied futures rate of the contract 
with x months to maturity. In order to generate the synthetic time series, the weighting 
procedure is applied to each 5-minute interval of the sample period. 
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A2. Overview of FOMC meetings, decisions, and the assigned option 
contracts for probability estimation 
Table A.1: FOMC meeting dates and assignment of option contracts for probability 
estimation 
FOMC meeting 
date 
Unscheduled 
meeting 
Target rate 
change (bp) 
Target rate 
after FOMC 
Assigned option 
contract(s) 
December 9, 2003 - 0 1.00% dropped   
January 28, 2004 - 0 1.00% dropped   
March 16, 2004 - 0 1.00% Mar-04 Apr-04 
May 4, 2004 - 0 1.00% May-04   
June 30, 2004 - +25 1.25% Jul-04   
August 10, 2004 - +25 1.50% Aug-04   
September 21, 2004 - +25 1.75% Sep-04 Oct-04 
November 10, 2004 - +25 2.00% Nov-04   
December 14, 2004 - +25 2.25% Dec-04 Jan-05 
February 2, 2005 - +25 2.50% Feb-05   
March 22, 2005 - +25 2.75% Mar-05 Apr-05 
May 3, 2005 - +25 3.00% May-05 Jun-05 
June 30, 2005 - +25 3.25% Jul-05   
August 9, 2005 - +25 3.50% Aug-05   
September 20, 2005 - +25 3.75% Sep-05 Oct-05 
November 1, 2005 - +25 4.00% Nov-05   
December 13, 2005 - +25 4.25% Dec-05 Jan-06 
January 31, 2006 - +25 4.50% Feb-06   
March 28, 2006 - +25 4.75% Mar-06 Apr-06 
May 10, 2006 - +25 5.00% May-06   
June 29, 2006 - +25 5.25% Jun-06 Jul-06 
August 8, 2006 - 0 5.25% Aug-06   
September 20, 2006 - 0 5.25% Sep-06   
October 25, 2006 - 0 5.25% Oct-06 Nov-06 
December 12, 2006 - 0 5.25% Dec-06 Jan-07 
January 31, 2007 - 0 5.25% Feb-07   
March 21, 2007 - 0 5.25% Mar-07 Apr-07 
May 9, 2007 - 0 5.25% May-07   
June 28, 2007 - 0 5.25% Jun-07 Jul-07 
August 7, 2007 - 0 5.25% Aug-07   
August 10, 2007 yes 0 5.25% removed   
August 16, 2007 yes 0 5.25% removed   
September 18, 2007 - -50 4.75% Sep-07 Oct-07 
October 31, 2007 - -25 4.50% Nov-07   
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(Table A.1 continued) 
December 6, 2007 yes 0 4.50% removed   
December 11, 2007 - -25 4.25% Dec-07   
January 9, 2008 yes 0 4.25% removed   
January 21, 2008 yes -75 3.50% removed   
January 30, 2008 - -50 3.00% Jan-08 Feb-08 
March 10, 2008 yes 0 3.00% removed   
March 18, 2008 - -75 2.25% Mar-08 Apr-08 
April 30, 2008 - -25 2.00% May-08   
June 25, 2008 - 0 2.00% Jun-08 Jul-08 
July 24, 2008 yes 0 2.00% removed   
August 5, 2008 - 0 2.00% Aug-08   
September 16, 2008 - 0 2.00% Sep-08   
September 29, 2008 yes 0 2.00% removed   
October 7, 2008 yes -50 1.50% removed   
October 29, 2008 - -50 1.00% Oct-08 Nov-08 
December 16, 2008 - -75 / -100 0 / 0.25% Dec-08   
January 16, 2009 yes 0 0 / 0.25% removed   
January 28, 2009 - 0 0 / 0.25% Jan-09 Feb-09 
February 7, 2009 yes 0 0 / 0.25% removed   
March 18, 2009 - 0 0 / 0.25% Mar-09   
April 29, 2009 - 0 0 / 0.25% Apr-09 May-09 
June 3, 2009 yes 0 0 / 0.25% removed   
June 24, 2009 - 0 0 / 0.25% Jun-09 Jul-09 
August 12, 2009 - 0 0 / 0.25% Aug-09   
September 23, 2009 - 0 0 / 0.25% Sep-09 Oct-09 
November 4, 2009 - 0 0 / 0.25% Nov-09   
December 16, 2009 - 0 0 / 0.25% Dec-09   
January 27, 2010 - 0 0 / 0.25% Jan-10 Feb-10 
March 16, 2010 - 0 0 / 0.25% Mar-10   
April 28, 2010 - 0 0 / 0.25% Apr-10 May-10 
May 10, 2010 yes 0 0 / 0.25% removed   
June 23, 2010 - 0 0 / 0.25% Jun-10 Jul-10 
August 10, 2010 - 0 0 / 0.25% Aug-10   
September 21, 2010 - 0 0 / 0.25% Sep-10 Oct-10 
October 15, 2010 yes 0 0 / 0.25% removed   
November 3, 2010 - 0 0 / 0.25% Nov-10   
December 14, 2010 - 0 0 / 0.25% Dec-10   
January 26, 2011 - 0 0 / 0.25% Jan-11 Feb-11 
March 15, 2011 - 0 0 / 0.25% Mar-11   
 
Table A.1 provides an overview of all FOMC meetings from November 2003 to March 
2011. Additionally, it shows the meetings’ decisions, the resulting target rate, the type of 
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FOMC meeting (scheduled or unscheduled), and which option contract(s) have been used 
to predict the meetings' outcomes. The first two FOMC meetings were dropped due to in-
sufficient data availability. Unscheduled meetings had to be removed because they cannot 
be predicted. 
 
A3. Trading days and recovered probability estimates in the sample pe-
riod 
Table A.2: Distribution of trading days, options trades and recovered probability es-
timates 
Year Number of  
trading days 
Number of  
estimated  
probabilities 
% of recovered 
probability  
estimates 
Average daily 
number of option 
trades 
2003 26 0 0% 157.58 
2004 253 169 67% 214.54 
2005 252 250 99% 174.58 
2006 252 195 77% 172.51 
2007 253 198 78% 222.88 
2008 253 1 0% 71.49 
2009 254 36 14% 100.32 
2010 253 109 43% 537.35 
2011 20 16 80% 887.05 
Total 1,816 974 54% 219.98 
 
Table A.2 shows the number of trading days, the number and percentage of recovered dai-
ly probability estimates, and the average daily number of option trades by year. The rea-
sons for the low percentage of recovered probabilities in some years are twofold. In the 
early stage of the sample period, options were not that heavily traded. The same is true for 
the years of the financial crisis. With less than five different (validly priced) options per 
day, probability estimation was not possible. Second, the FOMC held 14 unscheduled 
meetings between 2007 and 2010, nine of which took place in 2007 and 2008 (see Appen-
dix A2). In advance of unscheduled meetings no probability estimation is possible due to 
the unknown ex ante target rate. 
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A4. The impact of macroeconomic announcements on federal funds fu-
tures 
The following three tables show the results of the federal funds futures regression repre-
sented in equation (4.2). Table A.3 illustrates the results for the entire sample (2003 to 
2011). The two subsequent tables depict the subsample results for the years 2003 to 2006 
prior to the financial crisis (Table A.4) and the years 2007 to 2011 that include the finan-
cial crisis and the period of unconventional monetary policy and the approach of the zero 
lower bound (Table A.5). Future price effects are measured over a 90-minute event win-
dow from 30 minutes prior to the announcement to 60 minutes after the announcement. 
Models (1) to (6) correspond to the results of the future contracts with synthetic constant 
maturity of one to six months. Thereby, the effect of macroeconomic announcements can 
be assessed for different forecasting horizons of expected future monetary policy. As the 
explanatory power of regression models decreases for future contracts with a maturity of 
more than four months, as can be inferred from comparing the models’ adjusted R2, and 
the liquidity of future contracts with maturities of more than six months declines consider-
ably, the results of futures with longer maturities have been omitted. 
The results reveal that expansionary (recessionary) or inflationary (deflationary) macroe-
conomic news lead to an increase (decrease) in the implied futures rate. This is tantamount 
to expectations of tighter (more accommodative) future monetary policy. The most influen-
tial macroeconomic indicators are Non-farm Payrolls and the Civilian Unemployment, 
followed by the sentiment indicators Chicago PMI and Consumer Confidence. In contrast, 
inflation-related announcements do not seem to matter with respect to monetary policy 
expectations. Overall, the observed effects of future prices are consistent with the findings 
based on federal funds option implied probabilities for the entire sample period. 
The results in Tables A.4 and A.5 support the previous findings using federal funds op-
tions. The overall results (Table A.3) seem to be driven by the first half of the sample peri-
od (2003 to 2006) since the respective results are very similar to those of the entire sample. 
The results in Table A.5 (2007 to 2011) comprise the financial crisis as well as the period 
of the ZLB. The pre-crisis results stress the importance of the two labor market-related 
indicators and the Chicago PMI. For longer maturities, Durable Goods Orders, Retail 
Sales, Existing and New Home Sales, and GDP advanced also have an impact. For the cri-
sis period, the statistical significance of these indicators is considerably reduced.  
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Table A.3: Macroeconomic announcement effects on federal funds futures 
    
(1) 
1 month 
(2) 
2 months 
(3) 
3 months 
(4) 
4 months 
(5) 
5 months 
(6) 
6 months 
G
D
P
 
GDP preliminary 0.0743 0.0573 0.1416 0.0833 0.1612 0.1399 
  (0.865) (0.495) (1.193) (0.616) (1.013) (0.677) 
GDP advanced 0.0922 0.1775 0.3150* 0.3036 0.2507 0.3556* 
  (1.269) (1.586) (1.669) (1.474) (1.186) (1.805) 
GDP final -0.0133 -0.0212 -0.1358 0.1024 0.1300 -0.0226 
  (-0.121) (-0.163) (-0.867) (0.922) (1.028) (-0.104) 
T
ra
d
e 
&
  
C
o
n
su
m
er
s 
Current Account -0.2483 0.4070 0.3871 0.0860 0.6170 2.4443 
  (-0.401) (0.527) (0.408) (0.067) (0.447) (1.200) 
Personal -0.0070 0.0182 0.0063 0.1793 -0.0138 -0.1425 
Consumption (-0.188) (0.368) (0.089) (1.150) (-0.119) (-0.753) 
Personal Income 0.0420 -0.0386 0.0326 -0.1307 -0.0033 0.0117 
  (0.894) (-0.556) (0.246) (-0.931) (-0.027) (0.058) 
L
a
b
o
r 
 
M
a
rk
et
s Civilian Unem- 0.3496** 0.4656** 0.6465*** 0.8868*** 1.0239*** 1.0633*** 
 ployment (2.467) (2.345) (2.626) (2.915) (2.946) (2.855) 
Non-farm Payrolls 0.4913*** 1.1050*** 1.8525*** 2.6920*** 2.4892*** 2.0984*** 
  (2.663) (3.954) (4.905) (5.789) (4.420) (4.012) 
In
fl
a
ti
o
n
 CPI 0.0097 0.0975 0.2011 0.1965 0.1721 0.2529 
  (0.158) (0.982) (1.318) (1.200) (1.031) (1.283) 
PPI 0.0403 0.0941 0.1724 0.1815 0.2628 0.3380 
  (0.878) (1.234) (1.584) (1.308) (1.575) (1.449) 
P
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y
 
Productivity 0.0051 -0.0084 -0.0150 -0.1094 -0.1285 -0.0518 
preliminary (0.087) (-0.088) (-0.159) (-1.430) (-1.324) (-0.559) 
Productivity 0.0881 0.1070 0.1495 0.2002 0.1599 -0.0151 
revised (0.801) (0.794) (0.866) (1.312) (0.827) (-0.082) 
S
en
ti
m
en
t 
 
In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 
Consumer 0.1539 0.3282* 0.2522 0.3736** 0.4790** 0.4591** 
Confidence (1.170) (1.872) (1.438) (2.056) (2.345) (2.030) 
Index of Leading  -0.0105 -0.0001 0.0457 0.0334 0.0065 -0.0408 
Indicators (-0.637) (-0.006) (1.243) (0.761) (0.119) (-0.541) 
Chicago PMI 0.0821 0.1662*** 0.2188** 0.3801*** 0.4054*** 0.4237** 
  (1.573) (2.655) (2.039) (3.633) (3.287) (2.080) 
F
ed
er
a
l 
R
es
er
v
e Consumer Credit 0.0278 0.0581 0.0725 0.0300 0.0710 0.0583 
  (0.684) (0.629) (0.641) (0.224) (0.524) (0.555) 
Capacity 0.0879 0.0768 0.1563 0.2351 0.3070* 0.2951 
Utilization (1.024) (0.571) (1.085) (1.503) (1.671) (1.542) 
Industrial -0.1069 -0.0538 -0.0471 0.0138 0.0996 0.1917 
Production (-1.344) (-0.426) (-0.299) (0.078) (0.475) (0.883) 
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(Table A.3 continued) 
H
o
u
si
n
g
 
Existing Home 0.0221 0.0562 -0.0574 0.2261*** 0.4127*** 0.4725*** 
Sales (0.625) (1.186) (-0.397) (2.741) (3.150) (3.054) 
New Home Sales -0.0072 0.0097 0.0878* 0.1800*** 0.1906 0.1465 
  (-0.211) (0.239) (1.662) (2.594) (1.203) (1.010) 
Housing Starts 0.0543 0.0732 0.1048 0.1219 0.1535 0.0823 
  (0.905) (0.865) (1.002) (0.984) (1.289) (0.699) 
Construction -0.0485 -0.0207 -0.1063 -0.0511 0.0078 0.0337 
Spending (-0.848) (-0.189) (-0.798) (-0.330) (0.037) (0.119) 
O
rd
er
s 
&
 S
a
le
s 
Business -0.0150 -0.0313 0.0064 -0.0123 -0.0828 -0.0819 
Inventories (-0.387) (-0.555) (0.120) (-0.174) (-0.863) (-0.719) 
Durable Goods 0.0866 0.1460 0.3593*** 0.5478*** 0.6968*** 0.7220*** 
Orders (1.598) (1.451) (3.178) (3.562) (3.629) (2.926) 
Factory Orders -0.0076 0.0384 0.0568 0.0732 0.0235 -0.0357 
  (-0.145) (0.623) (0.776) (0.881) (0.197) (-0.255) 
Retail Sales 0.0898 0.1591** 0.2073** 0.3173** 0.4630*** 0.5673*** 
  (1.451) (1.987) (2.131) (2.524) (2.967) (2.948) 
T
ra
d
e 
&
 
B
u
d
g
et
 Trade Balance 0.0484 0.1034 0.1792** 0.1929** 0.1852* 0.1222 
  (1.171) (1.474) (1.994) (1.962) (1.718) (0.923) 
Treasury Budget -0.0523 -0.0726* 0.0045 -0.0506 -0.0753 -0.0334 
  (-1.241) (-1.722) (0.090) (-0.763) (-0.914) (-0.351) 
  Constant -0.0024 -0.0073 0.0019 0.0290 0.0321 0.0015 
  (-0.142) (-0.309) (0.064) (0.819) (0.773) (0.032) 
  Observations 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 
  F value 1.931*** 3.878*** 6.640*** 9.576*** 7.022*** 5.082*** 
  Adjusted R2 1.57% 4.71% 8.83% 12.83% 9.37% 6.55% 
 
Table A.3 shows the results of the federal funds futures regression in equation (4.2) for the 
entire sample (2003 to 2011). The analysis uses synthetic time series with constant maturi-
ty of 1 to 6 months. Heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics are depicted in parentheses. ***, 
**, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table A.4: Macroeconomic announcement effects on federal funds futures in the pre-
crisis period 
    
(1) 
1 month 
(2) 
2 months 
(3) 
3 months 
(4) 
4 months 
(5) 
5 months 
(6) 
6 months 
G
D
P
 
GDP preliminary -0.0139 0.0233 0.2107 0.2512 0.1316 0.1208 
  (-0.153) (0.214) (0.926) (0.681) (0.281) (0.185) 
GDP advanced 0.2051 0.3351 0.7363** 0.9384** 0.9417** 0.5109*** 
  (1.022) (1.231) (2.482) (2.530) (2.333) (2.646) 
GDP final -0.2268*** -0.2979 -0.5346* -0.1257 0.0439 -0.4119 
  (-2.830) (-1.626) (-1.827) (-0.519) (0.159) (-1.037) 
T
ra
d
e 
&
  
C
o
n
su
m
er
s 
Current Account -1.1126*** -0.7619* -0.4756 -0.8203 -1.3348 -1.1017 
  (-3.365) (-1.666) (-0.722) (-0.720) (-0.809) (-0.727) 
Personal -0.0266 -0.0415 -0.0090 0.2529 -0.0444 -0.0012 
Consumption (-0.961) (-0.797) (-0.078) (0.815) (-0.257) (-0.006) 
Personal Income 0.1635*** 0.0935 0.3712* -0.0369 0.1862 0.4255 
  (4.082) (1.101) (1.768) (-0.140) (0.876) (1.150) 
L
a
b
o
r 
 
M
a
rk
et
s Civilian Unem- 0.9186* 1.6734*** 2.8691*** 3.5768*** 3.3120*** 3.2008*** 
 ployment (1.701) (2.701) (4.653) (5.439) (3.787) (2.751) 
Non-farm Payrolls 0.5515** 1.5719*** 2.8654*** 4.2719*** 3.5079*** 2.4708*** 
  (2.255) (4.543) (5.986) (8.679) (3.943) (3.433) 
In
fl
a
ti
o
n
 CPI -0.0319 0.0190 0.0546 0.0535 0.0377 0.0856 
  (-0.736) (0.199) (0.421) (0.325) (0.227) (0.401) 
PPI 0.0502 0.0525 0.1193 0.1783 0.2921 0.2947 
  (1.135) (0.672) (0.899) (1.063) (1.309) (1.033) 
P
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y
 
Productivity -0.0165 -0.1692*** -0.0725 -0.231*** -0.2642 -0.3171** 
preliminary (-0.137) (-3.517) (-0.933) (-3.388) (-1.446) (-2.287) 
Productivity -0.2638 -0.3996** -0.3012 -0.4637 -0.8381 -1.2447** 
revised (-1.24) (-2.208) (-0.932) (-1.113) (-1.628) (-2.039) 
S
en
ti
m
en
t 
 
In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 
Consumer -0.0231 0.0725 -0.0692 0.1913 0.3491 0.3814 
Confidence (-0.510) (1.109) (-0.343) (1.292) (1.402) (1.340) 
Index of Leading  -0.0329 -0.0435 0.0470 0.0755 -0.0339 -0.2074 
Indicators (-0.766) (-0.898) (0.569) (0.627) (-0.194) (-0.622) 
Chicago PMI -0.0031 0.1948*** 0.3163** 0.5292*** 0.4606*** 0.5386 
  (-0.078) (2.613) (2.031) (4.012) (2.75) (1.5250) 
F
ed
er
a
l 
R
es
er
v
e Consumer Credit 0.0303 0.0157 0.0560 0.0244 0.0070 0.0256 
  (0.652) (0.354) (0.983) (0.340) (0.079) (0.267) 
Capacity 0.0092 0.0204 0.0689 0.1394 0.2378 0.1976 
Utilization (0.21) (0.242) (0.523) (0.690) (0.762) (0.625) 
Industrial 0.0299 0.0586 0.0125 0.1009 0.2267 0.2576 
Production (0.512) (0.649) (0.083) (0.480) (0.765) (0.923) 
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(Table A.4 continued) 
H
o
u
si
n
g
 
Existing Home 0.0491 0.1587** -0.3039 0.348** 0.6339*** 0.4499* 
Sales (0.963) (2.576) (-0.674) (2.046) (2.632) (1.874) 
New Home Sales 0.0253 0.0594** 0.1598** 0.2329*** 0.2330 0.1571 
  (0.799) (2.019) (2.386) (3.028) (1.147) (0.957) 
Housing Starts -0.0371 -0.0365 -0.0207 -0.0190 0.0613 0.0444 
  (-1.125) (-0.907) (-0.335) (-0.199) (0.585) (0.377) 
Construction 0.0721 0.0418 0.1350 0.0383 0.3653 0.3421 
Spending (1.054) (0.336) (0.537) (0.127) (0.630) (0.428) 
O
rd
er
s 
&
 S
a
le
s 
Business -0.0076 0.0362 0.1081 -0.0030 -0.1500 -0.0560 
Inventories (-0.211) (0.474) (0.998) (-0.018) (-0.657) (-0.205) 
Durable Goods 0.0577 0.0449 0.277*** 0.3439*** 0.5257*** 0.6009** 
Orders (1.429) (0.701) (3.049) (2.747) (3.011) (2.077) 
Factory Orders 0.0102 0.0975** 0.1105 0.0912 0.0117 -0.1431 
  (0.355) (2.177) (1.621) (1.006) (0.069) (-0.972) 
Retail Sales -0.0268 0.0398 0.1399 0.4098** 0.6848*** 0.6673*** 
  (-0.569) (0.478) (1.232) (2.531) (2.857) (2.703) 
T
ra
d
e 
&
 
B
u
d
g
et
 Trade Balance 0.0266 0.0662 0.1474** 0.1851* 0.1236 0.0360 
  (0.808) (1.411) (2.068) (1.948) (1.056) (0.206) 
Treasury Budget -0.0306 -0.0283 0.0481 0.0669 0.1360 0.3482 
  (-0.636) (-0.255) (0.248) (0.238) (0.415) (1.326) 
  Constant -0.0065 -0.0243 -0.0195 -0.0065 -0.0224 -0.0448 
  (-0.415) (-1.023) (-0.492) (-0.127) (-0.362) (-0.663) 
  Observations 700 700 700 700 700 700 
  F value 3.903*** 7.531*** 10.508*** 11.898*** 5.721*** 3.21*** 
  Adjusted R2 10.42% 20.74% 27.58% 30.39% 15.90% 8.13% 
 
Table A.4 shows the results of the federal funds futures regression in equation (4.2) for the 
subsample period 2003 to 2006. The analysis uses synthetic time series with constant ma-
turity of 1 to 6 months. Heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics are depicted in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  
Appendix 
151 
 
Table A.5: Macroeconomic announcement effects on federal funds futures in the cri-
sis and ZLB period 
    
(1) 
1 month 
(2) 
2 months 
(3) 
3 months 
(4) 
4 months 
(5) 
5 months 
(6) 
6 months 
G
D
P
 
GDP preliminary 0.1079 0.0728 0.1201 0.0281 0.1842 0.1559 
  (0.937) (0.469) (0.878) (0.222) (1.444) (1.073) 
GDP advanced 0.0461 0.1097 0.1411 0.0408 -0.0396 0.2804 
  (0.63) (1.015) (0.905) (0.2830) (-0.293) (1.238) 
GDP final 0.0891 0.1096 0.0538 0.2077** 0.1648 0.1587 
  (0.6170) (0.741) (0.892) (2.343) (1.198) (0.605) 
T
ra
d
e 
&
  
C
o
n
su
m
er
s 
Current Account 0.3200 1.0907 0.6174 0.2506 1.5419 4.6159 
  (0.298) (0.781) (0.356) (0.115) (0.671) (1.296) 
Personal 0.0173 0.0696 0.0413 0.1084 0.0042 -0.2401 
Consumption (0.285) (0.928) (0.514) (0.788) (0.026) (-0.798) 
Personal Income -0.0176 -0.1056 -0.1317 -0.1591 -0.0920 -0.1605 
  (-0.308) (-1.167) (-0.898) (-1.061) (-0.590) (-0.600) 
L
a
b
o
r 
M
a
rk
et
s Civilian Unem- 0.2221** 0.2280 0.2226 0.4087* 0.5901* 0.6025* 
 ployment (2.009) (1.452) (1.282) (1.715) (1.916) (1.759) 
Non-farm Payrolls 0.6061* 0.9453** 1.3796** 1.7007*** 2.0270*** 2.3516*** 
  (1.760) (1.974) (2.507) (2.667) (2.879) (2.932) 
In
fl
a
ti
o
n
 CPI 0.0105 0.1380 0.3331 0.3192 0.2998 0.4376 
  (0.077) (0.673) (1.044) (0.993) (0.934) (1.264) 
PPI 0.0259 0.1195 0.2111 0.1958 0.2580 0.3766 
  (0.341) (0.978) (1.300) (0.937) (1.075) (1.094) 
P
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y
 
Productivity 0.0104 0.0387 -0.0023 -0.0803 -0.1021 0.0195 
preliminary (0.155) (0.315) (-0.018) (-0.811) (-0.890) (0.185) 
Productivity 0.1160 0.1377 0.1780 0.2286 0.2214 0.0743 
revised (0.919) (0.875) (0.917) (1.264) (1.016) (0.364) 
S
en
ti
m
en
t 
 
In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 
Consumer 0.2349 0.4436* 0.3954* 0.4584* 0.5481** 0.5081* 
Confidence (1.293) (1.832) (1.770) (1.847) (2.059) (1.720) 
Index of Leading  -0.0056 0.0108 0.0360 0.0280 0.0187 -0.0127 
Indicators (-0.322) (0.438) (0.986) (0.610) (0.322) (-0.179) 
Chicago PMI 0.1768* 0.1412 0.1267 0.2232 0.3458** 0.2995* 
  (1.766) (1.413) (1.061) (1.585) (1.99) (1.773) 
F
ed
er
a
l 
R
es
er
v
e Consumer Credit 0.0261 0.0770 0.0780 0.0284 0.0965 0.0687 
  (0.461) (0.565) (0.466) (0.143) (0.485) (0.456) 
Capacity 0.1241 0.0997 0.2057 0.2857 0.3342 0.3481 
Utilization (0.920) (0.464) (0.944) (1.299) (1.464) (1.472) 
Industrial -0.1607 -0.0955 -0.0793 -0.0271 0.0530 0.1573 
Production (-1.485) (-0.557) (-0.396) (-0.118) (0.196) (0.552) 
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(Table A.5 continued) 
H
o
u
si
n
g
 
Existing Home 0.0105 0.0098 0.0545 0.1745** 0.3187** 0.4831** 
Sales (0.236) (0.19) (1.019) (2.181) (2.422) (2.434) 
New Home Sales -0.0413 -0.0342 0.0111 0.1240 0.1493 0.1628 
  (-0.849) (-0.336) (0.114) (1.006) (0.635) (0.550) 
Housing Starts 0.2768 0.3240 0.3617 0.4263 0.3130 0.0399 
  (1.323) (1.066) (0.985) (1.063) (0.883) (0.130) 
Construction -0.1063 -0.0557 -0.2239 -0.1010 -0.1672 -0.1119 
Spending (-1.295) (-0.372) (-1.313) (-0.548) (-0.935) (-0.540) 
O
rd
er
s 
&
 S
a
le
s 
Business -0.0167 -0.0508 -0.0245 -0.0158 -0.0617 -0.0867 
Inventories (-0.335) (-0.650) (-0.334) (-0.201) (-0.645) (-0.687) 
Durable Goods 0.1195 0.2807 0.4644** 0.8465*** 0.9354** 0.8858** 
Orders (1.005) (1.282) (1.978) (2.938) (2.558) (2.164) 
Factory Orders -0.0174 0.0097 0.0343 0.0745 0.0392 0.0420 
  (-0.213) (0.105) (0.324) (0.611) (0.238) (0.197) 
Retail Sales 0.1557 0.218* 0.2327* 0.2684 0.3602** 0.5224** 
  (1.590) (1.788) (1.647) (1.608) (1.991) (2.099) 
T
ra
d
e 
&
 
B
u
d
g
et
 Trade Balance 0.0609 0.1227 0.1950 0.1933 0.2154 0.1678 
  (0.947) (1.102) (1.393) (1.318) (1.335) (0.891) 
Treasury Budget -0.0552 -0.0783* -0.0009 -0.0661 -0.1035 -0.0863 
  (-1.163) (-1.723) (-0.019) (-1.030) (-1.278) (-0.894) 
  Constant -0.0009 -0.0022 0.0109 0.0453 0.0611 0.0204 
  (-0.032) (-0.061) (0.261) (0.949) (1.126) (0.341) 
  Observations 932 932 932 932 932 932 
  F value 1.148 1.445* 2.043*** 2.547*** 2.871*** 3.080*** 
  Adjusted R2 0.44% 1.32% 3.04% 4.45% 5.33% 5.89% 
 
Table A.5 shows the results of the federal funds futures regression in equation (4.2) for the 
subsample period 2007 to 2011. The analysis uses synthetic time series with constant ma-
turity of 1 to 6 months. Heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics are depicted in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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A5. The impact of cumulative employment and inflation information on 
the target rate probability 
In order to verify the probability estimates and to rule out sample-specific distortions, the 
actually chosen probability p
A
 is regressed on the cumulative number of employment re-
port announcements, CPI announcements, and the number of remaining days until the up-
coming FOMC meeting. The panel regression using fixed effects is the following: 
    
                 
              
                  (A.5) 
 
pf,t is the probability estimate of the actually chosen target rate as of day t for FOMC meet-
ing f. Af,t denotes the cumulative number of employment report announcements or inflation 
announcements, respectively. Dayst represents the number of days remaining until the next 
FOMC meeting takes place. The regression is thus similar to that of Carlson et al. (2005). 
Likewise, inflation and employment announcements are statistically significant in model 
(1) and (2). The results in model (3) differ considerably which could be due to the financial 
crisis and the approach of the zero lower bound. Apparently, the results in the entire sam-
ple are driven by the period prior to the financial crisis. 
Table A.6: The impact of cumulative information on option implied probabilities 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Entire sample 2003-2006 2007-2011 
Non-farm Payroll & Civilian  0.0151* 0.0212** -0.0097 
Unemployment announcements (1.771) (2.202) (-0.604) 
CPI announcements 0.0291*** 0.0271*** 0.0191 
  (3.340) (2.725) (1.206) 
Days until next FOMC -0.0013*** -0.0021*** -0.0009 
  (-2.994) (-3.805) (-1.295) 
Constant 0.8490*** 0.8720*** 0.8460*** 
  (44.06) (35.13) (29.70) 
Observations 974 614 360 
Adjusted R
2
 14.46% 32.62% -3.71% 
Number of FOMC meetings 45 22 24 
FOMC FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table A.6 shows the results of the panel regression with fixed effects in equation (A.5).  
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Model (1) uses the data of the entire sample, i.e. 
Appendix 
154 
 
2003-2011. For the other two models the sample is split into the periods 2003-2006 (model 
(2)) and 2007-2011 (model (3)). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
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